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ABSTRACT 
 
Carrie R. Matthews: Articulations of Anarchist Modernism: Putting Art to Work 
(Under the direction of John McGowan and Eric Downing) 
 
 
This dissertation connects literary modernism’s treatment of time to the historical and 
theoretical framework of anarchism. I show that anarchism’s identification of time as a 
political problem informs modernist experimentation with temporality and that we should 
look to literary texts’ conceptualizations of time to understand the relations of modernist 
genres like the prose poem and avant-garde manifesto to political concerns. By situating the 
work of Charles Baudelaire, Gertrude Stein and Tristan Tzara in juxtaposition to André 
Breton’s surrealism and in a historical context that has been largely obscured, I am able to 
delineate an anarchist modernist poetics.  This anarchist modernism proposes a specific kind 
of work for the artwork that counters three conceptions of literary modernism: as uncritically 
embracing newness and novelty; as indicative of a division between art and life; and as 
concerned with the individual genius over and above collectives.  
My project reads literary modernism’s appropriation of the manifesto and 
development of the prose poem as formal experimentation yoked to inherently political 
sensibilities. As modernist genres, both the prose poem and manifesto look back to 
nineteenth-century Paris and a historical context of failed revolution in important ways. Yet  
while scholars routinely hear echoes of the 1848 Communist Manifesto in aesthetic 
manifestos’ call for revolution, few discern the complementarity between the Baudelairean 
prose poem and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s anarchist analysis of 1848. 
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My work argues that as genres, prose poems and manifestos come apart at the seams, 
even bleeding into one another. Yet as two ideal types of literary modernism’s attitude 
towards time, prose poems and manifestos offer a historically viable and theoretically useful 
way to clarify two very different politics of time, one of which-- the anarchist modernist 
retemporalization of form found in Baudelaire, Stein, and Tzara--  has not been widely 
explored. My contribution to this area of scholarship is to offer a counterpoint to neo-Marxist 
readings that privilege the genre of the manifesto, futurity, and international revolution 
through a perspective that prioritizes the prose poem, artworks that work with and in the 
present, and a transnational task of re-infusing temporality with difference.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Prose Poems’ and Manifestos’ Politics of Time 
  
This study takes two assumptions for granted, one about politics, the other about art: 
that “all politics… centrally involve[s] struggles over the experience of time”1 and that 
aesthetic endeavor can furnish us different experiences of time, can alter our temporality or 
time-sense. To a large degree, the time of modernism/modernity has been evaluated by 
literary critics and theorists as something to escape, to somehow get outside of, or to get on 
the right side of. As collective signifiers for a variety of artistic movements, the terms 
“modernism” and “avant-garde” use temporal categories to organize our perception of 
artworks during a particular (if contested) period. The choice of terms is symptomatic of a 
historical impasse, the question of whether moderns’ time-sense emphasized the hellish 
repetition of the new or imminent revolution. Yet how does one escape time, being stuck in 
the modern or constantly worried about being on the right side of it, as with the avant-garde? 
Following the work of Peter Osborne, Andrew Benjamin, and David Cunningham, 
among others, I try to articulate another option within modernism, a project not of escape or 
revolution but of retemporalization, of an art that redisposes of time, altering our relations to 
it and within it. As Osborne and Benjamin point out, the “horizon of expectation” possible at 
a given time has a political valence, as does the doxical character of time during a period 
moment. Benjamin states starkly, with another Benjamin in mind, “This positioning of time 
[“the premise that historical time is inherently chronological and reciprocally that chronology 
                                                 
1
 Peter Osborne, Politics of Time: Modernity and the Avant-Garde (London: Verso, 1995), 200. 
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is the temporality proper to the unfolding of history”] is in the service of one political 
position rather than another.”2 My study grows out of an interest in the ways art might re-
shape our experience of time and specifically in how particular political sensibilities 
animated literary modernism’s formal innovations. What work can an artwork perform to 
alter a period’s temporality? In the case of mid-nineteenth-century Paris, and through 
transatlantic modernism at the end of two world wars, what temporalities did artists confront, 
and how, beyond withdrawal and attempted revolution, did they seek to engage and alter 
them?  
I investigate texts and writers at the heart of even the narrowest of transatlantic 
canons to suggest that the politics of time at issue in their texts trouble common 
characterizations informing our critical apprehensions of the field(s) of modernism and the 
avant-garde. My readings of Baudelaire, Gertrude Stein, Dada, and Surrealism not only 
displace the long-problematic oppositions between new and old, individual genius and the 
urban masses, and aesthetic and political production, they demonstrate each pair’s conceptual 
or processual interrelation within texts. Stereotypes of modernist temporalities emphasize 
extremes, a rush to the new and revolution, or a hermetic retreat into aestheticism, or a futile 
longing for a lost past, Eliot’s fragments shored against ruins. Thus, in terms of literary form, 
modernist studies frequently coalesce around the avant-garde manifesto, the escapist pastiche 
(Pound) or pure formalism of lyric, often analyzing texts in conjunction with political turns 
to Marxism or fascism. These stereotypes elide much temporal complexity, the 
interpenetration of concerns about form, history, and experience, and give rise alternately to a 
murky continuum or overdrawn distinction between the realms of modernism and the avant-
garde. 
                                                 
2
 Andrew Benjamin, Style and Time (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2006), x. 
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 I argue that we can gain a clearer appreciation of the character of much modernist 
and avant-garde literary experimentation if we replace the foci of formal innovation, 
historical character, and/or everyday experience with their imbrication in a politics of time. 
In this view, genres such as the prose poem (with its oscillations of form, new juxtaposition 
of pre-existing genres, and engagement with readers in a dialectic of familiarity and 
alienation) engender a richer temporality than manifestos, pastiches, or pure lyric. Most 
significantly, we make these texts’ politics of time more readily available for our own 
appropriation as well as identify a signal theoretical contribution of modernism and the 
avant-garde if we abandon the distinction between the two fields in favor of a political 
sensibility that bridges them: anarchism. 
 As a historical phenomenon, anarchism’s origins in the 1840s antedate conventional 
periodizations of modernism and the avant-garde, and not without justification, the anarchist 
imaginary has been linked to nostalgia, for example to images of the medieval commune, not 
to “the new.” Theoretically, one of anarchism’s key departures from Marxism, “the other 
(French) socialism,” is its insistence on grassroots, bottom-up action and disavowal of 
vanguardism. These anarchist modernist paradoxes actually clarify the politics of time I 
locate within key modernist texts by alluding to two important consequences: the 
questioning, loosening and even undermining of historical periodization, and a replacement 
of teleological trajectories (advanced by the avant-garde/vanguard) through a project of 
retemporalization. This retemporalization seeks future collective reinscription within a 
dynamic polity through the reactivation of unfilled past tasks and unrealized trajectories 
within a prolonged present duration of repetition. I follow David Cunningham in conceiving 
the avant-garde not as “a conventionally received art- [or literary-] historical category, but 
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rather as a general concept through which particular movements or works articulate 
themselves or come to be articulated in a way that is inseparable from more general questions 
concerning the nature of historical time (including the time of art and literary history).”3 Yet 
Bürger’s delineation of a historical avant-garde provides an important backdrop for my 
study, since part of my interest in conjoining anarchism and modernists’ exploration of 
temporality stems from a sense of a historical convergence, a false but productive repetition 
of these writers’ concerns and our own, a sense that “the more things change, the more they 
stay the same.” 
 This question about literary modernists’ strategies of temporal engagement matters 
because the modernism/modernity problem remains before us and more intractable than ever. 
Fredric Jameson provides one illustration of how we might conceive of this convergence or a 
present return of a historically modernist/avant-garde problematic in an argument for a social 
temporal problematic as a constitutive condition of contemporary (twenty-first century) art.4  
Postmodern artists, he claims, are linked not by a “period style” but in their confrontation 
with an “end of temporality,” “a dramatic and alarming shrinkage of existential time and the 
reduction to a present that hardly qualifies as such any longer, given the virtual effacement of 
that past and future that can alone define a present in the first place” (708). In contrast, 
modernists provided a “comparatist perception of the two socioeconomic temporalities” of 
their experience (699). When the premodern is effaced and supplanted, we lose “the very 
sense of an alternate temporality.”   
                                                 
3
 David Cunningham, “The Futures of Surrealism, Hegelianism, Romanticism, and the Avant-Garde,” 
SubStance 107, 34.2: 49. Also see Cunningham’s “Making an Example of Duchamp: history, theory, and the 
question of the avant-garde” in Dafydd Jones, ed., Dada Culture: Critical Texts of the Avant-Garde (New York: 
Rodopi, 2006), 254-279. 
 
4
 Fredric Jameson, “The End of Temporality,” Critical Inquiry 29.4 (Summer 2003), 695-718.    
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 I look to modernist experimentation with form to resurrect possibilities of an alternate 
temporality. While some modernist movements fell prey to a “politics of conflicting 
temporalities,”5 as did surrealism, I contend that some modernist experimentation with form 
sought to create a different temporality. This experimentation involved more than critique of 
a historical experience of temporality or its retrospective diagnosis via an “after-image of 
praxis”: it attempted to intervene in the production of temporality itself. I read debates over 
the role of art, value of autonomous art, and relation of art to the political sphere as 
arguments about the time character proper to change. 
 
Anarchism, Art, and Time 
It has long been noted that a desired complicity in political and social change 
characterizes much art situated within modernist and the avant-garde taxonomies. I argue that 
we can trace at least one kind of complicity to the founding of anarchism with Proudhon and 
the advent of modernity with Baudelaire in nineteenth-century Paris.6  While some 
chronologies of anarchism begin with British “proto-anarchists” such as William Godwin or 
French forerunners Saint-Simon and Fourier, anarchism is first invoked in a positive sense by 
Proudhon in 1840 in What is Property?.  Anarchism enters French history at a moment when 
industrial capitalism is rapidly becoming the norm (although belatedly, compared to 
England) and during which France is still grappling with the political consequences of 1789 
and the juxtaposition of being in many ways relatively politically avant-garde and socio-
                                                 
5
 Cunningham, “The Futures of Surrealism,” 50. 
 
6
 In relation to political and social transformation in an anarchist context, it makes little sense to try to 
separate out the avant-garde from modernism. As I noted earlier, unlike Marxism anarchism did not place its 
faith in a vanguard, and Baudelaire recorded in Les Fusées his disdain for the notion of an avant-garde as a 
small group who goes first in order to force everyone else to conform and follow. 
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economically retarded. The history of anarchism, like that of Marxism, is the history of an 
attempt to redress the greatest perceived ills of modern life in an industrial, capitalist nation 
state.7 
Anarchism, Marxism and, slightly later, fascism, each originated in important ways in 
nineteenth-century France. While anarchism and Marxism initially developed in tandem to 
address “the social problem” and crystallized around the failed revolutions of 1848, they 
differed even then in important ways. Anarchism, especially in the figures of Proudhon and 
Bakunin, critiqued Marx for underestimating the role of political coercion and according 
economics causal primacy for widespread inequity. Anarchists found Marxism insufficiently 
attentive to the individual; Richard Sonn, referencing a critique by Murray Bookchin, 
summarizes: “Marxism was devoted to objectifying and dominating the masses, anarchism to 
liberating the subjective individual” (109). Fascist ideology appeared in France as “a 
synthesis of organic nationalism [and an] antimaterialist revision of Marxism” whose 
conceptual framework was “nonconformist, avant-garde, and revolutionary in character.”8  
Fascism’s “communal, anti-individualistic, and antirationalistic” character reflected “the 
great discovery Sorel made: The masses need myths in order to go forward. It is sentiments, 
images and symbols that hurl individuals into action, not reasonings” (28).  
                                                 
7
 As historian David Berry explains, “Anarchism first appeared in France as a distinct ideology in a 
period characterized by the development of industrial capitalism. From 1815 on, and especially after the July 
revolution of 1830, the new industrial technology and the free market economy began to establish themselves. 
The results were rapid urbanization and immigration into the towns from the countryside, social dislocation, and 
the birth of a factory proletariat, the gradual decline of the artisanat. It was amongst the latter, during the years 
after 1830, that the origins of a working-class consciousness can be located.” David Berry, A History of the 
French Anarchist Movement, 1917-1945 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002), 10. See also John 
Ehrenberg, Proudhon and His Age (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996); and Richard D. 
Sonn, Anarchism (New York: Tawyne, 1992). 
 
8
 See Ze’ev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution. 
Trans. David Maisel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1994), 4, 6. 
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I want to claim two chief points of difference with respect to both Marxism and 
fascism: (1) anarchism critiques each one’s regard for individuals, Marxism as insufficiently 
attentive to the individual, failing to differentiate sufficiently within the mass, and 
centralizing, statist in its incarnations so far; and fascism as anti-individualist and nationalist; 
and (2) anarchism is more critical of revolution, or at least conceives of revolution 
differently, in terms of transformation and embodiment, becoming, not temporally-
contracted, teleological change; non-directive.9 
A chief characteristic separating anarchism from Marxism is a suspicion of fixed 
categories and modes of exclusion, of borders, both literal (as in the nation state) and 
figurative. Unlike communism, at least in its expression through states up to our present 
moment, anarchism avoids centralization, either in a state government or imagined 
international collective, focusing instead on individual and local autonomy with transnational 
and federalist linkages. And in lieu of advocating an expected unfolding of a particular 
historical trajectory, anarchists eschew grand teleological visions: they advocate situated 
practice in the here and now over and under future ends. But this thumbnail typology misses 
the many points at which anarchism and Marxism, if not statist communism, converge 
historically and practically. For example, as Richard Sonn observes in analyzing May of ’68 
in Paris, “If the difference between Marxists and anarchists was that the former sought 
freedom through equality and the latter sought equality through freedom, then this neo-
Marxism of the New Left seemed closer to the latter. For all of the dispossessed and 
                                                 
9
 One could argue that some anarchists’ recourse to violence, especially in advocating ‘propaganda by 
the deed’ in the late nineteenth-century, falls on the side of violent revolution. I don’t address this, and my basic 
arguments for skipping over it are that it was always a minoritarian strain within anarchism and that it does not 
characterize the anarchist modernism I seek to delineate. 
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alienated groups demanding social change, the clarion call was “Freedom now!” 10 
Anarchism has been attracted to persons, concepts and practices that upset categorization, 
from the lumpenproletariat to, I contend, the prose poem, and vice versa. Though given to 
moral justification and an adherent to certain positions perceived as exceptionally 
conservative or reactionary now and during his own time,11 Proudhon affirms a commitment 
to open-ended practice and debate over doctrine, famously writing in a letter to Marx that 
they must at all costs not replace religion with their own dogma and should debate 
unendingly any claim they are tempted to adopt as belief. I read Proudhon as a figure who 
advocates radical change but who is also reluctant to promote the absolute rupture of 
revolution and claims for a utopia.  
Proudhon’s overarching aim is to reinstate (in the absence of a state) society, 
conceived from his position as a member of the constantly imperiled petit bourgeois class, as 
a collective of freely associating small-property owners.  In Proudhon’s assessment the 
revolution of 1848 sought to end “by and through” democracy “a monstruous abnormality,” 
the state’s usurpation of the country or nation. The constellation of terms Proudhon invokes 
throughout his promotion of anarchy in the aftermath of 1848—either positively, as in 
“society” and “democracy,” or critically, as in “simplification” and “centralization”—
promotes a pluralism Proudhon’s anarchism sought to secure in practice even as Proudhon 
himself envisioned a very particular kind of society. Arguably, Proudhon’s espousal of 
                                                 
10
 Sonn, Anarchism, 105. 
11
 Proudhon’s dedication to a restrictive notion of family and reactionary attitudes towards women are 
well-documented. See, for example, John Ehrenberg’s intellectual biography Proudhon and His Age (Atlantic 
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996). 
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anarchism safeguards against the hegemony of a single vision for a given society’s character 
by substituting continuous, inclusive debate for commitment to any specific ends.12 
Anarchism can be defined loosely as an attitude towards power and ethos of practice. 
Because anarchism is generally hostile to theoretical orthodoxy and centralization, much of 
its theoretical content is subsumed by specific and variable instances of practice. As Richard 
Sonn generalizes, anarchism is “more an attitude toward power, a way of conducting one’s 
daily life, than… an application of theory.”13 This attitude has generally translated into a 
preference for specific embodiment over representation, valorizing the individual person, 
particular object, and singular event, situated (but not frozen!) in their spatio-temporal 
contexts, over their appropriation into categories, typologies, or other groupings that 
emphasize similarity and conformity and facilitate hierarchy. Anarchism seeks to preserve 
instantiations of difference in fields of relation free of domination.  It engages complexity, in 
all its messiness, and warns against the simplifications and substitutions of abstraction. 
Anarchism and art join forces in anarchist modernism through a desire for 
embodiment that temporalizes form. The works of art I discuss in chapters one, two and three 
perform anarchist revolution, which, unlike most conceptualizations of revolution, is not 
temporally contracted, teleological or inherently violent. In characterizing anarchism by way 
of contrast to Marxism, David Graeber asserts: “Marxism has tended to be a theoretical or 
analytical discourse about revolutionary strategy,” while “Anarchism has tended to be an 
                                                 
12
 Daniel Guérin locates an overlapping diversity of theoretical frameworks and practical applications 
in our inheritance from Proudhon, crediting him as “the father of ‘scientific socialism,’ of socialist political 
economy and of modern sociology, the father of anarchism, of mutualism, of revolutionary syndicalism, of 
federalism and of that particular form of collectivism that has recaptured a fresh relevance today as ‘self-
management.’” Richard Sonn notes anarchism’s internal diversity throughout its history “among advocates of 
individualist, mutualist, communist, and syndicalist approaches.”  See Daniel Guérin, No Gods No Masters: An 
Anthology of Anarchism (Trans. Paul Sharkey, Oakland, California: AK Press, 2005), 39 and Sonn, Anarchism, 
45.  
 
13
 Sonn, Anarchism, 46. 
  
10 
ethical discourse about revolutionary practice.”14 Graeber asserts that anarchism needs “what 
might be called Low Theory: a way of grappling with those real, immediate questions that 
emerge from a transformative project” (9), and that such a theory would need to include two 
assumptions, that it would be both feasible and desirable to create a world without 
institutions “like the state, capitalism, racism and male dominance” and that the creation of 
such a world would not involve leadership by some vanguard (11).15 Given these 
assumptions, anarchism needs a sort of ‘High Practice’ at least as much as a ‘Low Theory,’ a 
means of imagining this better world and of provoking movement towards it without giving 
over leadership to a particular group. This is where art comes in. 
 Anarchism requires a process in accordance with its aspirations to overturn hierarchy, 
inequity and other forms of domination, a means of embodying unending, peaceful 
revolution: literally, a way of getting people to “live the revolution.” As Cornelius 
Castoriadis has argued, a society without domination demands a polis that recognizes the 
interdependence of individual liberty and collective freedom. Castoriadis envisions such a 
polis occurring through a process of “social self-institution” in which individuals “institute” 
themselves into a collectivity in which each participates equally and which, collectively, has 
the freedom to determine its own character. Such a project necessitates what Paul Patton, 
assessing Deleuze’s political thought, terms “critical freedom,” which is attendant on “the 
conditions of change or transformation in the subject,” the “freedom to transgress limits of 
what one is presently capable of being or doing” and which maintains “indifference to the 
individual or collective nature of the subject” (83). Art provokes this critical freedom. 
                                                 
14
 David Graeber. Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 
6. 
 
15
 Ibid, 9, 11. 
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Art does this in a particular way. It is not a matter of Peter Bürger’s avant-garde 
challenging “the distribution apparatus on which the work of art depends,” nor, exactly, “the 
status of art in bourgeois society as defined by the concept of autonomy.” It is a question, 
rather, of what Krzysztof Ziarek calls “forcework,” of approaching art not in terms of its 
formal qualities or as commodity (though it remains that), but of encountering artworks non-
aesthetically, so as to allow them to work. In The Force of Art, Ziarek characterizes avant-
garde art as performing a particular kind of transformative work, “forcework.”16 In Ziarek’s 
conception an artwork functions as a force field that strips social relations of power and 
redeploys them in a different modality, freeing them “into a becoming, which is apart from 
the habitual relations of representation, action, and knowledge that form and regulate social 
praxis” (12). Art’s force field of non-power opens up a different kind of relationality, 
orienting forces towards freedom rather than subordinating them to power, such that “art can 
be said to instantiate not only an alternative politics but an alternative to politics” (14). Yet 
art’s efficacy as an alternative depends on “a specific kind of reception, when the artwork is 
encountered as a work, that is, nonaesthetically” (28).  And to impact life and resist co-
optation by power, art requires “a continuous reactivation of the transformative work,” an 
“ongoing reactivation [that] requires radical democratic politics” (13).  Art needs a kind of 
politics that will allow it to perform a political alternative, a politics without form—
anarchism; anarchism needs a means of discovering alternative modes of collective existence 
apart from domination, which art provides. 
                                                 
16
 Krzysztof  Ziarek, The Force of Art (Stanford, California: Stanford UP, 2004). Subsequent 
parenthetical references are to this text. I rely on Ziarek’s conception of forcework and description of its effects 
but, once again, would be more careful in attributing it exclusively to works labeled ‘avant-garde,’ since the 
term implies a vanguard, and I argue that anarchism’s disavowal of a vanguard is one reason art’s forcework is 
so important to anarchism’s aims. See n. 6 above.  
  
12 
Ziarek describes forcework in terms that make it of direct interest to anarchism, in 
relation to societal change, freedom and practice. Ziarek explains, 
Forcework could be called a power-free praxis if this were not an oxymoron. Among 
avant-garde artworks, Stein’s texts… elicit this kind of “praxis,” where textuality, 
working against linguistic, literary, and cultural conventions, reformulates the mode 
of relationality so as to give a different texture to “experience,” one fundamentally at 
odds with the constitution of reality dictated by the power-oriented social sphere. 
(148) 
 
The ways in which Stein’s writing breaks with conventions of meaning and asks its audience 
to alter their habits of reading, reconceive grammar and conceptualize reality in terms foreign 
to their experiences of it, come together as a kind of forcework that reorients readers to the 
world, changing their perceptions of the interconnectedness that constitutes a given reality.  
Ziarek insists: “In recoiling from action, artworks not only negate reality but also instantiate, 
as demonstrated by Dada art, Gertrude Stein’s works, or Wodiczko’s vehicles and 
instruments, forcework as an alternative to praxis” (147). Forcework posits “a redistribution 
of forces beyond production,” a “possibility of reassigning the momentum of relations, of 
releasing forces from the formative sway of power” (197). In reference to what I label 
anarchist modernism rather than a specific historical avant-garde or broader conceptual 
avant-garde, forcework produces a modality for reinscribing time-sense, retemporalizing. 
 
Exemplum: The Structure of Possibility 
 The first quatrain of an Emily Dickinson poem provides an apt point of departure for 
broaching this study’s conceptual center, a theorization of the modernist prose poem. The 
speaker opens the descriptive claim that constitutes the poem: 
I dwell in Possibility--  
A fairer House than Prose--  
  
13 
More numerous of Windows--  
Superior--for Doors— 
 
Dickinson conceives of “Possibility” and “Prose” architecturally, as houses one inhabits. The 
poem’s speaker justifies her judgment of Possibility as “A fairer House than Prose” by 
evoking both aesthetic qualities—the openness of its architecture, with “Gambrels17 of the 
Sky” (line 8) as Possibility’s roof—and functionality: the structure of Possibility allows the 
speaker the “Occupation” of “spreading wide… [her] narrow Hands /To gather Paradise” 
(lines 11-12). Form and function interpenetrate, as the “numerous” doors and windows 
facilitate the comings and goings of “the fairest” visitors (line 9) and the roof’s opening onto 
the sky permits the occupant to extend her arms toward the heavens and Paradise.  
Dickinson’s poem-claims surprises in the entities she compares and in the concrete 
character of her comparison of these abstract categories. We would expect a privileging of 
‘Possibility’ over ‘Necessity,’ ‘Potentiality,’ or ‘Impossibility,’ or a slighting of ‘Prose’ in 
favor of ‘Poetry,’ especially in a comparison articulated in a poem. On what grounds does it 
make sense to oppose Possibility and Prose?  The poem answers “architecture,” in its 
structural, aesthetic, and functional aspects, and specifically “as houses.” Through 
Dickinson’s positive evocation of the house of Possibility, we infer the less desirable 
architecture of Prose. By implication, the house of Prose is less open, possesses fewer 
windows and doors and perhaps a lower, less ethereal roof, and thus, by inference, does not 
allow the same functionality as Possibility, a reaching out “To gather paradise.” In the 
context of the traditional opposition between prose and poetry, this house of prose is 
shocking. It is poetry, not prose, that imposes architectural constraints of stanzaic structure, 
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meter and rhyme. The concreteness of Dickinson’s architectural comparison begs the 
question “Where does this house, which is ‘fairer’ than prose and thus not prose, yet which is 
too open to be poetry, exist?” 
I argue that the most sensible answer to this question is the prose poem, and that both 
the terms of Dickinson’s comparison—Possibility and Prose—and its architectural grounds 
furnish us with an important conceptual framework for approaching the modernist prose 
poem. As the fairer house in question, the prose poem possesses both the architectural form 
and functionality Dickinson ascribes to Possibility. Architecturally, the prose poem is 
constructed from already-given materials, the conventions of prose and poetry, and as a 
hybrid and variable form offers numerous means of entry and egress, many windows and 
doors.  Its inclusive nature (the freedom it offers to borrow from a grab-bag of forms and 
devices) invites “the fairest” visitors from numerous realms: narratives, fables, lyric, even 
drama. Functionally, as a place in which to dwell, the prose poem’s principal of open 
selection and combination promotes agency, the ability to “spread…wide… [one’s] narrow 
Hands” and “gather” from a cornucopia of elements as one wishes.  
Just as the speaker of Dickinson’s poem “gather[s] Paradise,” the prose poem, in 
many readings, takes on a utopian function. Jonathan Monroe describes the prose poem as “a 
critical, self-critical, utopian genre, a genre that tests the limits of genre,” and Michel 
Beaujour, borrowing from Mary Douglas’s conception of dirt’s system-revealing function, 
conceives of prose poems as a kind of dirt that affords an opportunity to study and re-
evaluate the system of genres, perhaps to re-think and renew the system. 18 Beaujour writes 
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grandly, “Anomalous and ambiguous as it is, the prose poem is the chosen ground for 
assertions concerning the supralinguistic, metatextual, and ontological status of poetic 
language: a fantasy, perhaps, of poetry as one might wish it to be.”19  Michel Delville labels 
the prose poem “a self-consciously deviant form,” and Margueritte Murphy and Richard 
Terdiman both highlight the prose poem’s actual or potential subversive nature.20  
While appreciative of the prose poem’s capacity for critique and subversion, I make 
two somewhat different claims about its chief merits: that its most salient characteristics as a 
modernist literary genre are its rejection of utopia in favor of possibility and its social 
cultivation of difference.  As a house named Possibility, the prose poem is a place in which 
to dwell. Its temporality is that of the present in process and in context, not a future (utopic) 
vision. The structure of possibility is one of manifestation, one that considers courses of 
action in view from the vantage point of the present, distinguishing it from potentiality, 
which allows for the hidden, the latent. And as Dickinson’s house of Possibility facilitates its 
inhabitant’s action of gathering her paradise, the prose poem augments individual or singular 
agency. As Caws notes, “Its defining characteristic is its own self-definition. Having no 
necessary exterior framework, no meter or essential form, it must organize itself from 
within.”21 The prose poem’s emphasis on self-determination in the present promotes 
difference—the instance of each prose poem’s unfolding— within a specifically social 
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context. I read the prose poem as a refusal of genre and simultaneous commitment to 
working within ‘the system’ or existence of genre, if not working within a genre.  As such, 
the prose poem performs a kind of social work, enacting a dialectic between individual 
agency and collective norms that enriches both and keeps both in motion 
 
Anarchist Embodiment: Prose Poems and Manifestos as Ideal Types  
 
     One can multiply endlessly the variety of approaches to the anarchist vision of a liberated 
society, but all were born of the desire to embody the principles of revolution rather than 
either theorizing or endlessly plotting one. In this sense anarchists were practical 
revolutionaries, not chiliasts awaiting the judgment day. On the other hand, their intense 
desire to ‘live the revolution’ dispersed their energies and, arguably, made it less likely that 
the revolution would ever come. (Sonn, Anarchism, 62).22  
 
I am writing this manifesto to show that you can do contrary actions together, in one single 
fresh breath; I am against action, for continual contradiction, for affirmation also, I am neither 
for nor against and I don’t explain because I hate common sense. (Tristan Tzara, Dada 
Manifesto 1918) 
 
Anarchist modernist texts focus not just on formal innovation or novelty for the sake 
of novelty but on performing a certain kind of politically useful, radical work by constructing 
a politics of time. Yet formal innovation and the obsession with novelty shape (literally) and 
inflect the texts that perform this revolutionary work. Attention to literary form provides one 
useful way to investigate ties between form and concepts of the new, on the one hand, and 
literary texts’ contribution to anarchist alteration, on the other.  
Broaching form through considerations of genre in the work of Baudelaire and Stein 
shows the importance of “the modality of relating” to the work their texts accomplish. As 
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 Critiques of anarchists’ emphasis on revolution through embodiment or enactment may stem from 
concerns about a lack of instrumentality, but they seem to rely on the illogical stance that change (in 
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Rebels, calling them “pre-political.” 
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Ziarek points out, “Art’s transformation works not on the level of objects, people, or things 
but in terms of the modality of relating, which, in the forms of perception, knowledge, acting, 
or valuing, determines the connective tissue of what we experience as reality” (28). 
“Modality” comes from modalité, which enters the French lexicon in terms of music—as 
“making use of a particular mode or modes, especially one other than the modern major or 
minor”-- in 1840, the year Proudhon first articulated anarchism positively, a decade and a 
half before Baudelaire would undertake the prose poems as a way to make writing accord 
with “the music of modern life.”23 Modality’s valences in terms of logic, sense perception 
and psychology, medicine, music, and politics suggest something of the variety of possible 
alternatives of relation art might make possible.24  
The importance of this work the prose poem performs becomes clear when we turn to 
its historical and literary historical context. Scholars generally attribute the origin of the prose 
poem to Aloysius Bertrand, who published a volume of prose poems, Gaspard de la Nuit, in 
1842.  Bertrand’s collection did not attract a wide audience, and the more significant 
instantiation of the prose poem as a modernist genre occurs in the 1850s and 60s, with 
Baudelaire’s adoption of the form. Baudelaire began the prose poems collected in Le Spleen 
de Paris, or Petits poëmes en prose, in 1855, two years before the publication of the more 
famous Les Fleurs du  mal, and the volume was published posthumously in 1869. Although 
the Symbolists, and Mallarmé in particular, wrote numerous prose poems, Baudelaire 
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arguably provides the most important precedent for modernist and avant-garde prose poems 
and offers a particularly interesting case study of prose poems as literary workhorses, as 
attempts of aesthetic endeavor to engage and alter social conditions by focusing on the 
possibilities for individual agency. Murphy makes a connection between Baudelaire’s prose 
poems and those of American Modernists, noting,  
the American avant-garde of the twentieth century felt impelled to reject the 
fin-de-siècle version of the genre, with its self-evident detachment from ‘life’, 
and reintroduce the ‘prose of the world,’ the idiolects of everyday life, as a 
part of its aesthetic, […]  This ‘new’ aesthetic or program—or revived, for it 
was present from the start in Baudelaire—was ‘successful’ in reinfusing the 
energy of living language into the prose poem. 25   
 
 As Richard Terdiman notes in his investigation of the prose poem in nineteenth-century 
France in relation to symbolic resistance, the socio-critical nature of the prose poem emerges 
much more perceptibly in Baudelaire’s work than in that of the Symbolists.  Terdiman notes 
that “tensions were more evident in the earlier incarnations of the prose poem, particularly in 
Baudelaire.  There they are often overtly represented as the stresses within the social 
formation.”26 Murphy’s emphasis on “living language” and Terdiman’s attention to the 
context of social cleavage allude to the social problem and the historical context of 1848 and 
failed revolution that, I argue, animate the prose poem as a modernist genre. 
I now turn to the simultaneous historical development of the genre of the aesthetic 
manifesto. If the prose poem emerges as a novel genre in its conjoining of two generic 
categories frequently treated as oppositional, the modernist manifesto engages issues of 
novelty and form doubly, first by injecting new content into an old form and secondly by 
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conjoining that form with another, the prose poem.27 Like the prose poem, the modernist 
manifesto emerges in Paris, first as prototype, with the Communist Manifesto in 1848, and 
secondly as type, with Marinetti’s publication of the founding manifesto of Futurism in the 
Parisian newspaper Le Figaro in 1909.28  Marx and Engels completed the foundational (for 
the modernists) Communist Manifesto in Belgium in 1848 after becoming acquainted in 
Paris, where Marx lived from 1843 until the French expelled him in 1845, on the eve of the 
revolutions. Unlike the prose poem, the manifesto screams its novelty, since the manifesto is 
an assertive, ‘strident’ genre, but like the prose poem, the manifesto also embodies, 
“embodying rather than explicating the aesthetic gesture of the new—even while exploding 
the very category of the aesthetic” (Kolocotroni xix). Janet Lyon calls the aesthetic manifesto 
“a singularly overdetermined form,”  “linking aesthetic practice with political militancy, 
modern rupture with revolutionary history, and bourgeois critique with aesthetic abstraction.” 
And finally, Martin Puchner characterizes Marinetti’s transformation of the political 
manifesto into an avant-garde aesthetic manifesto in terms of performativity caving to 
theatricality. Puchner explains: “The distinction between performativity and theatricality can 
be phrased in terms of means and end: the socialist manifesto has tended toward seeing itself 
as an instrument, as a means to an end, whereas the avant-garde manifesto had tended toward 
seeing the manifesto as an end in itself.”29  
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 May Ann Caws calls modernist and avant-garde manifestos prose poems. I think that some are and 
some aren’t.  
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 Marx and Engels completed the Communist Manifesto in Belgium, but only because of Marx’s 
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 In adopting the genre of the manifesto, art asks to be encountered as an event, as 
Ziarek argues art needs to be encountered to transform. Ziarek writes: “Since art works in the 
specific sense of being an act, an event of transformation, it should be thought of in a verbal 
fashion… as a happening, reactivated each time differently in its reception, rather than being 
seen as an object of the aesthetic and cognitive gaze” (28). As a manifesto, art asks to be 
taken as a happening, though often impatiently, preferring to usher in a real (or the actual) 
revolution. 
In her history of the genre, Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern, Janet Lyon 
links the form to post-Enlightenment, rationalist discourse and universalist notions of the 
subject.  Lyon claims: "the manifesto is the form that exposes the broken promises of 
modernity: if modern democratic forms claim to honor the sovereignty of universal political 
subjecthood, the manifesto is a testimony to the partiality of that claim.”30   In Lyon’s 
conception, the manifesto operates in paradoxical fashion, both reifying and critiquing 
modernist claims to universal political subjecthood. She attributes three generic conventions 
or "argumentative gestures" to the manifesto: (1) a concise, teleological encapsulation of 
history leading up to the current state in which the manifesto attempts to intervene; (2) a 
litany of complaints or stipulations that characterize a fight between oppressed (the 
movement behind the manifesto) and oppressive (the status quo the manifesto challenges) 
agents; and (3): rhetoric that calls out, directly challenges an oppressor, and impels the 
audience to action.31  Unlike the prose poem, the manifesto lends itself to more formulaic 
conventions. It constructs the universe in “you’re with us or against us” binaries and dodges 
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fine-grained analysis. More often than not, a revolutionary future orients its time-sense. It is 
distinctly not an architecture in which one can dwell, not a House of Possibility. 
 While the most interesting generic convention of the prose poem involves calling 
genre and generic conventions into question, the manifesto’s most significant convention 
appears as its own self-assertion in a call to rise up against the (wrongful) status quo.  As 
Caws notes, manifestos assert themselves as new and oppositional, always against 
conventional wisdom. And yet Caws also declares confidently, “The manifesto, at its height, 
is a poem in heightened prose,” a claim bolstered by Johanna Vondeling’s observation that 
some manifestos appeared in the form of prose poems, as well as in the introduction to 
collected texts of Modernist manifestos.32  Marjorie Perloff locates a prose poem at the heart 
of the foundational manifesto for modernism and the avant-garde, observing “Indeed, it is the 
curiously mixed rhetoric of the Communist Manifesto, its preamble itself something of a 
prose poem, that paved the way for the grafting of the poetic onto the political discourse that 
we find in Futurist, and later in Dada and Surrealist, manifesto.”33 No matter. As modernist 
genres, prose poems and manifestos may overlap, fall apart at the seams, or circulate within 
one another. The interest of this study is to use them as heuristics to think about two 
distinctly different politics of time instantiated in the formation and deformation of literary 
modernist works of art.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Baudelaire’s Prose Poems: From Artwork to Putting Art to Work 
 
 For anarchist modernism and, arguably, modernism more generally, Le Spleen de 
Paris, not Les Fleurs du mal, constitutes Baudelaire’s signal poetic text. Formal innovation 
unfolds almost exclusively in the prose poems, whose dynamism contrasts starkly with the 
petrified lyric of the profane Fleurs.  Le Spleen de Paris reunites the now archaic lyric poet 
with his own contemporaries, reconnecting him to the social world, albeit it critically. This 
chapter approaches Baudelaire’s prose poems as doubly volatile forms, as the means through 
which the grounded albatross-poet of the Fleurs du mal learns to walk despite his heavy 
wings and perhaps re-attains the capacity to take flight, even in the unpoetical world of 
Haussmann’s Paris; and as themselves intentionally unstable, shifting entities, changeable 
deformations. 
Baudelaire's Fleurs du mal fame has helped construct him for literary posterity in the 
figure of a rebel aesthete, concerned with drugs, prostitutes, dream-states, evil and ennui.   
Baudelaire can be read elegiacally, as a diarist of temporal and spatial dislocation, perhaps 
most famously in the allegory Benjamin analyzes in “Le Cygne.” Most frequently, he is 
taught as the poète maudit who fits lascivious content to classical alexandrines, or as the 
perpetual dandy. In Les Fleurs du mal, disjuncture manifests itself thematically, for example 
in the figures of the prostitute and lesbian, whose existence marks discrepancies between 
traditional women’s roles and those produced by the increasing commodification of Parisian 
society, and in the figure of the poet himself, the misanthropic flâneur who loathes society 
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but loves crowds. The Fleurs du mal is the text to which Benjamin refers in claiming for 
Baudelaire the status of the last widely-read lyrical poet. Benjamin captures the trace of loss 
in the volume’s success: it brings poetry to cliché.34 
Yet Baudelaire continued to write after 1857, and the prose poems offer a window 
onto a much less aestheticized Baudelaire, a poet who in many ways appears to question the 
isolation of the aesthetic from the rest of life. We see this in the poet’s preoccupation with 
material circumstances, in the connections he draws between the poet and the poor, and in his 
yoking together of contemplation and violence. Artistic and philosophical thought, which 
cannot be easily assigned a monetary value, and corporeality, usually depicted through the 
suffering of those at the bottom of the economic strata, appear time and time again in the 
prose poems as the suppressed remainders of means-end rationality and the exchange value 
economy. Most notably, the prose poems question the formation of an aesthetic realm apart 
from the rest of life by depicting moments of moral judgment artistically apprehended. 
Baudelaire provides evidence that moral evaluation requires the participation of artistic 
assessment: in the prose poems, art explicitly undertakes a kind of social work. 
It is this Baudelairean modernity that re-purposes the artwork by reformulating it in 
relation to modernist temporality. The chasm between lowbrow content and high art form in 
the Fleurs du mal announces a point of transition, as Benjamin puts it, a historical moment in 
which the traditional verse forms no longer seem appropriate due to a change in the structure 
of experience.  In Le Spleen de Paris, Baudelaire negotiates this transition aesthetically. As 
one study of the prose poems notes, “Baudelaire’s poetry in verse represents, through its 
inability to assume the real world and through its self-conscious references to itself, a form 
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become self-reflexive to the point of sterility… by smashing the form of verse, Baudelaire 
liberates his voice and his vision so that poetry can be born once again in prose.”35 
  I think that we can best make sense of this rebirth of poetry in prose by reading it in 
terms of a specifically modernist problematic. The problematic, conceived generally, is 
simply that at the center of the modernism/modernity conundrum, the double problem of time 
as the rapid pace of economic, social and political change in the transatlantic metropolis, and 
of temporality as such. The suddenness with which traditional lyric became irrevelant 
indicated both a massive cultural shift and a reconfiguration within temporality most 
apparent in the speed at which commodification, industrialization and urbanization rendered 
persons, practices, and objects outmoded. The variety of novelty generated by an 
increasingly short shelf-life produces an allure of difference undercut by the mandate to 
move on to the next vogue, such that novelty in fact marks a failure to generate genuine 
change, perpetuating “difference within variety rather than difference as a founding 
interruption.”36 
More specifically and contestably, I argue that we can read this temporal problematic 
in terms of a political failure, France’s failure to instantiate the republican promise of 1789, a 
pledge of political inclusion in which each (male) citizen would be incorporated into the polis 
in a collective embodiment of the nation. We might read this incapacity of France—and 
perhaps of the modern nation state as a political form-- in Bergsonian terms as an inability to 
engage temporal multiplicity, or through a poststructuralist lens that focuses on a failure to 
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recognize and grapple with difference. I will begin more simply, offering a historical reading 
of this problem through the shared concerns of Baudelaire and Proudhon in the 1840s and 
‘50s, a desire to preserve the individual (artist or petit bourgeois) from the tyranny of 
monarchy above and looming masses below. 
 
I. Converging Diagnoses: Baudelaire and Proudhon on the Failures of 1848 
The work Baudelaire’s prose poems undertake is informed by an understanding of 
power that links its character to the composition of its wielding. This understanding grows 
out of a particular reading of the social problem in mid-nineteenth-century France and the 
failures of the revolutions of 1848, and it reflects the same concern Baudelaire’s work 
evinces for the threat masses pose to the cultivated individual. Because political change far 
outpaced the economic transition to industrial capitalism in France, its history offers a clear 
view of how the effects of the formation of the mass as a political entity, first, and then as an 
economic one, could produce analogically an understanding of the social problem in terms of 
a theory linking the character of power to configurations of people. As historian David Berry 
notes, “For Proudhon and the mutualists, the lessons of the workers’ uprisings of 1830 and 
1848 were that the powers of the state were merely another aspect of the powers of capital, 
and both were to be resisted equally strongly.”37 Since the important difference between the 
Proudhonian-anarchist reading of the social problem and the Marxist-socialist reading is on 
the role of political coercion, I focus on the political sphere here. 
One of the first clear articulations of this reading of history appears in Proudhon’s La 
Révolution sociale démontrée par le coup d’état du 2 décembre, published in Paris in 1852. 
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Proudhon sees the French revolution as initiating a transferal of sovereignty from monarch to 
the people themselves, and he distinguishes between the country, the territory of shared 
abode [le pays] and the state [l’état], asserting that France has not had even five years of 
existence during the sixty-four years since the revolution. Proudhon sees a return to 
centralization as an interruption of the project 1789 was to have set in motion, the self-
institution of French citizens. Thus the expulsion of the Girondins in 1793 and 
commencement of the Terror reversed the brief evolution towards freedom in which France 
was constituted by means of a dispersal of monarchical power across its (male) citizenry. 
Proudhon explains: “After May 31, the relation is reversed: power, as under the kings, 
subordinates the country; the nation is now nothing but an integral part of the state; the 
container is included in the content.”38  In Proudhon’s reading France devolves from a self-
instituting collective of people in a particular territory to an empty form, a practical 
conceptual tool to concentrate power in the state. This move is made possible by a ceding of 
power to a centralized, representative government, to which many Frenchmen, not yet having 
developed into self-sovereign individuals, assent. Proudhon reads in the centralization of the 
Jacobins a “popular instinct, more easily seized by the simple notion of power than by the 
complicated idea of the social contract.”39 Insufficiently instituted in the body politic of 
France as individuals, Frenchmen reconstitute a political mass. 
This analysis of France’s political history allows Proudhon to come to specific 
conclusions about the failure of 1848 and the nature of the social problem. One reason 1848 
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failed, Proudhon speculates, is because it should not properly have been a revolution but an 
undertaking to “improve” circumstances.40 Revolutions, he declares, are a matter of negation, 
and the aim of 1848 was not to negate the project fought for in 1789 but to return to it, to 
recognize that France had not fulfilled this project, had in fact gotten quite off course. 
Proudhon offers a view of 1848 as concerned with securing what had been won theoretically 
and formally in 1789; thus 1848 may have required a process of reform, not negation. 1848 
could not but fail as a revolution because it did not aim to overturn political precedent. 
Rather, 1848 aimed to re-integrate French individuals into the nation. Proudhon explains the 
problem: 
All the strength of this nation, abstraction made of territory and of those living 
on it, those who constitute its importance as a political organ and function in 
humanity, then comes uniquely from its governmental and bourgeois feudal system. 
The people, the servile mass, exploited but not organized, are without political value. 
Their role is, more or less, that which slavery played for the ancients.41  
 
The “abstraction” of the nation and the absorption of so many French individuals into “the 
servile mass” create not just an imbalance of power but determine the kinds of power that 
may exist. Those privileged to exist apart from the mass retain the creative and generative 
power available to individuals; those constituted in the mass seemingly possess only 
instinctual or destructive power; and those cast out from or resistant to the mass possess 
creative or generative power whose exercise is severely constrained by the other two 
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 Proudon uses the verb améliorer, asking of the goals of February, 1848: “Y avait-il donc pour nous 
matière à négation, en fèvrier ? restait-il quelque chose à abolir, ou bien n’avions-nous qu’à améliorer ?” [And 
was it the case of there being something for us to negate, in February ? was there something remaining for us to 
abolish, or was it really a matter of improvement?”] Ibid, 18.  
 
 
41
 “Toute la force de cette nation, abstraction faite du territoire et des habitants, ce qui constitue son 
importance comme organe politique et fonction dans l’humanité, lui vient donc uniquement de sa féodalité 
gouvernementale et bourgeoise. Le peuple, la masse servile, exploitée mais non organisée, est sans valeur 
politique. Son rôle est, à peu de chose près, celui de l’esclavage chez les anciens.”  Ibid, 23. 
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groups.42 In Proudhon’s judgment, the answer to the social question—what should have been 
properly the project of 1848—was to return to the project of 1789, to instantiating a country 
embodied in individuals, not representation of the mass.  
Proudhon thus reads 1848 in France as a pro forma revolution standing in for a long-
term movement away from political representation and towards political embodiment. 
Proudhon does clearly state that real inroads to his ideal anarchy will require some process of 
education and debate among Frenchmen as a collective to prepare them for self-rule. This 
assessment historically grounds a specific understanding of the interrelation of different 
kinds of power, representation, and process that aligns a political project with an aesthetic 
one: rescuing the cultivated individual from the mass. Proudhon’s analysis foregrounds the 
mass as victim but then shows its unfitness for political power. His solution to the problem of 
a mass of poor people is to transform them into individuals who are sufficiently cultivated for 
full, direct participation in the polis. Yet a representative government precludes their full 
participation; in fact, Proudhon’s reading suggest that the very principal of representation, the 
one standing in for the many, creates a mass with limited power of a type that is singularly 
unhelpful for ending its own subordination, something like base instinct, an animalistic, 
lowest-common-denominator manifested in satisfaction of the senses or violence.  What is 
needed is a process that will yield cultivated individuals from the mass.  This political 
approach makes art enormously important, since the work of extracting a cultivated 
individual from the mass requires culture and a means—practices and processes—for 
cultivating individuals.  And a political ideal of free association lies at the heart of the 
                                                 
42
 I am associating this reading of power with Proudhon by drawing inferences also from his 
discussions of class, distinction between the petit bourgeoisie and proletariat, and wariness of instantaneous 
change, of the efficacy of another violent revolution.  
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aesthetic project, since it is the nature a person displays as part of a crowd, not one intrinsic 
to the individual, that requires action. 
 
II. Translating the Problem of the Mass: Proudhon to Baudelaire             
 
The period from the end of the First World War to the end of the Second can be seen as a time 
when politics and modernist culture were separated, often forcibly, as in the notorious 
example in Germany when the National Socialists relegated expressionism to the realm of 
‘degenerate art.’ Yet it may also be true that during this same period modernist art willingly 
separated itself from politics, largely because there is something inherently unaesthetic about 
the kind of culture encouraged by mass movements in any form, whether fascist, communist 
or even anarcho-syndicalist. Indeed, an aversion to the masses appears to be an element in the 
formation of the modernist aesthetic. According to Gustave Le Bon, who announced the 
science of crowd psychology in 1895 with his Psychologie des foules, the person who 
participates in any mass activity risks a loss of culture: “Isolated, he may be a cultivated 
individual; in a crowd he is a barbarian—that is, a creature acting by instinct.”  (David Weir, 
Anarchy and Culture, 261)43 
 
 In the account I wish to offer of anarchist modernism, Weir’s commonly held 
assertion that “an aversion to the masses appears to be an element in the formation of the 
modernist aesthetic” does not result in art separating itself from politics. Canonical 
modernists found in crowds a source of titillation as well as aversion, and their attitudes 
towards “the masses” involved more than a simple aesthetic calculus. The distinction Le Bon 
drew between “cultivated individual” and “barbarian” is notable in that both are the same 
person, whose devolution depends on the nature of his association with others. In Le Bon’s 
formulation the artist or civilized man does not differ from his neighbor categorically; rather, 
the comportment of each alone differs in character from each one’s behavior as part of a 
mass. The alchemy of the crowd makes quantitative change qualitative. Artists’ aversion to 
the masses produced attempts to avert (the problem of) the masses, which required artists not 
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 David Weir, Anarchy & Culture: The Aesthetic Politics of Modernism (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1997), 261. 
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to withdraw from society but to find means of association with others that avoided the 
individual-mass dialectic.  
Recognition of the crowd’s transformative power provoked modernist artists to 
investigate, challenge and offer alternatives to the constitution of the masses: they did not all 
simply take cover. Whether artists engaged the phenomenon of the masses as an object of 
fascination or disgust, its status as a focal point or problem reverberates throughout 
modernism and beyond. The poet’s negotiation of the crowd stands out as a central theme in 
the work of Baudelaire, who referred to the artist’s fleeting exchange of glances with a 
passerby on a Parisian street as a sort of sacred prostitution.44 Baudelaire’s artist famously 
finds the urban mass intoxicating in its submersion of individuals into a panoply of details of 
the latest fashions in dress or livery, a field of motion and source of unrelenting 
overstimulation of the senses. Only momentary encounters with one of the crowd’s bustling 
bodies, as in “A une passante,” remind the artist of the individuals who comprise the mass, 
and then frequently with the effect of reinvigorating the poet’s absorption by the crowd. The 
intoxication Baudelaire locates in the Parisian throng exists in inverse relation to individual 
agency: the artist’s genius dominates the crowd, extracting from it the raw material of his art, 
and the crowd draws its dizzying potency in subsuming the agency of its individual 
members. Yet the masses whose fashions feed the artist’s contemplation lack individuals to 
contemplate his product, such that the chief attraction of the crowd—transformation of the 
                                                 
44Baudelaire writes: “Ce que les hommes nomment amour est bien petit, bien restreint et bien faible, 
comparé à cette ineffable orgie, à cette sainte prostitution de l'âme qui se donne tout entière, poésie et charité, à 
l'imprévu qui se montre, à l'inconnu qui passé.” (That which men call love is so small, so restrained and weak, 
compared to this ineffable orgy, to this sacred prostitution of the soul that gives itself entirely, poetry and 
charity, to the stranger who appears, the unknown passerby.) “Les Foules,” Le Spleen de Paris. The complete 
text of Le Spleen de Paris is available online as “Charles Baudelaire’s Petits Poèmes en Prose ou Le Spleen de 
Paris,” Baudelaire Online, http://www.piranesia.net/baudelaire/spleen/frame.html 
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individual and his assimilation into an amorphous collective-- also constitutes its primary 
problem.  
 It is important to remember that the seismic shifts of modernity behind this 
individual/crowd dialectic were largely economic (characterized by the new domination of 
industrial capitalism) and political (involving the consolidation of modern nation states and 
development of nationalisms), and that what came to be known as “the social problem” in 
nineteenth-century Europe, especially in France, was the collective change in relations 
among individuals that these economic and political and economic shifts brought about. Like 
the historical avant-garde45 that was to follow, Baudelaire critiqued the emerging organization 
of individuals into masses of consumers or citizens; yet Baudelaire critiqued much more 
vituperatively the notion of a vanguard or avant-garde, conceiving of it as another vehicle of 
conformity.  The issue was not what to do with the masses or even what the masses should 
do but the impingement of any mass on individuals.  
Baudelaire’s art approaches the question of the masses in a way that does not 
constitute a retrenchment into a purely aesthetic sphere: rather, it signals the imbrication of 
aesthetic, political and economic concerns in the social question. To put it another way, the 
object of concern is the cultivated individual, not an autonomous artwork. As Foucault shows 
in his characterization of Baudelaire, self-fashioning is a crucial part of modernity’s project.46 
Masses are perceived to threaten most individuals doubly, with either transformative 
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 I use this term as Peter Bürger employs it in Theory of the Avant-garde (Trans. Michael Shaw. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), though noting critiques of the narrowness of Bürger’s 
grouping such as Richard Murphy’s argument for the inclusion of the German Expressonists. See Richard 
Murphy, Theorizing the Avant-Garde: Modernism, Expressionism, and the Problem of Postmodernity 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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 Michel Foucault,“What is Enlightenment?” Translated by Catherine Porter, in The Foucault Reader, 
Edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32-50. 
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absorption into the mass, or with marginalization or worse in existing outside the mass. Just 
as the mass makes quantitative change qualitative in transforming civilized individuals into 
the barbarians of a mob, it transforms and reconfigures power. Whatever power an individual 
possesses metamorphoses into a different kind of power in a crowd, as the agency required 
for cultivation and creation degrades into a mindless groping to satisfy some instinct. As Le 
Bon observed, “Crowds are only powerful for destruction.”47  Base instinct, as a lowest 
common denominator, constitutes the desire of a crowd, investing masses with a peculiarly 
negative kind of power. 
Baudelaire’s aeshetics and Proudhon’s politics meet at the threshold between 
individuals and the worrisome collectivity of the mass. Most tellingly, the prose poet and the 
political thinker share a simultaneous concern for and loathsome fear of the masses. These 
concerns lead to a politics of time that seeks to retemporalize form to open a field for self-
determination. If Proudhon sees a temporal problematic in explicitly political terms, as a 
political unfolding and amalgamation of processes that have yet to take place, Baudelaire’s 
texts directly reference an attenuation and aestheticization of time, a quickening of the pace 
at which people were being divested of political, economic and social agency. The prose 
poems show a deficit of time in which to act; the temporal character they evoke is the 
collectively imposed, standardized time of the mass.48  Baudelaire’s depiction aligns with an 
anarchist reading of the social problem, a reading that in hindsight is much better equipped 
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 Le Bon asserts: “It is only by obtaining some sort of insight into the psychology of crowds that it can 
be understood… how powerless they are to hold any opinions other than those which are imposed on them, and 
that it is not with rules based on theories of pure equity that they are to be led, but by seeking what produces an 
impression on them, and what seduces them.”  
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 For an account of historical changes in the experience of time, especially in terms of technological 
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than an orthodox Marxist approach to account for the fact that the social problem would 
become increasingly entrenched over the duration of modernism even as material conditions 
for much of the proletariat improved. In the anarchist interpretation, political coercion equals, 
if not trumps, economic causality, and the political problem is one of time and action, not 
ideology.  
 
III. The Prose Poems’ Diagnosis of the Attenuation and Aestheticization of Time 
Baudelaire’s prose poems clearly announce the hegemony of a new character of time, 
as the temporality of ritual and tradition gives way to increments, stingily doled out by 
factories or, in this case, randomly ordered by the poet. The preface to Le Spleen de Paris, 
dedicated to Arsène Houssaye, indicates an awareness on the part of the author of the ways 
time pressures of rushed urban life impact the work of the poet. Baudelaire expresses this 
awareness by emphasizing his own attentiveness to readerly customer service, 
acknowledging his audience’s lack of patience, lack of attention span, and lack of time.  
Baudelaire says readers may approach the poems in any order—“We can cut where we wish, 
me my revery, you the manuscript, the reader his reading”49—and has the expectation that 
modern life no longer permits lengthy periods of artistic contemplation (revery).  Baudelaire 
refers to these potentialities as “quelles admirables commodities” [such admirable 
conveniences], highlighting a gap between qualities readers associate with art 
(inconvenience, non-utility) and desirable qualities for daily life (speed, convenience, use-
value). 
In the following section I undertake close readings of  the prose poems“Un plaisant” 
[A Joker], “Un Cheval de race” [A Racehorse], “Le Galant tireur” [“The Gallant 
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 “ Nous pouvons couper où nous voulons, moi ma rêverie, vous le manuscrit, le lecteur sa lecture.”  
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Marksman”], “La Femme sauvage et la petite-maîtresse” [The Wild Woman and the 
Gentlewoman], and “Les Dons des fées” [The Gifts of the Fairies] to illustrate Baudelaire’s 
diagnosis of the problems of modern temporality. These texts highlight the foreshortened 
character of a temporality structured by novelty and mass consumption’s flattening of time 
into a veneer. 
 The fourth poem of Le Spleen de Paris, “Un plaisant” [A Joker], encapsulates a 
critique of novelty.  The temporal and spatial settings highlight a character of newness: it 
occurs at the “explosion of the new year,” and the protagonist of the poem is “a handsome 
gentleman gloved, polished, cruelly necktied and imprisoned in his completely new 
clothes.”50 The association of the new year’s arrival with an explosion suggests a violent 
genesis of the new, as does the way in which the gentleman’s proper new clothes constrain 
him “cruellement.” Newness overlays the physical setting as snow, entailing the pure 
associations of whiteness, but the snow is mottled by underlying mud churned up by the 
“thousand coaches.” The poet’s word choice registers an excessive, violently greedy 
character of newness—the candy, the toys, the scene “teeming of cupidities and despair” 
manifest the “official delirium of a big city” that leaves no one in peace. 51  
This scene of unsettling, newly uncivilized Paris includes a ubiquitous marker of 
pastness, the dumb but functional beast of burden. A confrontation ensues between man and 
animal, stylishly arrayed novelty and abused past. In an absurdly frivolous gesture of pure 
theatricality—one that can carry no social meaning because of the grossly unequal stature of 
the participants—the gentleman salutes the donkey and formally offers good wishes for the 
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 “un beau monsieur ganté, verni, cruellement cravaté et emprisonné dans des habits tout neufs.” 
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 “grouillant de cupidités et de désespoirs”…  “délire officiel d'une grande ville.” 
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new year. The beast, not noticing the man, “continued to run with zeal wherever duty called 
him.”52  Whipped and working, the beast does not register the absurd gesture and could not 
take leave of his work to respond in any case. After the null exchange, the gentleman returns 
to his companions “with an air of self-complacency, as though to ask them to add their 
approval to his satisfaction.”53 To complete his satisfaction from the absurdly unequal one-
way interaction, the gentleman requires that his companions watch and approve of his action. 
Baudelaire thus substitutes a dynamic of one-way action (on the part of the gentleman) and 
specular satisfaction (of the onlookers) for functional social exchange. The speaker of the 
prose poem makes clear that such change begs condemnation, explaining “As for me, I was 
suddenly grasped by an incommensurable rage against this magnificent inbecile, who seemed 
to me to condense in himself the whole soul of France.”54 The speaker’s reaction provides a 
blanket condemnation (making the gentleman synecdoche for nation) while offering nuanced 
evaluation in the pairing of “magnifique” with “imbécile” and the ambiguity of the referent. 
If we read the “magnifique imbecile” as referring to the gentleman, then the judgment seems 
to contrast the flawless new style of the man’s dress with his ridiculous behavior; if we read 
the description as referring to the donkey, it attains pathos: as beast, the animal’s lack of 
intelligence makes him imbecilic; as persevering beast of burden, beaten but working, the 
donkey exemplifies magnificence by continuing traditional, useful work in the face of the 
frivolous antagonism of the new.55   
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 “continua de courir avec zèle où l'appelait son devoir” 
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 “avec un air de fatuité, comme pour les prier d'ajouter leur approbation à son contentement” 
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 “Pour moi, je fus pris subitement d'une incommensurable rage contre ce magnifique imbécile, qui 
me parut concentrer en lui tout l'esprit de la France.” 
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 The fop’s dress in the prose poem places fashion front and center, which we might interpret through 
a Benjaminian lens as the moribund tiger’s leap into the past evoked in Thesis XIV of Theses on the Philosophy 
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The work the donkey performs has no connection to the modern or the new, and the 
new fashion bears no trace of work or labor, its own history, or that of the bypassed donkey. 
As in the case of the horse in “Un Cheval de race” [“A Racehorse”], Baudelaire valorizes 
that which has been used, abused by time, asserting in the two exclamatory sentences that 
begin the poem that the spent racehorse is “laide” [ugly] yet “délicieuse” [delicious]. 
“Marked” by Time and Love, the horse sparkles in her phenomenal ugliness: she “is really 
ugly; she is ant, spider, if you wish, skeleton even; but also she is potion, magistral, 
witchcraft! In sum, she is exquisite.”56 The horse is “usée” [run-down] but not “fatiguée” 
[tired], is “toujours héroïque” [still/always heroic], and makes one think “of those great race 
horses that the eye of the real amateur recognizes, even attached to a rented carriage or heavy 
wagon.”57 Made superior to people in the way she loves and serves (”She loves as one loves 
in autumn; one would say that the approach of winter lights in her heart a new fire, the 
servility of her tenderness has nothing tiresome in it”58), the animal once again marks the 
fallen values of the modern (non artist) man. In Baudelaire’s assertion of the horse’s value to 
the artist it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate aesthetic from moral valuation. 
 In fact, it is difficult not to discern a moral character in many of the aesthetic 
judgments and positions in the prose poems. While the languor of drug-induced stupor and 
                                                                                                                                                       
of History.  The temporal discontinuity evoked in the juxtaposition of the gentleman and the horse almost 
mocks the possibility of an effective discontinutity, a founding interruption. See the analyses of Thesis XIV of 
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 “est vraiment laide; elle est fourmi, araignée, si vous voulez, squelette même; mais aussi elle est 
breuvage, magistère, sorcellerie! en somme, elle est exquise” 
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 “à ces chevaux de grande race que l'œil du véritable amateur reconnaît, même attelés à un carrosse 
de louage ou à un lourd chariot” 
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 “Elle aime comme on aime en automne; on dirait que les approches de l'hiver allument dans son 
cœur un feu nouveau, et la servilité de sa tendresse n'a jamais rien de fatigant.” 
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irremediable loss of Paris before Haussman provided the temporal settings of Les Fleurs du 
mal, this mournful treatment of time gives way to a bitingly critical demonization of the 
clock in Le Spleen de Paris. The poet presents time, or its regulation by society, as 
symptomatic of a means-end obsession in which efficiency of production trumps all other 
values. Several of the prose poems show the poet’s inimical relationship to quantitative time 
and the values associated with such regulation. “Le Galant tireur” [“The Gallant Marksman”] 
and “Les Dons des fées” [The Gifts of the Fairies] portray the endangerment of the poet, of 
unmotivated (by profit) activity generally, while “La Femme sauvage et la petite-maîtresse” 
[The Wild Woman and the Gentlewoman] conversely depicts the attenuated existence of the 
non-poet and the poet as a threat to her well-being. 
In “Le Galant tireur” Baudelaire contrasts the artist’s relation to time to that of society 
at large, represented in the poem by the artist’s rather obtuse muse. The speaker of the poem 
stops travel to, literally and idiomatically, “tuer le Temps” [kill Time] in a shooting gallery, 
remarking, “Tuer ce monstre-là, n'est-ce pas l'occupation la plus ordinaire et la plus légitime 
de chacun?” [Killing that monster there, isn’t that anyone’s most ordinary and legitimate 
occupation?]  The adjectives “ordinary” and “legitimate” reveal a problem of contradiction: 
while everyone may at some point kill time, making the undertaking “ordinary” indeed, the 
wastefulness (lack of productivity) of killing time makes it illegitimate, at least by the norms 
of a society that measures success in quantifiable production. And, of course, it is the artist 
who requires the aimlessness of killing time for creativity, making him by association both 
normal, in the sense of “ordinary,” and illegitimate, in the sense of normative assessments of 
productivity and value. The speaker of the poem, accompanied by his “chère, délicieuse et 
exécrable femme” [dear, delightful and atrocious wife] who appears incomprehending of the 
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artist but “à laquelle il doit tant de plaisirs, tant de douleurs, et peut-être aussi une grande 
partie de son genie” [to whom he owes so many pleasures, so many pains, and perhaps also a 
large part of his genius] shoots several bullets “loin du but proposé” [far from the intended 
goal]. His companion laughs at his poor aim, as though the goal—killing time—demanded 
that he hit the target. The speaker responds to her laughter: “«Observez cette poupée, là-bas, 
à droite, qui porte le nez en l'air et qui a la mine si hautaine.  Eh bien! cher ange, je me figure 
que c'est vous.»” [Note that doll over there, to the right, who carries her nose in the air and 
has such a haughty demeanor. Well, dear angel, I envision it’s you.] Eyes closed, the speaker 
shoots, cleanly decapitating the doll. He then turns to his “ inévitable et impitoyable Muse, et 
lui baisant respectueusement la main, il ajouta: «Ah! mon cher ange, combien je vous 
remercie de mon adresse!»” [inevitable and merciless Muse, and respectfully kissing her 
hand, he added "Oh! my dear angel, how I thank you for my dexterity!"]. While the artist’s 
wife and muse stands in for a disagreeable society compelled to measure out increments of 
time and link them to productivity, she also impels the artist to create. One might read the 
poem allegorically, as a representation of the relations between art (the artist) and society 
(the wife), in which arts suffers under the tyranny of society but requires it for creation and 
society mistreats the artist and devalues his labor, but is attracted to art nonetheless. 
Baudelaire’s prose poem suggests that the problematic relations between art and society 
might yield violence, if only in the aesthetic realm, as death by proxy.  
Baudelaire depicts time’s flattening into a kind of uniform mass veener in  
the twentieth prose poem of Spleen de Paris, “Les Dons des fees.” He takes advantage of the 
diverse possibilities of the genre is he engendering to meld the action and moral of a fable to 
the characters and logical universe of a fairy tale in order to emphasize the capricious nature 
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of success in the ‘real’ world.  The poem opens onto a scene at which fairies have gathered 
together with fathers and their newborns to bestow a gift on each infant. The narrator notes 
that because each gift falls to a baby, the gift plays a determining factor in that person’s 
eventual fortune or misfortune, as the newborn’s fate has not yet been written.  Baudelaire’s 
fairies resemble people: they are “diverse” and overtaxed, harried, caught between “man and 
God, and submitted like us to the terrible law of Time and its infinite posterity, the Days, 
Hours, Minutes, Seconds.”59 The narrator likens the fairies to government ministers or 
“employees of the public pawnshop when a national holiday authorizes free redemption.”60  
Subject to the same impatience, stresses and worries as humans, the fairies are not faultless, 
and the narrator notes analogously: “If, in supernatural justice, there is a little precipitation 
and chance, we will not be surprised to find the same in human justice. We would be 
ourselves, in this instance, unjust judges.”61 Hazard and error permeate the supernatural as 
well as the natural. 
 Accordingly, some of the fairies’ gifts cause unhappiness rather than joy.  For 
example, the gift of effortlessly accumulating wealth falls to the sole heir of a wealthy 
family, “who, without being endowed with any sense of altruism, nor with any yearning for 
the most visible goods of life, would find himself later prodigiously encumbered by his 
millions.”62  Similarly, if producing opposite circumstances, the fairies bestow “the love of 
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en soit de même quelquefois dans la justice humaine.  Nous serions nous-mêmes, en ce cas, des juges injustes.” 
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Beauty and of Poetic Power”63 to the son in a miserly family, such that he is never able to 
climb up from poverty. The narrator notes at this juncture in the telling: “I have forgotten to 
tell you that the distribution, in these solemn cases, is without appeal, and that no gift can be 
refused.”64 
 As the overworked fairies prepare to depart the gift-giving ceremony, a man whose 
newborn has been overlooked confronts one of the exiting fairies:  “Oh!  Ms.! you forget us! 
there is still my little one! I don't want to have come here for nothing.”65 The fairies had by 
this time exhausted the gift catalogue.  However, the narrator explains that there exists for 
such circumstances a law “which allows fairies, in a case like this one, that is to say the 
exhaustion of gifts, the ability to give one more, supplementary and exceptional, so long as 
she has adequate imagination to create it immediately.”66 The quick-thinking fairy thus 
replies to the man’s request, “I give to your son... I give him... the Gift of pleasing!”67 The 
father, « incapable of descending to the logic of the absurd » 68questions the merit of such an 
ability. Rushed and annoyed, the fairy replies simply  “«Parce que! parce que!»” [“Because! 
Because!”] The narrator then reports the fairy’s speech to her colleagues as they leave: “How 
do you find this vain little Frenchman, who wishes to understand everything, and who having 
obtained for his son the best of gifts, dares to question and discuss that which admits no 
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faculté d'en donner encore un, supplémentaire et exceptionnel, pourvu toutefois qu'elle ait l'imagination 
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discussion?”69 The inference, of course, is that an ability that cannot create anything, that is  
without trade, vocation or direct material worth, in fact possesses in the real world 
extraordinary value. Yet it is hardly the stuff of fairy tales or parents’ romantic images of 
their children’s futures. 
 The singularly unimaginative yet highly useful character of the talent of pleasing 
evokes a disenchantment with the increased uniformity Baudelaire associates with the rise of 
technologies of reproduction and the development of the mass market in Paris. During a 
moment of direct political engagement in the hopeful chaos of 1848, Baudelaire mocked 
newspapers’ soliciting of a mass audience in the short-lived political journal he edited with 
friends, Le Salut public.70 The artist-cum-activist wrote in the second number of the journal 
in March, 1848: 
 Citizen Girardin conducts himself admirably. In the midst of the upheaval, of 
the disorder that momentarily seizes all things public and personal, the newspaper of 
Citizen Girardin is better put together than ever. This known capacity, this rapid and 
universal aptitude, this excessive energy, all that will be to the advantage of the 
Republic. 
 Everyday the important current questions are chewed over in The Press. 
 Citizen Girardin takes as his mantra: ONE IDEA A DAY! 
 His newspaper, up to the present, says that which everyone thinks.71 
 
Baudelaire's barbed praise of Emile de Girardin's (1802-1881) newspaper, La Presse, a 
cheap, conservative daily founded in 1836, registers his awareness of newspapers' shift in 
                                                 
69
 “«Comment trouvez-vous ce petit Français vaniteux, qui veut tout comprendre, et qui ayant obtenu 
pour son fils le meilleur des lots, ose encore interroger et discuter l'indiscutable?»”   
 
70
 Baudelaire, Champfleury and Toubin published two issues of Le Salut public, a revolutionary paper, 
before running out of funds. 
 
 
71
 "Le citoyen Girardin se conduit admirablement. Au milieu du trouble, du désordre qui envahissent 
momentanément toutes choses publiques et particulières, le journal du citoyen Girardin est mieux fait que 
jamais. Cette habilité connue, cette aptitude rapide et universelle, cette énergie excessive, tout cela tourne au 
profit de la République.  
Tous les jours les questions importantes at actuelles sont mâchées dans La Presse. 
      Le citoyen Girardin prend pour devise: UNE IDÉE PAR JOUR! 
      Son journal, jusqu'à présent, dit ce que tout le monde pense." Baudelaire, Œuvres Complètes II, 1037. 
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focus from politically divisive commentary and analysis towards polish, production value 
and commercial appeal. Richard Terdiman explains in the second chapter of Discourse / 
Counter-Discourse, "Newspaper Culture: Institutions of Discourse; Discourse of Institutions" 
that "the discourse of political opinion which had been a primary content of the traditional 
paper tended to be replaced by a flattened 'objective' discourse of information. For the first 
time, a newspaper began to conceive its audience not exclusively but inclusively, to project 
its mode of intervention in the broader social text not as confrontation and challenge but as 
co-optation" (131). Sonya Stephens concurs in Baudelaire’s Prose Poems: The Practice and 
Politics of Irony that Girardin's La Presse initiated a move towards "a universalization which 
eroded political partiality and, with the newspaper's new bias towards advertising and 
commercialism, turned readers into consumers." 72  
Baudelaire notes the simplification that results from newspapers' commodification of 
news and analysis, the reduction of content to "one idea a day." This flattening of varying 
perspectives into watered-down, agreeably inoffensive content involves, in Baudelaire's 
assessment, polish, speed, efficiency, an attenuated presentist temporal frame, and the 
pretense of universal consensus. These are precisely the traits his prose poems thwart. 
Baudelaire's prose poems offer an alternate path through the cultural landscape of post-1848 
Paris, one that makes use of a new, unfamiliar genre to alieneate/defamiliarize and re-
habituate readers so that they take critical notice of change. Once newspapers cede their 
                                                 
72
 Gregory Shaya links the development of the mass press in France during the second half of the 
nineteenth century to the construction of an inclusive public readership through the figure of the badaud, a low-
class, not-too-bright gawker. It’s interesting to think of the badaud as perhaps occupying (with respect to the 
prose poems) a role similar to that of the flâneur in the Fleurs du mal.  See Gregory Shaya, “The Flâneur, the 
Badaud, and the Making of a Mass Public in France, circa 1860-1910.” American Historical Review. 109.1 
(February 2004): 41-77. 
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critical function, assimilating to economic imperatives of profit and a rationalizing ethos, 
prose poems arguably take it up.  
 The long, disturbing prose poem “La Femme sauvage et la petite-maîtresse” [The 
Wild Woman and the Gentlewoman] effects one of the collection’s most visceral arguments 
against the attenuated temporality of the modern city, suggesting an effacing of individual 
difference into slick commercial veneer, mimesis in its most superficial instance as a 
colonizer of the human.73 The poem literally regards violence and barely contains a threat of 
it directed at the addressee, “la petite-maîtresse.” The entire poem consists of a monologue in 
which the speaker, a poet, lectures the petite-maîtresse about the enclosed violence before 
them, all the while threatening to move from contemplation of the violence to enacting it 
upon her person. 
The poem opens with the speaker reproaching the little bourgeoise gentlewoman for 
her constant sighs and complaints, which he finds inexcusable because they do not even 
express genuine dissatisfaction, only a state of boredom and expectation of indulgence. He 
critiques,  “If at least your sighs expressed remorse, they would do you some honor; but they 
transmit nothing but the satiety of well-being and exhaustion of rest. And then, you do not 
cease to spill yourself in useless words: "Love me well! I have such need! Console me here, 
                                                 
73
 In a note on the poem in the Bibliothèque de la Pléide edition of Le Spleen de Paris, Claude Pichois 
reports that an earlier version of the poem (which appeared in this version in the August 27, 1862 edition of La 
Presse) was written in verse in the 1850s.  Pichois claims: “Si Baudelaire a renoncé à la forme versifiée, c’est 
sans doute en raison du ton sarcastique qu’il voulait donner à sa composition” [If Baudelaire renounced the 
verse form, it is undoubtedly due to the sarcastic tone he wanted to give to his composition]  Baudelaire, OC, 
1315. I would also add that the prose poem form allows for stronger narrative and conversational elements, such 
that the speaker’s final threat attains a particularly acute tone of personal menace in the context of 
narrative/fabulist exposition and deceptively casual conversation. 
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caress me there!"”74  The speaker then announces that he will try to “cure” the woman, and 
that means for a cure might be quickly and cheaply obtained by walking over to the nearby 
fair.   
At the fair the speaker directs the woman’s attention to an exhibit in which a figure 
“tosses about, hurling like the damned, shaking the bars like an orangutan infuriated by exile, 
imitating, in perfection, sometimes the circular paths of the tiger, sometimes the stupid 
waddling of the polar bear.”75 This “monstre poilu” (hairy monster) resembles “vaguement” 
(vaguely) the gentlewoman, and the speaker clarifies, “This monster is one of those animals 
that one generally calls “my angel!,” that’s to say a woman. The other monster, the one 
yelling his head off, a cudgel in his hand, is a husband. He has chained his lawful wife like a 
beast, and he shows her in the suburbs, on fair days, with the permission of the authorities, 
that goes without saying.”76 The speaker instructs his pupil to pay close attention to the way 
in which the woman rips apart the live rabbits and chickens her keeper tosses to her, and to 
how her teeth cling to pieces of bloody flesh when her keeper tears the prey from her mouth, 
admonishing her not to eat all her allotment of food in one day. As the husband hits his wife 
with a cudgel to tamp down her rage at having her meal taken from her, the speaker calls 
attention to the sound of the cudgel hitting her flesh, emphasizing the reality of the spectacle 
to his addressee.   
                                                 
74
 “Si au moins vos soupirs exprimaient le remords, ils vous feraient quelque honneur; mais ils ne 
traduisent que la satiété du bien-être et l'accablement du repos.  Et puis, vous ne cessez de vous répandre en 
paroles inutiles: «Aimez-moi bien! j'en ai tant besoin!  Consolez-moi par-ci, caressez-moi par-là!»” 
   
75
 “s'agite, hurlant comme un damné, secouant les barreaux comme un orang-outang exaspéré par 
l'exil, imitant, dans la perfection, tantôt les bonds circulaires du tigre, tantôt les dandinements stupides de l'ours 
blanc.” 
 
76
 “ «Ce monstre est un de ces animaux qu'on appelle généralement «mon ange!» c'est-à-dire une 
femme.  L'autre monstre, celui qui crie à tue-tête, un bâton à la main, est un mari.  Il a enchaîné sa femme 
légitime comme une bête, et il la montre dans les faubourgs, les jours de foire, avec permission des magistrats, 
cela va sans dire.” 
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The staging of this scene almost directly counters the pedagogical structure of scenes 
of caged animals and animal-human interaction depicted in newspaper illustrations. 
Baudelaire counters that pedagogical structure in three significant ways: by altering content, 
in subsituting for caged animals caged people—one thinks of the human zoos included in the 
Expositions Universelles, notably the 1867 Paris Exposition—but caged people who act like 
animals; by undermining the distance between viewer and spectacle; and by recommending 
no resolution for the spectacle depicted, no culminating expression of emotion through which 
readers or viewers may quit the scene.  
For the remainder of the prose poem, the speaker analyzes the spectacle. He explains:  
Such are the conjugal customs of those descendants of Eve and of Adam, those works 
of your hands, oh my God! This woman is indisputably unfortunate, even if, after all, 
the titillating joys of notoriety are not unknown to her. There are more irreparable 
misfortunes, and without compensation. But in the world into which she was cast, she 
could never have believed that woman deserved any other fate.77 
 
Addressing his companion, the speaker points out the unreality of all her sighs and 
complaints, “learned from books, and this indefatigable melancholy, put on to inspire in the 
onlooker a completely different sentiment than pity.”78 The feigned suffering of the woman, 
the speaker says, makes him want to show her what real misfortune is like. The speaker 
concludes his lecture cure with a threat of violence, warning her “Poet though I am, I am not 
such a dupe as you would like to believe, and if you tire me too often with your precious 
whining, I will treat you like a wild woman, or I will throw you out the window, like an 
                                                 
77
 “Telles sont les moeurs conjugales de ces deux descendants d'Ève et d'Adam, ces oeuvres de vos 
mains, ô mon Dieu!  Cette femme est incontestablement malheureuse, quoique après tout, peut-être, les 
jouissances titillantes de la gloire ne lui soient pas inconnues.  Il y a des malheurs plus irrémédiables, et sans 
compensation.  Mais dans le monde où elle a été jetée, elle n'a jamais pu croire que la femme méritât une autre 
destinée. » 
 
78
 “apprises dans les livres, et cette infatigable mélancolie, faite pour inspirer au spectateur un tout 
autre sentiment que la pitié” 
 
  
46 
empty bottle.”79 The speaker’s threat is to move from a position of contemplation to action, 
from explaining a spectacle to enacting it—or another violent scenario—upon his 
companion. 
The two threats suggest different appraisals of the woman as subject: the first threat 
envisions her as the pre-civilized, animalistic wild woman, the second as a useless product of 
civilization, a receptacle of no value, depleted of its contents. The threat to treat the little 
gentlewoman as a savage calls into question the woman’s status as civilized. The speaker has 
characterized the civilized status of the woman in terms of comfort (“you who rest only on 
fabric as soft as your skin, who eat only cooked meat, and for whom a domestic takes care to 
cut it into small pieces”80) and education (repeating the pose of sighs and melancholy that 
one learns from books). If a woman with all the accoutrements and practices identified as 
“civilized” merits barbaric treatment, then the distinction between civilized and barbaric 
becomes uncertain.  
The speaker’s second threat suggests that the ideal in this context has no substance; it 
is void, surface—or container—only, like the bottle. The woman learns a certain melancholic 
pose from texts, and her enaction of the pose does not represent actual melancholia, nor does 
she desire real empathy or some ideal response to true melancholy; rather, she mimics a 
certain pose of melancholy as means to specific ends, to manipulating men into lavishing 
upon her attention, services and material comforts, certainly, but most importantly, to reify 
the subject-pose she has learned to enact. The “ideal” has given way to a rationalized, closed 
                                                 
79
 “Tant poëte que je sois, je ne suis pas aussi dupe que vous voudriez le croire, et si vous me fatiguez 
trop souvent de vos précieuses pleurnicheries, je vous traiterai en femme sauvage, ou je vous jetterai par la 
fenêtre, comme une bouteille vide.” 
 
80
 “vous qui ne reposez que sur des étoffes aussi douces que votre peau, qui ne mangez que de la 
viande cuite, et pour qui un domestique habile prend soin de découper les morceaux.” 
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system wherein processes of iteration displace imagination. Production becomes value. Any 
trace of the natural-- the captive woman, recalling an orangutan maddened by exile and the 
absent tiger and polar bear-- has been covered over by a veneer of civilization. In the prose 
poem, there is literally no rhyme or reason for this blank veneer’s substitution for substance. 
The dilemma recalls “Le Miroir,” a prose poem in Le Spleen de Paris that explicitly calls our 
attention to a displeasing mirror reflection that replaces a man’s reasonable self 
determination. In the text a man gazes at his reflection with disgust, and when the narrator 
inquires about why he does so, the gazer replies that “he has the right”: “Monsieur, following 
the immortal principles of ’89, all men are equal in rights; thus I possess the right to gaze at 
myself; with pleasure or displeasure, that concerns only my own conscience.”81 The 
architecture of the prose poem suggests that this sad state of affairs—a joyless enactment of a 
right—is the end result of the promise of 1789. The citizen thoughtfully embodies his rights, 
the better to preserve them; and yet the rights produce no collective work of happiness (the 
republic).  And the man’s right to gaze at himself also stands in for a critical function of art, a 
function that in contemporaneous circumstances will no longer suffice. 
 
IV. Art’s Work as Solution: Baudelaire and Foucault 
Art’s participation in anarchist retemporalization begins when Baudelaire meets 
Proudhon, historically and philosophically. Baudelaire admired Proudhon, writing to him 
while he served in the brief National Assembly formed after the 1848 revolutions, and 
addressed him in the last line of a draft of what may be Baudelaire’s most famous prose 
poem dealing with the problem of poverty, “Assommons les pauvres!” [Beat up the Poor!] 
                                                 
81
 “Monsieur, d'après les immortels principes de 89, tous les hommes sont égaux en droits; donc je 
possède le droit de me mirer; avec plaisir ou déplaisir, cela ne regarde que ma conscience.” 
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Their philosophical alignment becomes apparent in Foucault’s demonstration of how 
Baudelaire’s art takes up a project complementary to Proudhon’s anarchism in “What is 
Enlightenment?”82   
Foucault declares Baudelaire’s work emblematic of modernity as an attitude, “a form 
of relationship to the present” and “a mode of relationship that has to be established with 
oneself” (41). Foucault explains: “For the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present 
is indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it other than it is, and to 
transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is” (41).  The relationship to the 
present takes the form of a transformative labor, a work of apprehending reality in its full 
exactitude, holding it up for critique, imagining how it might be otherwise, and through art 
displaying at one and the same time reality as it is and as it might become. Thus 
“Baudelairean modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is 
confronted with the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates 
it” (41). As with Ziarek’s forcework, art instantiates a different mode of relationality in 
grappling with things as they are and freeing them from the constraints of the actual into 
other possible configurations. In this context the “precept” of Baudelaire Foucault cites—his 
insistence “You have no right to despise the present”—possesses the weight of an ethical 
imperative. Like Constantin Guys, a modern artist must grasp and transfigure the present, not 
dodge this task by taking refuge in a past whose fashions he prefers or taking flight into a 
future detached from present circumstances.  
 It is this attention to the present with an eye to the conditions necessary for its 
alteration that Foucault sees linking modernity to the Enlightenment: he posits “the thread 
                                                 
82
 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” trans. Catherine Porter. In The Foucault Reader, ed. 
Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, 32-50. Subsequent parenthetical references refer to this text. 
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that may connect us to the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather 
the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be 
described as a permanent critique of our historical era” [my italics] (42). Like forcework, 
which to impact the political realm needs “continuous reactivation,” critique is not only 
negative but positive, in the sense that it may be transformed “into a practical critique that 
takes the form of a possible transgression” (45). This project of critique “will separate out, 
from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, 
or thinking what we are, do, or think… [It will] give new impetus, as far and wide as 
possible, to the undefined work of freedom” (46). The character Foucault attributes to this 
“historico-critical attitude” resembles that of anarchism in several significant aspects: both 
are experimental, wary of coalescence into “a theory, a doctrine,” or “a permanent body of 
knowledge that is accumulating,” shy away from instantaneous revolution (Foucault calls for 
“a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty”) and concerned with processual, 
local change (50). Foucault advises  
this work done at the limits of ourselves must… put itself to the test of reality, of 
contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, 
and to determine the precise form this change should take. This means that the 
historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be 
global or radical. In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the 
system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another 
society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has 
led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions. (46) 
 
Like anarchism, Foucault’s attitude of modernity shuns grand designs and unitary visions for 
society in favor of instantiating change at specific points where it is “possible and desirable.” 
It is in circumspection regarding the basis for and enactment of change that Foucault finds an 
affinity between the attitude of modernity and the approach of the Enlightenment in this 
minor text of Kant. Kant’s defining of the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) “in an almost entirely 
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negative way, as an Ausgang, an exit, a way out” of “our immaturity” does not attempt to 
locate origins, or discover some “internal teleology of a historical process,” or “seek… to 
understand the present on the basis of a totality or of a future achievement”; Kant “deals with 
the question of contemporary reality alone” to answer the question “What difference does 
today introduce with respect to yesterday?” (34). In this pairing Kant’s Enlightenment and 
Foucault’s and Baudelaire’s modernity both take up tasks properly delimited historically and 
critically. 
 Foucault sees in this reading of Kant the Enlightenment posed as a political problem 
of the exercise of reason by individuals. I argue that Foucault poses this political problem for 
modernity in a recognizably anarchist formulation remarkably similar to Castoriadis’s 
conception of social self-institution83. Foucault begins with Kant’s conditions for exiting 
immaturity, distinguishing between realms of obedience and reasoning, and between public 
and private uses of reason. Kant states that reason must be submissive in its private use, free 
in its public use. Foucault first focuses on the conditions free public use of freedom entails: 
“The question, in any event, is that of knowing how the use of reason can take the public 
form that it requires, how the audacity to know can be exercised in broad daylight, while 
individuals are obeying as scrupulously as possible” (37). Foucault then examines what this 
means for the character of the Enlightenment: “Enlightenment is thus not merely the process 
by which individuals would see their own personal freedom of thought guaranteed. There is 
                                                 
83
 Castoriadis writes: “The central idea realized by the [French] Revolution… is that of the explicit 
self-institution of society by collective, lucid, democratic activity. But at the same time the Revolution never 
freed itself from the grip of this key part of the modern political imaginary that is the state. I say expressly ‘the 
State’—a separate and centralized apparatus of domination—and not ‘power.’ For the Athenians, for example, 
there is no ‘state’—the very word doesn’t exist; the power is ‘we,’ the ‘we’ of political collectivity.” See 
Cornelius Castoriadis, The Rising Tide of Insignificancy. Trans. Anonymous. 
http://www.costis.org/x/castoriadis/castoriadis_rising_tide.pdf , 294. 
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Enlightenment when the universal, the free, and the public uses of reason are superimposed 
on one another.” (37)  
The Enlightenment possesses a collective dimension that interrelates individuals 
through the free exercise of reason: “Thus Enlightenment must be considered both as a 
process in which men participate collectively and as an act of courage to be accomplished 
personally” [italics added] (35) and “Now the analysis of Enlightenment, defining its history 
as humanity’s passage to its adult status, situates contemporary reality with respect to the 
overall movement and its basic directions. But at the same time, it shows how, at this very 
moment, each individual is responsible in a certain way for that overall process” [italics 
added] (38).  The Enlightenment, and by extension modernity, through the relation of 
similitude Foucault sketches between the two, “appears as a political problem” in a 
formulation that solicits anarchism for its solution. Foucault writes of the Enlightenment: 
“Men are at once elements and agents of a single process. They may be actors in the process 
to the extent that they participate in it; and the process occurs to the extent that men decide to 
be its voluntary actors” (35). Foucault writes of modernity in relation to the Enlightenment: 
 Thinking back on Kant’s text, I wonder if we might not envision modernity 
rather as an attitude than as a period of history. And by ‘attitude,’ I mean a mode of 
relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the 
end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and 
the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no 
doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And consequently, rather than seeking to 
distinguish the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’ or ‘postmodern,’ I think it would 
be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, every since its 
formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of ‘countermodernity.’[italics 
added] (39)  
 
The chief representative of countermodernity here seems to be humanism (in which Foucault 
includes, notably if partially, Marxism). Foucault opposes humanism, as “a set of themes” 
that have appeared in European societies and which are “always tied to value judgments,” to 
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the Enlightenment-modernity project (44). Foucault claims that humanism “serves to color 
and to justify the conceptions of man to which it is, after all, obliged to take recourse” (44). 
Humanism limits the exercise of reason Kant proposes by foreclosing what it means to be 
human at a particular historical moment and confining options for action/practices to 
whatever value judgments a particular instance of humanism deems moral or otherwise 
acceptable. 
 Shifting to the second element comprising the attitude of modernity, the mode of 
relationship one has to establish with oneself, Foucault turns again to Baudelaire, noting: “To 
be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take 
oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in the vocabulary 
of his day, calls dandysme” (41). This ‘elaboration’ involves man revolting against himself 
and making “his very existence” into an artwork so that man can maintain the autonomy 
required to reason freely while participating fully in the public exercise of reason. Art 
furnishes the means for man to engage in reasoning—which is open-ended—and still 
maintain the submission (to the public exercise of reason) Kant demands of the private use of 
reason. Thus “Baudelaire does not imagine that these [the “ironic heroization of the present, 
this transfiguring play of freedom with reality, this ascetic elaboration of the self”] have any 
place in society itself, or in the body politic. They can only be produced in another, a 
different place, which Baudelaire calls art” (42). 84 
To make life into art and to live the revolution (or anarchist alteration) overlap 
through a particular conception of art that privileges embodiment (of life in art) and 
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 For affinities between Foucault and anarchism  (and anarchism and other post-structuralist theorists), 
see Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism  (University Park, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994)  and Jesse S. Cohn,  Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: 
Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Politics (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Press, 2006). 
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enactment (of the revolution in life) and makes art and life interdependent. Man produces 
himself, but only in art, where it is not a question of power but of the free, private exercise of 
reason. Art is active, not passive, its non-power offering a kind of spectral power, experience 
as it might become.  
 
V. Art’s Work in the Prose Poems: The Value of Aesthetic Encounter 
 Richard Terdiman claims that in the prose poems “the poor do not appear as long-
suffering objects of compassion but as a social force bearing latent consciousness of its 
power” (315). Baudelaire was certainly aware of the potential power of the poor and of 
conflict between the artist and the poor, and was thus frightened by the peasants in 1848 at 
the same time as he embraced other aspects of the revolutions. Baudelaire presents the poor 
most often in relation to the artist and his practice of his vocation. As numerous critics have 
noted, Baudelaire’s work frequently aligns the artist with the poor, since both are alienated 
from and mistreated by society. But the relationship between the two groups of outcasts is a 
problematic one for the artist: others’ poverty interferes with the artist’s aesthetic 
contemplation. One can read in the prose poems’ treatment of the poor and the theme of 
poverty an argument against separating art from the praxis of life. Over and over again, 
Baudelaire shows the imbrication of aesthetic and moral/ethical judgments, a co-
development that requires a particular temporality of duration, a prolonged or extended 
present for the movement of thought. 
 This temporality of duration requires an escape from formal or procedural restraints 
into experience, an escape whose broader social ramifications Baudelaire brings to the 
foreground in the prose poem “Le Joujou du Pauvre” [The Toy of the Poor Child]. First 
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published in La Presse in September, 1862, the piece compares the toys of children from 
opposite ends of the class spectrum. The poem shares all of its text except the first two 
paragraphs and conclusion with the essay “Morale du joujou”, published in the April 17, 
1853 edition of Le Monde littéraire. But unlike the essay, a much longer rumination on the 
relations of children to their toys, the prose poem contains an obvious patterning of a fable, 
concluding with a sort of moral. The poem opens with a statement of moral intention: “I want 
to give the idea of an innocent distraction. There are so few amusements that are not 
culpable!”85 Before launching into a narrative, the speaker instructs the reader to equip 
herself with a variety of little toys and gadgets when she leaves in the morning to stroll the 
city streets so that she might surprise the children she encounters with presents of toys. Then, 
in a narrative from the essay, Baudelaire describes an attractive rich child playing on the 
grass in front of the chateau in which he lives with a “splendid” toy. The speaker remarks 
“Luxury, insouciance, and the habitual spectacle of wealth, render such children so attractive, 
one would think them made of another material than the children of mediocrity or of 
poverty.”86 Despite the magnificence of his preferred toy, the child ignores it; he is gazing 
across the gate, at another child, a ruffian, playing with his own toy. Baudelaire describes the 
scene: 
  Across the symbolic barriers separating the two worlds, the highway and the 
chateau, the poor child was showing the rich child his own toy, which the other was 
examining avidly like a rare and unknown object.  However, this toy, which the little 
slattern was nettling, agitating and shaking in a square cage, was a live rat! The 
parents, out of economic necessity no doubt, had wrenched the toy from life itself. 
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 “Je veux donner l'idée d'un divertissement innocent.  Il y a si peu d'amusements qui ne soient pas 
coupables!” 
 
86
 “Le luxe, l'insouciance et le spectacle habituel de la richesse, rendent ces enfants-là si jolis, qu'on les 
croirait faits d'une autre pâte que les enfants de la médiocrité ou de la pauvreté.” 
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In contrast to the patina of wealth that attaches to the rich child’s toy, the poor child amuses 
himself with a living animal culled from the squalor of his daily life, not purchased as a 
commodity. The rich child does not react with horror; rather, both children laugh “at one 
another fraternally, with teeth of an equal whiteness.”87 This fraternal bond crosses class, and 
occurs at the site of the poor, over the amusement of the poor, which also represents the  
natural world, not that of manufactured goods. In contrast to the sparkling newness of the 
bourgeois or rich Parisian’s surroundings, with all history and mythology jerked out of 
context, the poor take their entertainments from their own humble environments, those they 
experience over time. 
 Occasional moments in the prose poems hold out hope for the artist’s ability to 
grapple with qualitative difference aesthetically, to assimilate others’ duration and singularity 
into the artwork’s work. Poverty becomes a vocational threat to the artist in “Le Gâteau” 
[The Cake], as the hunger of the wretchedly poor shatters the repose of a traveling artist 
seduced by landscape. Yet in an uncharacteristically optimistic moment the speaker rises to 
the occasion, demonstrating both generosity to the less fortunate and a process of experiential 
learning.  
At the beginning of the prose poem, the speaker says of his surroundings: “Le 
paysage au milieu duquel j'étais placé était d'une grandeur et d'une noblesse irresistible” [The 
landscape in the middle of which I was placed was of an irrestible grandeur and nobility]. 
The magnificence of the landscape infuses his soul, elevating the experience of sensation and 
perception to art.  As the speaker gazes at the reflection of a silently moving cloud in a lake, 
he nears a sensation of the sublime, “une joie mêlée de peur” [a joy mixed with fear]. As he 
pulls a large morsel of bread out to eat, a small ruffian appears, his eyes “devouring” the 
                                                 
87
 “l'un à l'autre fraternellement, avec des dents d'une égale blancheur” 
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piece of bread, his lips muttering “cake.” The speaker, amused, explains his reaction to the 
child’s desire: “Je ne pus m'empêcher de rire en entendant l'appellation dont il voulait bien 
honorer mon pain presque blanc” [I could not prevent myself from laughing in understanding 
the designation with which he wanted to honor my nearly white bread]. The speaker cuts a 
slice for the child, who approaches cautiously, gaze never leaving the bread, quickly grabs it 
and recoils “comme s'il eût craint que mon offre ne fût pas sincère ou que je m'en repentisse 
déjà” [as if he feared that my offer was not sincere or that I was already repenting it]. At this 
moment another ragged child arrives, apparently a brother of the first, and a vicious battle for 
the portion of bread ensues. 
The fight ends when both brothers are bloody and exhausted, by which time the 
object of battle has disintegrated into crumbs scattered about like “grains of sand.” In the 
final paragraph of the poem the speaker returns to his initial subject, the landscape, which has 
been altered in the speaker’s perception by the fight between the children.  Joy from 
contemplation of the natural beauty has “totalement disparu” [completely disappeared], and 
the poem concludes with the now sad speaker repeating to himself “sans cesse: «Il y a donc 
un pays superbe où le pain s'appelle du gâteau, friandise si rare qu'elle suffit pour engendrer 
une guerre parfaitement fratricide!»” [without ceasing: “There is then a superb country where 
the bread is called cake, delicacy so rare that it suffices to engender a perfectly fratricidal 
war!”] The elevation of bread to cake recalls the apocryphal story of Marie Antoinette 
offensively commanding in regards to starving peasants, “Let them eat cake!” (or brioche, as 
Marie-Théresè, wife of Louis XIV, is reported to have actually said: “Qu’ils mangent de la 
brioche!”). The impoverished state of others interferes with the speaker’s aesthetic 
enjoyment. Over the course of the prose poem, a classical aesthetic experience 
  
57 
(contemplation of the sublime) cedes its ground to a process of socialization, as the 
misanthropic poet confronts the cureent and historical problem of hunger. 
The prose poem “Les Yeux des Pauvres” [The Eyes of the Poor] similarly conjoins 
aesthetic and social/moral experience.  Baudelaire shows explicitly how the spectacle of 
poverty infuses a poet’s (aesthetic) assessment and enjoyment of his surroundings and (moral 
and psychological) evaluation of his beloved and their relationship. The poem opens with the 
speaker declaiming “Oh! You want to know why I hate you today. It will be no doubt easier 
for you to understand it than it will be for me to explain it to you, for you are, I believe, the 
most beautiful example of imperviousness that can be found.”88 Earlier the narrator and his 
beloved had decided to share all their thoughts in order to unite into a single soul, “a dream 
that had nothing original in it, after all, if it is not that, dreamed by all men, it has been 
realized by none.”89 That night the couple visit a new café. Light reflects off the polished 
interior of the café, the mirrors, the gold trim, the mythologically-themed paintings— “all 
history and all mythology put to the service of supreme tackiness.”90  Into this scene of 
opulence enters a tired-looking, disheveled poor man, holding hands with a young boy and 
carrying a little child “too weak to walk” in his arms.The speaker seees in the eyes of each 
figure astonishment at the interior: 
 The eyes of the father were saying “How beautiful it is!  How beautiful! One 
could say that all the gold in this poor world has come to rest on these walls.” –The 
eyes of the little boy: “How beautiful it is!  How beautiful! but it’s a house where 
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 “Ah! vous voulez savoir pourquoi je vous hais aujourd’hui.  Il vous sera sans doute moins facile de 
le comprendre qu’à moi de vous l’expliquer; car vous êtes, je crois, le plus bel exemple d’imperméabilité qui se 
puisse rencontrer.” 
 
89
 “un rêve qui n’a rien d’original, après tout, si ce n’est que, rêvé par tous les hommes, il n’a été 
réalisé par aucun” 
 
90
 “toute l’histoire et toute la mythologie mises au service de la goinfrerie” 
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only people who are not like us can enter.”  --As for the eyes of the smallest, they 
were too fascinated to explain anything except a stupid and profound joy.91 
 
Confronted with the spectacle of the poor family, themselves astonished before the spectacle 
of the café, the speaker feels embarrassed by his wealth, the glasses and carafes “plus grands 
que notre soif” [larger than our thirst]. Forsaking the opportunity to malign the poor family’s 
genuine awe at the tacky décor, the speaker turns to his beloved for confirmation of his 
empathetic reaction when she says: “«Ces gens-là me sont insupportables avec leurs yeux 
ouverts comme des portes cochères!  Ne pourriez-vous pas prier le maître du café de les 
éloigner d’ici?»” [“Those people there are unbearable to me with their eyes open like 
saucers!  Couldn’t you ask the manager of the café to send them away from here?”]  
Baudelaire abruptly concludes the poem: “Tant il est difficile de s’entendre, mon cher ange, 
et tant la pensée est incommunicable, même entre gens qui s’aiment!” [How difficult it is to 
come to understanding with one another, my dear angel, and how uncommunicable is 
thought, even between people in love!”]. The spectacle of the poor family has marred the 
speaker’s enjoyment of his surroundings and demolished his hopeful appraisal of a romantic 
relationship. 
 While the figures of poverty I have discussed in Le Spleen de Paris to this point have 
consisted almost entirely of children, who (beyond seeking out toys from their environments) 
possess no agency, in Baudelaire’s most extended treatment of a poor person in the prose 
poems, we do encounter a genuine potential threat, a poor person capable of rising up. From 
the vantage point of a politics of time, what I find most interesting in the text is its clever 
                                                 
91
 Les yeux du père disaient: «Que c’est beau! que c’est beau! on dirait que tout l’or du pauvre monde 
est venu se porter sur ces murs.» -- Les yeux du petit garçon:«Que c’est beau! que c’est beau! mais c’est une 
maison où peuvent seuls entrer les gens qui ne sont pas comme nous.» -- Quant aux yeux du plus petit, ils 
étaient trop fascinés pour exprimer autre chose qu’une joie stupide et profonde. 
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juxtaposition of the misery of an urban poor lived experience, on the one hand, and the 
instructiveness of the immediately apprehended experience on the part of the poem’s 
speaker, on the other hand.  
 Baudelaire satirizes charitable pretenses towards the poor while making clear the real 
quandary poverty presents in this penultimate prose poem of the collection, “Assommons les 
pauvres!" [Beat up the Poor!]. The poem opens with the speaker’s account of his reading 
habits of a fortnight sixteen or seventeen years ago and his ensuing state of mind.  “[C]onfiné 
dans [s]a chambre” [Confined in his room], the speaker surrounded himself with “des livres à 
la mode dans ce temps-là” [books then in vogue], books discussing “l'art de rendre les 
peuples heureux, sages et riches, en vingt-quatre heures” [the art of making people happy, 
wise and wealthy, in twenty-four hours]. These avatars of self-help books provide 
contradictory advice, some advising the poor “de se faire esclaves” [make themselves slaves] 
others “qui leur persuadent qu'ils sont tous des rois détrônés” [which persuade them that they 
are all dethroned kings]. As a result of his reading material, the speaker concludes the first 
paragraph of the text: “One will not find it surprising that I was then in a spiritual state 
bordering on vertigo or stupidity.”92 This sentiment furnishes an ironic contrast for the next 
sentence of the poem, which opens the second paragraph with a claim to intelligence: “It 
seemed to me that I felt confined at the base of my intellect the obscure germ of an idea 
superior to all the old wives’ tales I had just read.”93 As this idea germinates, the speaker 
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 “On ne trouvera pas surprenant que je fusse alors dans un état d'esprit avoisinant le vertige ou la 
stupidité.” 
 
93
 “Il m'avait semblé seulement que je sentais, confiné au fond de mon intellect, le germe obscur d'une 
idée supérieure à toutes les formules de bonne femme dont j'avais récemment parcouru le dictionnaire.” 
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finally leaves his room, observing that “the passionate taste of bad reading engenders a 
proportional need for the outdoors and refreshments.”94 
 Upon approaching the entrance to a cabaret, the speaker encounters a beggar “with 
one of those unforgettable looks which would overturn thrones, if spirit could move matter, 
and if the eye of a hypnotist were to make grapes ripen.”95 Just at that moment, the speaker 
hears the familiar voice “d'un bon Ange, ou d'un bon Démon, qui m'accompagne partout” [of 
a good Angel, or of a good Demon, who accompanies me everywhere]. The speaker 
compares his demon to that of Socrates but notes that unlike Socrates’ demon, who “ne se 
manifestait à lui que pour défendre, avertir, empêcher,” [manifested himself only to forbid, 
warn, prevent] his demon “daigne conseiller, suggérer, persuader” [deigns to advise, suggest, 
persuade]. Thus “That poor Socrates had but a prohibitive Demon; mine is a great affirmer, 
mine is a Demon of action, a Demon of combat.”96Accordingly, the demon whispers to the 
speaker: “He is only the equal of another who proves it, and he is only worthy of liberty who 
knows how to conquer it.”97   
 The speaker then takes action, pouncing on the beggar, beating him violently.  During 
the beating the speaker’s only concerns extend to his ability to carry out the action of beating; 
the speaker worries that his own fragile constitution and lack of an exercise regime might 
prevent him from killing the man (those facts explain why the speaker breaks a nail knocking 
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 “le goût passionné des mauvaises lectures engendre un besoin proportionnel du grand air et des 
rafraîchissants” 
 
95
 “avec un de ces regards inoubliables qui culbuteraient les trônes, si l'esprit remuait la matière, et si 
l'œil d'un magnétiseur faisait mûrir les raisins” 
 
96
 “Ce pauvre Socrate n'avait qu'un Démon prohibiteur; le mien est un grand affirmateur, le mien est un 
Démon d'action, un Démon de combat” 
 
97
 “«Celui-là seul est l'égal d'un autre, qui le prouve, et celui-là seul est digne de la liberté, qui sait la 
conquérir.»” 
 
  
61 
out the beggar’s teeth), and as he rams the man’s head into a wall, the speaker reassures 
readers that “I had verifed that in this deserted suburb I would find myself, for a rather long 
time, away from the presence of any policeman.”98  As the speaker moves to finish the 
beggar off by beating him with a tree branch “avec l'énergie obstinée des cuisiniers qui 
veulent attendrir un steak” [with the obstinate energy of cooks who want to tenderize a 
steak], the beggar shocks his attacker by picking himself up off the ground and fighting back. 
Baudelaire writes:  
 All of a sudden—o the joy of a philosopher who confirms the excellence of his 
theory!—I saw this ancient carcass stand up, restore himself with an energy I would 
never have guessed at in a machine so singularly decrepit, and, with a look of hate 
that appeared to me a good augur, the decrepit man jumped on me, punched out my 
two eyes, broke four of my teeth, and with the same tree branch beat me like a sheet 
of metal.  –By my energetic medication, I had thus returned to him his pride and his 
life.99  
 
The proud philosopher, no doubt worried about his own physical well-being, then signals to 
the beggar “pour lui faire comprendre que je considérais la discussion comme finie” [to make 
him understand that I considered the discussion over] and instructs him: “Sir, you are my 
equal! Do me the honor of sharing with me my winnings; and remember, if you are truly 
philanthropic, that you must apply to all your cohorts, when they ask for charity the theory 
that I have had the difficulty of trying on your back.”100 The poem concludes with the 
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“j'avais vérifié que dans cette banlieue déserte je me trouvais, pour un assez long temps, hors de la 
portée de tout agent de police” 
 
99
 “Tout à coup, -- ô jouissance du philosophe qui vérifie l'excellence de sa théorie! -- je vis cette 
antique carcasse se retourner, se redresser avec une énergie que je n'aurais jamais soupçonnée dans une machine 
si singulièrement détraquée, et, avec un regard de haine qui me parut de bon augure, le malandrin décrépit se 
jeta sur moi, me pocha les deux yeux, me cassa quatre dents, et avec la même branche d'arbre me battit dru 
comme plâtre. -- Par mon énergique médication, je lui avais donc rendu l'orgueil et la vie. » 
 
100
 “ «Monsieur, vous êtes mon égal! veuillez me faire l'honneur de partager avec moi ma bourse; et 
souvenez-vous, si vous êtes réellement philanthrope, qu'il faut appliquer à tous vos confrères, quand ils vous 
demanderont l'aumône, la théorie que j'ai eu la douleur d'essayer sur votre dos.»” 
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speaker reporting that the beggar assured him that he “avait compris ma théorie, et qu'il 
obéirait à mes conseils” [had understood my theory and would obey my counsel]. 
 In one version of the manuscript Baudelaire concludes with the line: “Qu’en dis-tu, 
Citoyen Proudhon?” [What do you say of it, Citizen Proudhon?]. In a letter to Proudhon 
dated August 22, 1848, in which Baudelaire urges Proudhon to be careful of attempts on 
his life, the poet writes that he has “une absolue confiance” in Proudhon. If, then, we read 
the poem through the lens of an anarchist philosophy, we might note the central role of the 
immediate apprehension of experience in the context of utterly illogical “common sense” and 
the irrationality of hallucinations. And yet,  much madness is divinest sense: the alienists 
Baudelaire references in the poem-- Louis Francisque Lélut (1804-1877) and Jules-Gabriel-
François Baillarger (1815-1890) studied hallucinations, and Lélut judged Socrates afflicted 
with insanity in Du démon de Socrate, spécimen d’une application de la science 
psychologique à celle de l’histoire (1836). But, Baudelaire seems to ask, is Socrates madder, 
Proudhon’s theories more outlandish, and the speaker’s philosophical and physiological 
remedy more absurd than prevailing theories on how to deal with the poor and the issue of 
poverty? 
Like the philosopher, the artist holds the potential to see the issue of poverty in a 
clearer light, to see beyond the lazy and convenient truisms society proffers. In “La Corde” 
[The Rope], a prose poem dedicated to Edouard Manet, the impressionist painter, and 
ostensibly narrated in his voice, the speaker opens with the assertion that nothing is more 
inviolable than maternal love, than a mother’s affection for her own child. The painter-
speaker of the poem adopts his favorite portrait model, a young boy, from his dirt-poor 
parents. The boy shows a predisposition for bouts of depression and a predilection for sweets 
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and alcohol that causes him to steal. After one such theft, the painter threatens to return the 
boy to his parents. The artist returns home later that day to discover that his charge has 
hanged himself, and cries out to his neighbors for help. No one, notes the speaker, ever 
wishes to involve himself in the business of a hanged man, and none of the neighbors 
respond. 
 When the speaker summons the resolve to go and inform the boy's parents of their 
son's suicide, he is surprised by their stoic reaction but tells himself "Les douleurs les plus 
terribles sont les douleurs muettes" [The most dreadful sorrows are those suffered in silence]. 
The mother pleads first for her son's corpse, then, after the painter dissuades her, for a piece 
of the rope he used to fashion his noose that remains, much to the painter's horror, attached to 
the armoire. The painter, thinking the mother's grief over the loss of her son motivates her 
request, readily assents. The next morning he awakens to a barrage of letters from neighbors 
asking also for a piece of the rope, and the speaker suddenly realizes its commercial value, 
and that a desire for monetary profit, not sentiment, impelled the mother's request: “And 
then, suddenly, a light went off in my brain, and I understood why the mother wanted so 
badly to tear from me the remainder of the rope and by what commerce she was intending to 
console herself.”101  Participation in commerce apparently reveals the illusion of maternal 
love, and the impersonal character of commodity exchange replaces the specific and intimate 
love of a mother for her own flesh and blood. 
The first paragraph of the prose poem prepares readers for an investigation of the 
manifold illusions that, at least in the poet's estimation, surround them. The introduction 
makes clear not only the vast number of illusions readers confront, but the difficulty of 
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 "Et alors, soudainement, une lueur se fit dans mon cerveau, et je compris pourquoi la mère tenait 
tant à m'arracher la ficelle et par quel commerce elle entendait se consoler" 
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discovering them, their ability to reside in some of the "truths" readers hold most self-
evident. Baudelaire also makes clear through the voice of the painter that the unveiling of 
illusions involves a process of loss and mourning, on the one hand, and excitement before the 
newly apparent character of the real, on the other. "La Corde" opens: 
 Illusions,--my friend was saying to me,-- are as innumerable perhaps as the 
relations between men, or of men with things. And when the illusion is disappearing, 
that's to say when we see the being or the fact just as it exists apart from us, we 
experience a strange sentiment, half composed of regret for the disappeared ghost, 
half of pleasant surprise before novelty, before the real fact. If there exists any 
phenomenon that is obvious, trivial, always the same, and of a character it is 
impossible to mistake, it is maternal love. It is as difficult to conceive of a mother 
without maternal love as it is of a light without heat; isn't it then perfectly legitimate 
to attribute to maternal love all the actions and words of a mother regarding her child? 
But, however, listen to this little tale, through which I was singularly mystified by the 
most natural of illusions.102 
 
The mystification of the poem's speaker functions to comfort the reader, to assure her that 
even great artists may be duped by illusions, such that the reader may be more willing to 
acknowledge and search out her own delusions of reality. And yet Baudelaire's prose poems 
addressing the poor, poverty and the character of illusion in society suggest that problems of 
accurate perception--which would seem to require an ability to empathize and analyze and a 
willingness to grapple (perhaps physically!) with the poor and the issue of poverty—are 
serious. If we accept that an attenuation of time brings about a shrinkage of modern 
experience, then the poet’s preoccupation with accurate perception signals an urgent social 
need.  Nothing trumps knowledge acquired through experience—even the painter cannot see, 
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 «Les illusions, -- me disait mon ami, -- sont aussi innombrables peut-être que les rapports des 
hommes entre eux, ou des hommes avec les choses.  Et quand l'illusion disparaît, c'est-à-dire quand nous 
voyons l'être ou le fait tel qu'il existe en dehors de nous, nous éprouvons un bizarre sentiment, compliqué moitié 
de regret pour le fantôme disparu, moitié de surprise agréable devant la nouveauté, devant le fait réel.  S'il existe 
un phénomène évident, trivial, toujours semblable, et d'une nature à laquelle il soit impossible de se tromper, 
c'est l'amour maternel.  Il est aussi difficile de supposer une mère sans amour maternel qu'une lumière sans 
chaleur; n'est-il donc pas parfaitement légitime d'attribuer à l'amour maternel toutes les actions et les paroles 
d'une mère, relatives à son enfant?  Et cependant écoutez cette petite histoire, où j'ai été singulièrement mystifié 
par l'illusion la plus naturelle.»" 
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cannot interept the reality of the poor before his eyes accurately until he interacts with them 
(the boy’s mother) directly. And nothing, another prose poem suggests, is more inexcusable 
than subscribing to an illusion. “La Fausse Monnaie” [“Counterfeit Money”] concludes with 
the judgment: “One is never excusable for being evil, but there is some merit in knowing that 
one is; and the most unforgivable of vices is to do evil through stupidity.” 103 Seeing clearly, 
perceiving accurately, matters.  
   
Art, Experience, and the Politics of Deformation 
The question of genre in the prose poems does not exist independently of inquiry into 
Baudelaire's subject matter. If accurate perception matters, and experience (unfolding in 
time) offers the best conduit to such perception, then the prose poem’s deformation of form 
takes center stage, for this deformation temporalizes form to make a project of 
retemporalization possible.  The interdependence and inseparability of form and content in 
the prose poems suggest how different a project they represent from Les Fleurs du mal, 
which epitomizes the modernist project of the poet as flâneur: to discern beauty and 
individuality in the modern city and to create something from it.104 Intellectual historian J.W. 
Burrows describes the dandy-cum- flâneur as "at the heart of modern society... yet wholly 
insulated from any demands it might make on him" and characterized by "aesthetic not 
sentimental" sympathies.105 This flâneur is not the heart of the speaker of the vast majority of 
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 “On n’est jamais excusable d’être méchant, mais il y a quelque mérite à savoir qu’on l’est; et le plus 
irréparable des vices est de faire le mal  par bêtise.” 
 
104
 Elizabeth Wilson, “The Invisible Flaneur.” New Left Review 191, no. 1 (January-February 1992): 
90-110. 
 
105
 J. W. Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 2000), 173. 
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the prose poems. Baudelaire's thematic interest in poverty and frequently empathetic 
portrayals of the poor argue against a purely aesthetic interest on the part of many of the 
prose poems' speakers. 
Or do they? Elizabeth Wilson characterizes the Modernist task of the strolling urban 
artist in “The Invisible Flaneur” as follows: 
The heroism... is in surviving the disorientating space, both labyrinthine and 
agoraphobic, of the metropolis. It lies in the ability to discern among the massed 
ranks of anonymity the outline of forms of beauty and individuality appropriate to 
urban life. The act of creating meaning, seemingly so arbitrary, becomes heroic in 
itself. (19-20) 
 
The deformation of the prose poem may be viewed as a response to the Herculean task of 
creating meaning in a society that in the main lacks a temporality for experience. In the 
difficult process of creating meaning, Baudelaire’s prose poems work to denature the already 
temporally denatured habitual paradigms of reality, critically participating in newly modern 
habits of reading, interpreting, assigning value, and identifying content as high art or 
newspaper fodder. The prose poems alienate but do not shock, which allows—even 
demands—a longer engagement of the audience with the text, and through this more 
sustained engagement readers stand to gain a resuscitation of experience. In 1848 Baudelaire 
watched the February riots from the Place de la Concorde with Gustave Courbet, crying out  
in  his excitement “General Aupick [Baudelaire’s stepfather]  must be killed!” Baudelaire 
diagnosed his excitement years later as “literary intoxication; memories of what I had read.” 
It is this preoccupation with the aesthetic imagination and endeavors that permitted 
Baudelaire to respond to the political and social turmoil in aesthethic terms, terms which, as 
Baudelaire evidences in the prose poems, clearly do not preclude emotional responses or 
political concerns while, in my anarchist modernism reading, certainly performing social and 
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political work. The prose poem’s refusal to adhere to a poetic form participates in the same 
task of promoting an indeterminacy for self-determination as does explicitly political 
philosphophical anarchism in its rejection of political form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Gertrude Stein Authors Collective Time 
Gertrude Stein’s writing reclaims time for experience. Rather than contract past and 
present in the service of future plans, engineering a plot to arrive at its end, Stein holds the 
future hostage to the unfolding present. As Stein scholar Ulla Dydo explains, “Stein’s is a 
world—a space—of unending process, which does not unroll toward a climax or conclusion 
but goes on, steadily and simultaneously, in many forms” (41). We see in Stein’s texts a 
steadfast refusal to arrest time, to halt the movement of thought and experience through 
coalescence into any fixed meaning which might then take its place. Experience, or duration, 
exceeds the ideas to which meaning reduces it, so Stein’s temporal defiance leaves its traces 
in the appearance of a sort of remainder, text from which readers cannot extract meaning as it 
is conventionally construed (for example as plot, characterization, or moral in fiction or as 
sound effect, figurative language or poetic devices in poems and prose poems).106 In a 
discussion of the ‘openness’ of Stein’s work, Mac Wellman observes: “[Stein’s art] is the 
work of somebody who continues to write when she has nothing to say, which is deeply 
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 I provide these examples of textual operations to which we look for meaning only as evidence of 
readerly habits of extracting meaning from texts. Obviously, much—if not the bulk—of Stein’s writing crosses 
borders between prose and poetry ands wander among genres. I read this wandering as a part of the avoidance 
of identity, teleology, and closure in Stein’s texts. 
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terrifying for most people.”107 As an ongoing, open work, Stein’s writing evokes anarchism’s 
ethos of practice and unease with teleology in its nondirective, processual character.108 
This chapter treats Gertrude Stein as a founding figure in an explicitly anti-
foundationalist anarchist modernist politics of time. If Proudhon identifies republican 
politics’ failure to grapple with temporal multiplicity as an obstacle to realizing a republic, 
and Baudelaire signals literature as a locus for addressing this political failure, Stein theorizes 
and enacts a retemporalization, re-inflating the present and re-imbuing it with the difference 
of duration. Language art serves as the site for change that cannot be effected within given 
political procedures, and Stein responds to the attenuation and aestheticization of time by re-
making it, re-infusing language with a richer experience of temporality. 
I approach Stein as a political thinker who largely evades political philosophy to 
practice a “happy anarchism.”  Stein’s disengagement with political philosophy indicates, as 
with Proudhon, an interest in means rather than a debate about ends: Stein basically accepted 
republicanism. Her contribution to political thinking unfolds as a politics of time that works 
by confronting readers with interaction among formal-constitutive, historical, and 
experiential conceptions of time, making them conscious of such interaction and its 
productive potential. At its most useful, Stein’s writing works toward conditions necessary 
for self-institution, for individuals and collectives to come into temporality to produce an 
actual republican polis. The creation of this polis depends on individuals and collectives 
coming to possess time and on replacing teleological, futurist orientations with the “peaceful 
and exciting” change Stein valorizes in the present. This political possession of time that 
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permits an embodiment of the republic emerges as a simultaneous cohabiting of time, in all 
its difference, not as synchronization, some process of jostling behind the scenes to align 
individuals and collectives at a starting line for a brief moment, as though before a race.   
I use Deleuze’s conception of the three syntheses of time as a touchstone for 
imagining the interaction among formal-constitutive, historical, and experiential or 
phenomenological time in Stein’s work. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze presents the 
self as a modification of time and time in terms of three syntheses: habit, the ‘foundation’ of 
time; memory or attentive recollection, the ‘ground’ of time;109 and eternal return, the 
repetition of the future in which “the ground has been superseded by a groundlessness, a 
universal ungrounding which turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to return” 
(91). In the third synthesis “[t]he form of time is there only for the revelation of the formless 
in the eternal return” (91) because this last synthesis is a “repetition by excess” in which 
“neither the condition nor the agent… return” (90). The first synthesis functions as the 
“living present” that the second synthesis grounds by registering change, “the passing of one 
present and the arrival of another” (94). But it is not until the third synthesis that the event of 
change takes place, that a new future to which the actors become equal is realized. Deleuze 
explains: 
In the third synthesis, however, the present is no more than an actor, an author, an 
agent destined to be effaced; while the past is no more than a condition operating by 
default. The synthesis of time here constitutes a future which affirms at once both the 
unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production, 
and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor. In all three 
syntheses, present, past and future are revealed as Repetition, but in three very 
different modes. The present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future 
is that which is repeated. (94) 
 
                                                 
109
 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton.( New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994, 79. Subsequent parenthetical citations refer to this text. 
 
  
71 
Deleuze’s conception yields repetition as “for itself, difference in itself” and as “the category 
of the future.”  This conceptualization of time in terms of repeated difference demands a 
politics of time in which movement supplants representation. While representation offers one 
center, one perspective that “mediate[s] everything, but mobilises and moves nothing,” 
movement “implies a plurality of centers, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points 
of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially distort representation” (55-56). Stein’s 
radically individual, nonconformist aesthetics unite Deleuze’s temporality of movement with 
anarchism’s avoidance of centralization and representation. As David Kadlec notes, Stein’s 
“resistance to mimetic ‘resembling’… hinges… on an anarchistic decentralization of 
linguistic and visual ‘syntax,’” and her “effort to decentralize… drove her desire to ‘rid’ 
poetry of nouns’… and to fashion the modern ‘paragraph’ as not a representational unit but 
rather as a ‘space that is filled with moving’” (31).   
Deleuze’s theorization of the three syntheses provides a useful lens through which to 
consider the temporal character of Stein’s writing.110  This chapter proceeds by describing 
that character and then tracing its politics. While I do look to the prose poems of Tender 
Buttons (1914) as seminal texts for thinking about retemporalization, I also consider later, 
more novelistic and autobiographical writings such as the memoir Paris France (1940), 
Everybody’s Autobiography (1937), and Wars I Have Seen (1945). The tendency on the part 
of Stein scholars to distinguish between “experimental” and “audience” writing does tell us 
something about the difference between Tender Buttons or The Geographical History of 
America (1936), on the one hand, and The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933) on the 
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other, but in terms of a politics of time I tend to see Stein’s writing as more of a piece—
despite or because of its wandering among genres—than as divided. Virtually all of Stein’s 
œuvre temporalizes form as process and experience and eschews revolutionary politics, 
clearly taking the side of the ideal type of the prose poem over that of the manifesto.   
I pay particular attention to the ways Stein’s texts, even as they frequently make 
outrageous political pronouncements and proffer questionably tenable readings of history, 
consistently articulate a temporal politics of difference and process that holds promise for a 
simultaneous self-determination at the level of the individual and the collectivity. Stein’s 
conception of nation, in particular, discards the form of the nation state in favor of a dynamic 
collective embodiment, a living together in constant motion.  From the perspective of the 
work of anarchist modernism, Stein’s texts comprise a gold mine of strategies for reinstating 
time for everyone. 
 
I. Becoming and Repeating: Fleshing out the Present 
The prose poems of Tender Buttons and the long, often autobiographical works of 
Stein’s last decade demonstrate a consistent focus on “fattening” the present. Stein either 
draws the present out by focusing on becoming and on ongoing, continuous action or situates 
the present in cyclical time, as a moment to be repeated.  
Stein re-inflates the present by focusing on becoming, which “does not tolerate the 
separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future.”111  Attending to 
becoming emphasizes the extent and duration of time conceived as blank linearity 
(continuous chronological time) and calls attention to the teleology often imposed upon it. 
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For example, Stein asks “What is the use of being a little boy if you are going to grow up to 
be a man"? (Geographical History 58). If the boy is merely the cause of the man, why bother 
with him? Stein’s question echoes Bergson’s discussion of the reality of temporal movement 
in Creative Evolution (1907). Bergson writes: 
Infancy, adolescence, maturity, old age, are mere views of the mind, possible stops 
imagined by us, from without, along the continuity of a progress. […]When we say 
“The child becomes a man,” let us take care not to fathom too deeply the literal 
meaning of the expression, or we shall find that, when we posit the subject “child,” 
the attribute “man” does not yet apply to it, and that, we when express the attribute 
“man,” it applies no more to the subject “child.” The reality, which is the transition 
from childhood to manhood, has slipped between our fingers.112  
 
Read in this light, Stein’s question mocks the importance assigned to end-points (“boy” and 
“man”) at the expense of the intervening duration.  Bergson himself uses the example of a 
boy becoming a man to critique what he terms “the cinematographical mechanism of 
thought,” which ignores the actual character of duration.  Bergson insists, “The truth is that if 
language here were molded on reality, we should not say “The child becomes the man,” but 
“There is becoming from the child to the man.”113 Stein’s texts take on this becoming, the 
passage of time characterized by ongoing change, “the difference” that “is spreading”114  to 
recharge becoming with the movement and difference normally occluded by an orientation 
towards ends and accompanying assumption of linear development. Stein’s time-sense 
counters habitual thought, in which “[b]ecomes” represents “the movement, always the same, 
of the cinematographical film, a movement hidden in the apparatus and whose function it is 
to superpose the successive pictures on one another in order to imitate the movement of the 
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real object.” 115   To encounter the object as it actually exists in time, over time, we “must… 
escape from the cinematographical mechanism of thought.”116 
 Stein defines a route of escape through a coming into one’s own in language. Just as 
Bergson’s durée is not restricted to personal psychology but encompasses all of reality or 
ontological existence, coming into language occurs not just individually but collectively. In a 
favorable comparison of American soldiers of the Second World War to those who came to 
Europe during the first, the narrator of Wars I Have Seen asserts  
I think of the Americans of the last war, they had their language but they were not yet 
in possession of it, and the children of the depression as that generation called itself it 
was beginning to possess its language but it was still struggling but now the job is 
done, the G. I. Joes have this language that is theirs, they do not have to worry about 
it, they dominate their language and in dominating their language which is now all 
theirs they have ceased to be adolescents and have become men.117 
 
Two elements stand out in this passage: first, the states of adolescence and adulthood exist 
only in reference to linguistic facility; and second, the acquisition of adulthood shows its 
becoming, manifests it repeatedly, through language use.  Becoming culminates in the 
repetition of fully inhabiting one’s language, a process rather than an end point. Language 
marks independence from a childish colonized status. Stein observes: “I was much taken with 
what one American soldier said when he was in England. He said we did not get along at all 
with the English until they finally did get it into their heads that we were not cousins, but 
foreigners, once they really got that, there was no more trouble” (Wars I Have Seen 25).  
Language is an especially crucial component of living together because of the rare security it 
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affords as one of the few things moderns can truly own. 118 Through language Stein escapes 
the cinematographical mechanism of thought not by substituting another mechanism to 
connect static end points but by exchanging the idea of mechanism for dynamism, a living 
language. 
Stein “fleshes out” the present by inflating moments into becoming and by situating 
the present in a context of flux, releasing time from static notions of form and highlighting 
the repetition of daily life to emphasize cyclical conceptions of time at the expense of linear 
ones. Many of Stein’s earlier writings, particularly Tender Buttons and the portraits, overtly 
throw off the yoke of form to restore the time-sense—the ongoing, everchanging character of 
experience—of process. For example, in “A Time to Eat,” which appears in the middle of the 
“Objects” section of Tender Buttons, the short prose poem never moves beyond its own 
(temporal) enactment to arrive at some formal closure. “A Time to Eat” asserts, in its 
entirety: “A pleasant simple habitual and tyrannical and authorised and educated and 
resumed and articulate separation. This is not tardy.”119  The poem enacts what it tells, an 
“articulate separation,” and exhibits many of the hallmarks of a Steinian prose poem: 
quotidian content, an evocation of time as simultaneously repeated and unending, and 
unexpected combination. The adjectives in the text suggest oppositionality, between 
“pleasant” and “habitual,” on the one hand, and “tyrannical and authorised,” on the other; 
between “simple” and “educated”; and between “resumed” and “articulate.” These adjectives 
seem to comment both on the “object” of the poem— a time to eat as an end—and on the 
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objects of the poem, words, language. “Pleasant” calls to mind food as enjoyment; “simple,” 
a basic meal or eating as a fundamental act; “habitual,” the fact that eating occurs all the 
time; “tyrannical,” the requirement that one has to do it; “authorized,” that eating fits with 
accepted social norms; “educated,” that one learns the proper way to do it; and “resumed,” 
that eating ends and begins again. Then “articulate” would seem to present an obstacle to the 
logical path: in evoking the articulation of words in succession like the bones of a skeleton, 
the sentence shifts from conveying content to calling attention to medium (word-bones) and 
to its own enactment in time: “This is not tardy.” Stein’s prose poem announces itself in the 
act of its realization—its reading and interpretation—as composed of entities, medium and 
act inextricably bound up in process, not as a form with a content distinct from its container. 
Words and food, eating and reading, comprise the indissoluble stuff of daily life as objects 
are gathered into the temporal contexts of their use. 
  
II. Open Time: Incorporating Entities and Forces in Expression 
Tender Buttons reveals Stein’s—and modern physics’-- seemingly paradoxical 
advocacy of two distinct views of reality, one of atomistic elements that retain their 
autonomy as entities, coming together and moving apart without violation, the other of the 
“unfixability,” the formlessness, of each experienced moment.120  This double view takes on 
additional significance for Stein’s aesthetics in the context of her study under William James 
while she was a student at Radcliffe and, as I emphasize here, with respect to the ethical and 
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political implications of Stein’s writing.121 The question is how to preserve the conditions 
under which both these descriptions of reality might exist, or in Gödel’s terms, to maintain 
the incompleteness of any systematization.   
Stein’s emphasis on individual autonomy, on the one hand, and capturing the 
dynamic and relational nature of experience, on the other, cohabit in the temporality of her 
writing as entities and forces.  Rather than choose between entities—words, people-- and 
dynamic forces, Stein gathers their interaction in expression, the webbed character of specific 
circumstances, forcefields of relation. She opts for a semi-autonomy in which entities 
relinquish any notion of a context-free existence and in which the freedom of forces is 
limited by an ethics that recognizes the reality of relations and their effects.  This 
aesthetically-rendered depiction of the world possesses a time sense which, put into practice 
in the operations of texts, includes much more experience—temporal and spatial 
multiplicity—than existing political mechanisms can take into account, and in that capacity 
continues the anarchist modernist project Baudelaire inaugurates in Le Spleen de Paris. Most 
remarkably, Stein’s sort of literary physics works within notions of the sanctity of the 
individual even as it attends to contexts in which form, thought here as the autonomy of the 
individual, is deformed in relation and context.  The next two sections of this chapter 
emphasize the ontological mobility of Stein’s experiential world in comparison to the more 
static political imagination. I also delineate some of the ways Stein suggests, explicitly and 
implicitly, for politics to catch up to experience. 
 Movement links entities and forces by situating them in experience. Like Baudelaire, 
Stein wrote prose poems that engage readers in a dialectical process of defamiliarization and 
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reconstitution of the textual universe.  Her generic innovations, largely hybridizations and 
mixed generic texts, advance an ambitious poetics that loosens familiar social constructions 
to make them more flexible and multiple, allowing alterations to existing frameworks of 
perception and action and giving rise to new ones. Tender Buttons makes art out of life by 
taking everyday household items—“Food”,” Objects” and “Rooms”—and converting 
domestic economy to word arrangements that fail to make sense, at least in terms of 
referential value and conventional language usage.  Stein’s failure to make sense emerges in 
the creation of an art of common objects, and frequently, in the context of Cubism, scholars 
have referred to Stein’s prose poems as “still-lifes.” Yet like the work the genre of the prose 
poem performs, provoking an oscillation on the part of the reader between familiar (generic 
convention) and unfamiliar (switching from one generic register to another), what matters in 
Stein’s still-lifes is movement. If cubist painting explores the perception of movement in time 
and space, Tender Buttons focuses on the movement of perception, its fluidity and 
changeability.  
 Stein’s emphasis on movement is linked to the temporality of her texts and to a 
conception of knowledge she explains in The Geographical History of America. Stein 
distinguishes between the knowledge allowed by the human mind and that permitted by 
human nature, declaring: “To understand a thing means to be in contact with that thing and 
the human mind can be in contact with anything. / “Human nature can be connected with 
anything but it can not be in contact with anything” (66). Understanding’s dependence on 
contact (offered by the human mind) rather than connection (a characteristic of human 
nature), makes freedom of movement paramount. One might contrast this freedom with the 
stasis of representation. Stein’s nonconformist aesthetics share anarchism’s avoidance of 
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domination, particularly with respect to centralization and representation, even at the level of 
self-knowledge, where her preference for contact over connection decenters, if not undoes, 
identity in favor of creation. 
As a centralized representation of the self to the self, identity opposes the conception 
of knowledge Stein associates with the human mind and links to contact. The self as a form is 
not exempted from Stein’s temporalization of form in her language art, and as such possesses 
a variable semi-autonomy dependent on context. Consequently, while knowledge of the self 
depends on its contact with the world beyond it, the self’s very existence happens, not is: the 
self is constantly in process. The self’s status as particle (an entity in contact with other 
entities) and wave (in process) allows an analogy between the temporal character of the self 
and that of the expression of an artwork. Both the self and the artwork emerge through 
poeisis, as the following reading of What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of 
Them?, a lecture Stein delivered at Oxford in February 1936 and published in 1940, 
illustrates. 
 Stein links an evasion of identity to creation and the freedom of self-determination in 
her discussion of expression as the practice of a freedom that surpasses or exceeds the 
individual person or artwork. In What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of 
Them? Stein characterizes a masterpiece in terms of an escape from identity and school. The 
process of producing a masterpiece entails a momentary forgetting or break with everyday 
reality, a departure from normal consciousness. Stein explains: 
The thing one gradually comes to find out is that one has no identity that is when one 
is in the act of doing anything. Identity is recognition, you know who you are because 
you and others remember anything about yourself but essentially you are not that 
when you are doing anything. I am I because my little dog knows me but, creatively 
speaking the little dog knowing that you are you and your recognizing that he knows, 
that is what destroys creation. That is what makes school. Picasso once remarked I do 
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not care who it is that has or does influence me as long as it is not myself. [my italics] 
(355) 
 
Creation involves not perceiving oneself or one’s context as one normally does,  not knowing 
according to prevailing norms or what a school of thought teaches, avoiding the easy 
connection (of human nature) in favor of the experience of contact (of the human mind). This 
alienation from self and context might be read as self-absorption, but also as absorption of 
the self in the act of imagining a new context. The first reading emphasizes an introspection 
and individualism characteristic of one modernist stereotype; the second interpretation 
envisions the self as extrusive and attached to process and environment. Loss of identity 
occasions a momentary disinterest that is productive, and as Stein shows later in this text, the 
artist creates a masterpiece that raises the question of identity and which may then spur a 
reflection on identity that could yield alternate identities or more dynamic alternatives to 
identity. 
 Stein’s move away from identity is explicitly a move toward creation or making 
(poiesis). Subjects step outside identity to create themselves anew. Stein asserts: “At any 
moment when you are you you are you without the memory of yourself because if you 
remember yourself while you are you you are not for purposes of creating you” (356). This 
seemingly paradoxical declaration that one must forget oneself in order to become oneself, or 
a different instantiation of oneself, makes sense in the context of school and of the dialectic 
of recognition between the subject and her dog. The reference to school evokes the context of 
received notions and pedagogy in which identities are constructed, a context indicative of the 
category of knowledge Stein labels human nature. Likewise, the recognition between the 
subject and her dog invokes an already given connection, not an understanding generated in 
the specific encounter or contact.  So to mitigate the influence of school and escape the 
  
81 
constraints of connection, subjects must forget themselves. In this forgetting lies the 
possibility of forging something other, because the present temporality of contact can 
generate an understanding only if connections to the past, to preformed notions, are loosened.  
 Stein explains this potential for creating something other than what context has 
already developed by opposing necessity and human nature to possibility and the human 
mind. The possibility of going on, of a masterpiece maintaining an impact, is that of creation, 
which depends on open engagement rather than on necessity, which is unreflective, 
consumed rather than expressed. Necessity and human nature meet in naturalized 
preconceptions, in accordance with the Kantian formulation of necessity as bound to a 
“coherence with the actual… determined according to universal conditions of experience.”122 
Creation lies outside these, the product of the human mind to imagine something other than 
what human nature believes, values and does during a specific period in a particular place. 
Stein argues: 
…action is direct and effective but after all action is necessary and anything that is 
necessary has to do with human nature and not with the human mind. Therefore a 
master-piece has essentially not to be necessary, it has to be that is it has to exist but it 
does not have to be necessary it is not in response to necessity as action is because the 
minute it is necessary it has in it no possibility of going on. (357) 
 
Kant formulates the principle of possibility as "What agrees (in terms of intuitions and 
concepts) with the formal conditions of experience is possible."123 What is judged necessary 
cannot “go on” because the perceived universal conditions of experience, as the modern 
experience of time, do not admit of its temporality. Both the specific masterpiece and 
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individual artwork as Stein conceives them can exist only in the temporality permitted by a 
poietic temporalization of form. 
In the contest between contact and connection, human mind and human nature, only 
contact preserves the difference intrinsic to temporal multiplicity. Masterpieces raise 
questions that allow those who regard them to think beyond the status quo: What does a 
masterpiece do? Which approaches does it require to be intelligible? How should we regard 
it? What contexts does it need, suggest? What, if any, means, frames, practices does it need? 
In being out of relation, a masterpiece begs consideration of what would have to change to 
bring it into relation. But bringing the masterpiece “down to earth” comes at a cost: “The 
moment it is in relation it is common knowledge and anybody can feel and know it and it is 
not a master-piece” (358). The proper mode of engagement with a masterpiece is through 
contact, not connection, such that an understanding of it can develop relationally, 
processually.  
Stein suggests that it may be easier to understand masterpieces from antiquity than 
those from our own time because they are less readily apprehensible through connection. 
Historical difference usefully estranges them. Stein notes the contemporary salience of 
ancient art: 
 
The manner and habits of Bible times or Greek or Chinese have nothing to do with 
ours today but the masterpieces exist just the same and they do not exist because of 
their identity, that is what any one remembering then remembered then, they do not 
exist by human nature because everybody always knows everything there is to know 
about human nature, they exist because they came to be as something that is an end in 
itself and in that respect it is opposed to the business of living which is relation and 
necessity. (358) 
 
Two antipodes emerge here, that of “manner and habits,” human nature, identity, relation and 
necessity, versus “something that is an end in itself.” The masterpieces of antiquity have 
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come “to be as something that is an end in itself” because their contexts are alien to our own 
“manner and habits.” Like prose poems, masterpieces are able to perform a specific work of 
retemporalization through the engagement (the contact) they demand to overcome their 
initial alienation. 
 In the last part of What Are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them? Stein 
intimates the political utility of an abandonment of identity.  The value of knowing that one 
has no identity, of masterpieces’ re-fashioning of temporality, is a full, open present, a 
broader realm of the possible.  Creation staves off time (the determinism of the past, 
contractedness of the passing present, or teleology of a given future), as Stein insists “time 
and identity is what you tell about as you create only while you create they do not exist.” She 
explains: 
But what can a master-piece be about mostly it is about identity and all it does and in 
being so it must not have any. I was just thinking about anything and in thinking 
about anything I saw something. In seeing that thing shall we see it without it turning 
into identity, the moment is not a moment and the sight is not the thing seen and yet it 
is. Moments are not important because of course master-pieces have no more time 
than they have identity although time like identity is what they concern themselves 
about… (360-61) 
 
Masterpieces step outside time and identity to make time and identity the terms they contest, 
or at least put back into play. The time-sense masterpieces produce is opposed to the arrested 
time of governance, so masterpieces perform a politically significant work of delivering from 
power relations. Stein reasons: 
If there was no identity no one could be governed, but everybody is governed by 
everybody and that is why they make no master-pieces, and also why governing has 
nothing to do with master-pieces it has completely to do with identity but it has 
nothing to do with master-pieces. And that is why governing is occupying but not 
interesting, governments are occupying but not interesting because master-pieces are 
exactly what they are not. (363) 
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Outside identity, masterpieces also exist apart from governance, aware of freedom from 
constraint but disinterested in using that freedom for a power grab, for purposes of 
governance. As metanarratives, masterpieces tell about the context they eschew and escape 
and allow us to perceive conditions that usually govern our perception and evaluate them. In 
this text as in Tender Buttons Stein is a reviser, constantly revising perception to allow 
political re-visioning and revising. This revising occurs in a particular temporality, between 
the “occupying” of identity and governance and the present of engagement of the interesting 
masterpiece. The former colonizes and dominates, while the latter appeals, rousing 
curiosity.124  Masterpieces provide a way of perceiving, re-viewing current contexts, 
practices, governance; “master-pieces” are literally pieces of mastery, of momentary triumph 
over prevailing identities. 
 To re-focus from the artwork to the individual, Stein’s evasions of identity cast her 
texts’ refusal of a stable or isolate “I” in a positive light. Charges of extreme subjectivism 
misread Stein’s project of recontextualization and overestimates the difficulty her writing 
poses to readers.125 This kind of charge mistakes Stein’s concern with apperception for 
solipsism, reading an investigation into self-consciousness and the operations of individual 
minds within particular social contexts as a retreat into a single mind’s most obscure 
preoccupations. The pronoun “I” does not appear, for example, in Tender Buttons, and as 
Ulla Dydo has noted, Stein “neutralizes” language through a variety of means, such as 
substituting impersonal pronouns (chiefly “it” and “this”) or pronouns without antecedents 
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for specific subjects: recontextualization (to engender “peaceful and exciting change”) begins 
with decontextualization. Of Stein’s “Identity A Poem” (1935), which is in fact more play 
than poem, Charles Bernstein notes, “Stein celebrates her suspension of identity, this holding 
off naming to see what otherwise emerges. Her writing becomes a state of willing, of willed, 
unknowingness.”126 Even when Stein takes herself as the subject of her writing, she seeks 
distance, writing her autobiography in the voice of Alice.   
 Such writing encapsulates the instability of experience, its non-reducibility to subjects 
and actions, entities and forces. Stein’s texts involve shifting subjects and entities and lack 
clearly defined subjects. The complexity of dynamism evades reduction to stable identity or, 
sometimes, any identity at all. As contact, knowledge of self cannot be separated from 
knowledge of selves, which we see in the ways Stein’s individuals and collectives can only 
be thought together, in relation in time.  
 
III. Authoring Time Collectively: Nation 
Like self, Stein takes on collectives as a matter of expression, not simply as entities in 
and of themselves. Her investments in collectives emerge in her writings in terms of two 
general types: an investment in actual, embodied groups of individuals, from the artists and 
writers who comprised her salons to grounded, living French people in the memoir Paris 
France (1940); and an investment in collectives as people in dialogue. Stein’s treatment of 
nations and national identity provides a good model of both of these types of collective 
investment.  Embodied as individuals, nations are not abstract ideals, superior to or different 
from the people that comprise them—they are just as prone to silliness and foibles as 
individuals. As people in dialogue(s), nations are not static entities but ongoing practice, 
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dynamic, with their character constantly in play. Given Stein’s grounding of nation in a 
specific kind of community and attention to an ethics of communal life and openness to 
identity, collectives for Stein consist of individuals living together, not as representations or 
fixed or static categories.127 Stein’s writing follows her thinking of nations: the barrier 
between form and content evaporates in practice, such that Stein’s reliance on mixed genres 
and generic hybrids has less to do with instantiating new forms than with transgressing form 
altogether.  
It is important, then, to understand Stein’s interest in nations and affection for many 
of them apart from the form of the nation-state. Stein broaches nations as expression and as 
community. As Catharine Stimpson has noted, “Although Stein believed in the free 
individual, she did not want to be free, atomistic, and isolated. She was sociable and 
gregarious, and her units of preference were the couple, the marriage…, the local community 
(be it a rural village or urban neighborhood with a common life and custom), and finally the 
nation, although her nationalism is cultural rather than political.”128 Barbara Will similarly 
reads Stein’s nationalism in terms of social interaction and communal belonging, perceiving 
it as “linked to a shared set of experiences and beliefs—cultural, geographical, and 
linguistic—as well as to the ongoing dialogue that takes place through and as a sign of this 
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shared experience. […] Without this love, without this profound sense of belonging, without 
this collective ‘talking and listening,’ allegiances in the name of abstract ideas become 
‘disgusting.’”129 
Stein announced in 1935: “Political theories bore me because political theories end in 
nothing. Soviet Russia will end in nothing and so will the Roosevelt administration end in 
nothing because it is not stimulating it will end in nothing.”130  In Stein’s aesthetics, as 
evidenced in the syntax of her pronouncement, ending is overrated, so the real bite of her 
critique comes from calling politics “not stimulating,” failing in practice.  Catharine 
Stimpson identifies three foci of Stein’s political ire: communism, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, and revolution, and also alludes to Stein as a closet anarchist, likening her to a 
“premature” Ayn Rand. Stein, writes Stimpson, “has whiffs of the closeted and demure 
anarchist…  approvingly quot[ing] her friends [in the 1930s] who say that Sovietism and 
collectivism are out of style and conservative. And what matters now, she says, happily, is 
anarchism.”131  I read Stein as a left-leaning (rather than individualist) anarchist, a reading 
linked to others that view Stein as a small-town Jeffersonian or as a “peaceful and exciting” 
(as Stein describes Paris in the first sentence of Paris France) pragmatist.  
My discussion here examines Stein’s conceptualization of nation in two works in 
relation to states and politics, on the one hand, and aesthetics and ethics, on the other, to 
explore her aesthetics more directly in relation to ethical anarchism. Stein advocates nations, 
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in this instance the United States and France, not states, and conceives of nations in ethical 
and communal terms that partake of her aesthetics of process and relationality.  
 In The Geographical History of America; or, The Relation of Human Nature to the 
Human Mind (1936) and Paris France (1940) Stein reflects on the two nations that comprise 
her home. Stein writes “America is my country and Paris is my home town”132 and asserts 
that as a republic, the U.S. “can have everything in common with France” (versus “a great 
deal in common with England” and “nothing in common with Germany”).133 Stein’s re-
encounter of the United States during her 1934-35 tour after three decades of expatriate 
living in France “provided a core of new voices and new experiences” which she assimilated 
and processed in The Geographical History of America.134 Conversely, Stein’s little book on 
France emerges from a context that is literally more conservative, an accumulation of Stein’s 
daily living in the country, under threat of war as Stein wrote. Stein’s biographers read Paris 
France as homage-- Wagner-Martin calls it “her book about her loyalty to France”135 and 
James Mellow cites Stein friend Kate Buss’s description of the book as a ‘love letter’ to 
France”.136 In contrast, The Geographical History of America has been received as “a work 
primarily of ideas, or, more precisely, of one idea,”137 an attempt “to arrive at something 
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beyond identity.”138 While The Geographical History of America overtly explores 
philosophical concerns, such as the nature of a masterpiece and of identity, and Paris France 
displays characteristics of the genre of the memoir, both texts conceptualize nation similarly. 
Read comparatively, these two works show how aesthetic and ethical concerns conjoin in the 
nation, an ongoing project of individuals interacting in community. 
Stein opens The Geographical History of America by situating herself in the context 
of U.S. history, beginning the text: “In the month of February were born Washington Lincoln 
and I.” Stein aligns herself with Washington and Lincoln and later in the text critiques Teddy 
and Franklin Roosevelt, but in many ways her concept of nation most resembles that of 
Thomas Jefferson. Stein’s assertion that “what makes America what it is” is that “In the 
United States there is more space where nobody is than where anybody is”139 echoes 
Jefferson’s belief that the United States will remain “virtuous… as long as agriculture is our 
principal object, which will be the case while there remains vacant lands in any part of 
America.”140 Stein also resembles Jefferson in her attention to size, perceiving it as an aide to 
freedom, space in which to wander unrestrained by centralized control. As Jefferson wrote, 
“Our country is too large to have all its affairs directed by a single government.”141 
Stein condemned politics as a “trade based entirely on human nature without the 
constructive aid of the human mind,” insisting  “People have a peculiar attitude toward being 
governed, in that they allow themselves to be governed not by people who think but by 
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people who never have thought in their lives.”142  So Stein conceives of politics as inherently 
uninventive, a (dull) dead end in which individuals subject themselves to thoughtless 
domination. Yet she wrote books lauding nations. 
 The Geographical History of America presents the U.S. in terms of action that has 
creative potential, as a large field of continuing processes in spatial relation. The book 
spatializes time through both verb tense and structure, creating a panorama that from the first 
sentence—“In the month of February were born Washington Lincoln and I”—makes time 
part of a landscape of apparently limitless expanse. The chapters of the book disrupt linear 
time by repeating and skipping, positing, for example, numerous “Chapter V”s and inserting 
“Chapter 91” in between a “Chapter I” and “Chapter II” that appear mid-way through the 
work. The spatialized temporality of the text enacts the nation’s geographical history by 
wandering. As Dydo notes of Stein’s sense of geography, it “is not about places visited 
during travels” or “setting or scenery” but “words in relation in the space of the 
composition.” 143 Dydo’s definition allows us to read in parallel Stein’s text and the text 
whose geography she takes for content, the U.S. Stein’s musing “What has excitement got to 
do with geography and how does the land the American land look from above from below 
and from custom and from habit” interrogates the interrelating components of the nation and 
of her text.144  Stein writes: “Wandering around a country has something to do with the 
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geographical history of that country and the way one piece of it is not separated from any 
other one” (84-85) and “wandering has something to do with the human mind” which “has 
neither identity nor time and when it sees anything has to look flat” (176). Action, not stasis, 
occurs without awareness of identity or time, and Stein valorizes this kind of action as 
creative.  The book’s fifth “Chapter II” asks and answers: “Are there any customs and habits 
in America there is geography and what what is the human mind. The human mind is there 
because they write and they do not forget or remember and they do not go away and come 
back again” (72).  The U.S. has human mind, which has nothing and everything to do with 
habit, because its inhabitants write—they do, they act—rather than remember or forget or 
become weighted down by the connections of human nature. Americans in this conception 
are paradoxically in the habit of not succumbing to habits, instead continually doing, 
changing. 
Stein associates this freedom of the human mind with what “ordinary” people do, not 
politicians. She insists: “A communist and individualist a propagandist a politician cannot 
listen to the human mind, a business man can and anybody who can sit and write can he can 
listen to the human mind” (74). Politicians and propaganda rely on programs and call on 
identity, but “anybody who can sit and write” and maintain an open mind may access human 
mind. Stein defined genius as listening and talking at the same time, and Charles Bernstein 
observes that much of her work espouses an “ethics of dialogue.”145 In Wars I Have Seen 
Stein praises “this army” for their skill at dialogue: “they talked and they listened” and “they 
consider that people have their habits and their ways of living, some you can get along with 
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and others you can’t, but they are all perfectly reasonable for the people who use them.” 
Stein calls this “the great change in Americans, that “they are interested, they are observant, 
they are accustomed to various types of people and ways of being,” that  “they [now] have 
plenty of curiosity, but not any criticism, this is the new army.” Stein concludes: “It was all 
very exciting.”146   
 A Geographical History of America defines the nation in terms of its genius, an 
ongoing openness and dialogue facilitated by spatial relation, by geography. As Stein 
declares from the first page, “In the United States there is more space where nobody is than 
where anybody is.  This is what makes America what it is” (46), and she noted during her 
recent lecture tour of the U.S., “it is something strictly American to conceive a space that is 
filled with moving, a space of time that is filled always filled with moving.”147  
If space underpins the genius of the U.S., time and tradition form the backdrop for the 
nation of France. Stein valorizes France as a nation that thinks historically and peacefully, 
individually and communally, and most of all conservatively.  
  Stein’s preference for France’s temporality is linked to her perception of it as 
conservative. Seemingly eternally preoccupied with fears of teleological visions of history 
and threats of revolution, Stein insists: “I cannot write too much upon how necessary it is to 
be completely conservative that is particularly traditional in order to be free. And so France is 
and was. Sometimes it is important and sometimes it is not, but from 1900 to 1939, it 
certainly was” (38). The recognition that “sometimes it is important” to be “completely 
conservative” or “particularly traditional” and “sometimes it is not” makes clear Stein’s 
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attention to context: specific beliefs and practices do or do not make sense, are more or less 
desirable, according to geographical and historical circumstance. Context trumps ideology. 
This position makes Stein both more attuned to issues of temporality and insufficiently 
attentive to imminent possibilities for sweeping historical change. The chatty, fond tone of 
Paris France provides an interesting illustration of Stein’s lack of attention, as the memoir 
was published on the day the Germans took Paris, June 14, 1940. 
Stein lauds her home nation especially because she judges the United States as the 
best expression of difference due to its sheer variety. Stein aimed in The Making of 
Americans (written 1911, pub. 1925) to give “a complete description of every kind of human 
being that ever could or would be living.” This early work shows Stein to have been 
preoccupied with working out a means of negotiating between the particular or individual 
and the general/collective from very early in her literary career.“Kind” and type give way to 
a less structured, less stratified relation of individual/particular to collective/universal, which 
becomes apparent in radical individual perception as early as Tender Buttons and later in the 
loose culture of Paris France. Stein fondly wrote about nations as experiments in living 
together which were somehow delightfully always the same despite their dynamic characters. 
Stein revels in thinking through a comparison of the U.S. army of World War II to that from 
the previous war, reflecting  
this army conversed, it talked it listened, and each one of them had something to say 
no this army was not like that other army. People do not change, no they don’t, when 
I was in America after almost thirty years of absence they asked me if I did not find 
Americans changed and I said no what could they change to except to be Americans 
and anyway I could have gone to school with any of them they were just like the ones 
I went to school with and now they are still Americans but they can converse and they 
are interesting when they talk. The older Americans always told stories that was about 
all there was to their talking but these don’t tell stories they converse and what they 
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say is interesting and what they hear interests them and that does make them different 
not really different God bless them but just the same they are not quite the same.”148  
 
I read Stein’s vacillation here between recognizing effects of change and refusing to admit of 
real change as a relief that no matter what has or hasn’t changed, her countrymen remain 
comfortingly familiar as she sees them.  Ideally, by coordinating individual and collective 
self-determination, nations offer a way to manage change and make change manageable. 
 Stein’s writing about nations provides additional evidence of the centrality of issues 
of temporality to Stein’s thinking. Because in her view the U.S., at the turn of the century, 
makes a requirement or necessity of newness, Stein argues that its lack of time-sense makes 
France a more important nation for thinking about temporality. France’s sense of stability 
and continuity, Stein asserts, made it the perfect environment for Modernism’s radical 
innovation and creation during the first decades of the twentieth century. Stein explains: 
 
 So Paris was the natural background for the twentieth century, America knew 
it too well, knew the twentieth century too well to create it, for America there was a 
glamour in the twentieth century that made it not be material for creative activity. 
England was consciously refusing the twentieth century, knowing full well that they 
had gloriously created the nineteenth century and perhaps the twentieth century was 
going to be too many for them, so they were quite self-consciously denying the 
twentieth century but France was not worrying about it, what it was and what was is, 
was their point of view of which they were not very conscious, they were too 
occupied with their daily life to worry about it. (Paris France 24) 
 
Absent-mindedness acts as a virtue, allowing fertile ground for creation, change. This absent-
mindedness corresponds to a belief “in civilisation in and for itself,” as an end. Stein 
contrasts this belief in civilization, which she ascribes to France, with a faith in progress and, 
therefore, interest in means, which she associates with England: “England had the 
disadvantage of believing in progress, and progress has really nothing to do with civilisation, 
but France could be civilised without having progress on her mind, she could believe in 
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civilisation in and for itself, and so she was the natural background for this period” (39). In 
Stein’s view, England’s progressivist creed disqualifies it from being “the natural 
background” for modernism just as strongly as the United States’ insistence on newness: 
open time is a prerequisite to creation, not progress, which already fills time up, or a fetish 
for novelty, which makes time stutter. 
While Stein’s conceptualization of nation steers well clear of fascism’s sentient 
organism guided by myth, in Ze’ev Sternhell’s formulation, her belated condemnation of 
fascism and National Socialism and appearance of occasional complicity with fascists (she 
was to write an introduction to Pétain’s speeches, for example) have obscured the radical 
challenge her work poses to such ideologies. Stein’s naïve and often disastrously wrong 
political assessments tend to reveal either an optimistic misattribution of her specific 
aesthetic and ethical principles to people’s actions in the political sphere or a refusal to think 
dystopically on her part. For example, Stein’s argument against the plausibility of a second 
Great War relies on others’ ethical behavior: 
Why Europe is too small to wage war.  
Why is Europe too small to wage war because war has to be waged on too 
large a scale to be contained in a small country therefore as they think about war they 
know that they can only think and not do. They are like our dogs who make believe 
do things to each other but they know that they can be seen and if you can be seen 
then you cannot do anything to one another. (The Geographical History of America 
61-62) 
 
Stein assumes that leaders would not dare begin a war when everyone will see them and/or 
that people would stop their governments from making war in broad daylight. Stein sounds 
more common-sensical than idealist or utopic here, wryly noting that Europe “can have a 
great many troubles but they cannot wage war” (62). Conversations between the narrator and 
a French villager in Paris France show a desperate attempt to try to hold off war by arguing 
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that it goes against common sense, as when the villager says “It is not logical mademoiselle” 
that there will be another war because he fought in the last one and, at forty-five, would have 
to fight again were war to occur, as would his seventeen-year-old son (42). Too terrible to 
contemplate, war should be staved off by argument. 
 In Stein’s conception of nations, words have a chance of holding war at bay: her 
aesthetics of process and relationality, akin to the ethics she ascribes to nations, are smarter 
than her politics. Stein thinks in nations, not states, which accounts for her failure as a 
political pundit, her love of the U.S. and France, and her loathing of leaders of each who she 
perceives as paternalist, imperialist, domineering. In The Geographical History of America 
Stein links Napoleon and Louis Napoleon with Teddy and Franklin Roosevelt, finding in the 
French and American nations the unwanted repetition of autocrats.149 She labels these leaders 
“foreign” to their nations, announcing “Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt like Napoleon and 
Louis Napoleon even though they belonged to the country to which they belonged were 
foreign to it” (127). The Napoleons even died obligingly in exile, Napoleon on St. Helena, 
Louis Napoleon in England proper, in Kent.  
 Stein lumps together for condemnation the authors of the Civil (Napoleonic) Code, 
the Square Deal, the Second Empire and the New Deal. Her critique of leaders from the right 
and left sides of the political spectrum indicates not that she is a centrist but that she opposes 
any augmentation of executive power. Stein’s conception of nations precludes states, or at 
least any strong centralized structure. Her repeated condemnation of the Napoleons and 
Roosevelts for amassing centralized power recalls the injunction early in her career, linked to 
her power struggle with her brother Leo, to “Act so that there is no use in a centre” (63) in 
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the “Rooms” section of Tender Buttons (1914). Stein’s politics are in fact an ethics of 
nations, a call for individuals to act together by interacting with one another in open-minded 
fashion, unfettered by the confines of a particular political program or dictates of a state. 
Nations, it would seem, have a shot at the human mind, while states, like propaganda and 
politicians, wallow in human nature. Understanding, Stein suggests, occurs not subjectively 
but contextually, relationally, and thus depends on free interaction. Connection looses the 
specific thing or individual by making it subject to something else (like the state); contact 
permits the individual to encounter a plurality of different entities. Near the end of Paris 
France Stein recounts the story of Anatole France telling Madame Pierlot, who was visiting 
Paris for the first time at forty after growing up in the provinces and living in “various 
capitals” around the globe (as the wife of a military attaché): “continue, live in Paris but 
always remain provincial” (118). We may read Stein’s nations as collectives comprised of 
provincials, whether Jeffersonian federalists or ‘happy’ anarchists. 
 
 
 
 IV. The Fashionable Free Exercise of Habit: Gertrude Stein Eyeballs Utopia 
 
Stein insists in Paris France:  
 
 And France and England after the war began to feel that the twentieth century 
would have to get civilised. It would have to go through that period of revolution that 
every young person goes through, when they think that systems will not be systems 
but something else, when every one is certain that they can reform everybody if they 
only go the right way to work at it. 
 […] 
 So this book is dedicated to France and England. (118-119)  
 
This dedication shows not only Stein’s wishful thinking for the character of the twentieth 
century but her association of France with civilization and continuity and her disdain for 
revolution, linked here to immaturity and imperialism. Stein opposes revolution to tradition 
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and peaceful change throughout the text, frequently by juxtaposing war with fashion. In 
Paris France fashion represents something quintessentially French and functions 
synecdochically as France’s genius for peaceful change over time. Fashion intersects with the 
idea of tradition as a particular tradition of France and as a historical phenomenon of 
nonviolent alteration, the antithesis of revolution as bloody, teleological, temporally-
contracted change. It is important to note that Stein’s conception of fashion as such in the 
text is not that of mass production or even haute couture but a more democratic and 
miniaturist, petit-bourgeois artisan model. For example, Stein praises the variety in style and 
cost of hats one season, reading the phenomenon as indicative of the nation’s economic and 
creative health in alluding to all the successful, individual milliners selling hats at different 
prices to Frenchwomen across classes. Stein contrasts this bounty of beautiful hats to “the 
first war period, a period of fashion without style, of systems with disorder, of reforming 
everybody which is persecution, and of violence without hope” (119). Fashion represents 
France’s facility for voluntary change by individuals of the nation in direct opposition to 
involuntary change imposed on the masses through bloodshed and rupture. As a global leader 
in national revolution, France has done with its adolescence and is ready to be a model of a 
civilized adult. 
Stein eyeballs utopia to avoid the revolutions its image provokes, in search of ways to 
construct a “peaceful and exciting” present that will forestall revolution. I see fashion as a 
concept and phenomenon to which Stein returns over and over again as a way to think about 
a collective practice that will possess a temporality and enact a polity hostile to revolution.    
Stein borrows from fashion to replace development and a progressivist sense of history with 
mode (fashion), which in Middle French (1393) meant “collective manner of living or 
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thinking proper to a country or age.” In what follows I explore how Stein envisions politics 
as fashion and advocates a pluralist conception of fashion made into habit. 
 Stein sees politics in terms of the day’s fashion and fashion as a potentially 
significantly useful phenomenon at moments of political and social upheaval. She offers the 
simile “In a French village they understand all about that [politics as a change in fashion], 
they say the men in politics are like the women in dressing, sometimes the skirts are long and 
sometimes the skirts are short.” In Stein’s analysis fashions matter “in the great moments 
when everything changes” because they provoke action “that has nothing to do with 
anything.” Stein’s hope for fashion is not dialectical but alternative: fashion does not respond 
to cataclysmic change so much as take off from it, using the event as fuel and as a point of 
departure.150  Fashion funnels and diffuses historical momentum across collective life in a 
way that is never revolutionary but that may generate radical change in the relations among 
individuals and between individuals and collectives (most often nations in Stein’s texts). 
Importantly for Stein, fashion generates this change in a way that preserves a space for the 
individual within a collectivity through the interplay of fashion with fashions. In the singular, 
“fashion” signifies a current, collective pre-occupation, a trend endorsed and/or practiced by 
many individuals at a given moment and familiar to most members of a society. In the plural, 
“fashions” signals a variety of objects and practices that one may purchase or adopt, securing 
pluralism. The internal logic of fashion makes it useful in three key ways: as a collective 
touchstone that gathers together entities and behaviors, embedding objects in the contexts of 
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their use, actors in the process of acting; as a guarantor of the existence of multiple and 
overlapping practices within a collective (one may choose to follow some fashions, one, or, 
perhaps, none); and as a conterminous process of individual and societal self-determination. 
 Stein sees in fashion’s dependence on change and manipulation of commodities and 
behaviors a possibility to replicate the ethos of her writing, to continually re-work the 
relations among entities (objects, people, ideas), maintaining ongoing processes that do not 
arrive at teleological or temporal ends. In the most optimistic and proleptic assessment, 
fashion, like Stein’s writing, collapses distinctions between content and form in pursuit of a 
positive freedom that imbricates individual and collective agency. In this discussion I will 
focus on the most hopeful vision of fashion that may be distilled from Stein’s œuvre to 
sketch the contours of a character and practice of fashion that might perform the tasks of her 
work. This fashion does not yet exist. 
 Stein relies on popular practices of art, in the form of fashion, to yield collective 
access to a peaceful, ongoing process of experimentation. Masterpieces allow for re-
perceiving the status quo, but fashion actually tries on new or different practices, offering 
low-risk opportunities to enact changes: for Stein fashion comprises a mode of change more 
than a category of endless novelties.  Stein sees Paris’ role as fashion center as equally 
crucial to its suitability for forming the backdrop of Modernism. She notes: 
It was important too that Paris was where fashions were made. To be sure there were 
moments when they seemed to dress better in Barcelona and in New York but not 
really. 
 It was in Paris that the fashions were made, and it is always in the great 
moments when everything changes that fashions are important, because they make 
something go up in the air or go down or go around that has nothing to do with 
anything. (Paris France 11) 
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Fashion matters in its very inconsequentiality, as a realm that tells us something about 
conditions (like masterpieces tell us about identity) and for its potentiality to serve as a stable 
vehicle for constant change. Stein associates fashion with the stability of conservatism, or at 
least tradition, and optimistically sees fashion as indicative of a society at peace with itself, 
sufficiently comfortable to permit change(s), albeit in non-committal way. 
 Stein not only includes fashion in the realm of art, alongside literature, she sees 
fashion as an indicator of national health. Stein writes: 
 It is funny about art and literature, fashions being part of it.  Two years ago 
everybody was saying that France was down and out, was sinking to be a second-rate 
power, etcetera etcetera. And I said but I do not think so because not for years not 
since the war have hats been as various and lovely and as french as they are now. Not 
only are they to be found in the good shops but everywhere there is a real milliner 
there is a pretty french little hat. (Paris France 11) 
 
Stein refuses to entertain the notion that France is “sinking to be a second-rate power” on the 
grounds that the hats of the moment are unusually “various and lovely and […] french.” As 
frivolous and ludicrous as this reasoning may appear at first read, that state of hats indicates 
quite a bit about the state of economic relations. Because the hats are “various,” they signal 
multiple artisans expressing individual visions, abilities and craftsmanship. And these 
milliners are not just crafting for a very wealthy class— the hats are not only “to be found in 
the good shops but everywhere.” Presumably there are hats of different prices in these 
variably posh stores which consumers of varying incomes can purchase. As “characteristic 
art product[s]” hats may have little or “nothing to do with… material life,” but they have 
quite a lot to tell about relations of production. 
Fashion in 1930s Paris involves commodification and craftsmanship. Stein writes 
during a period of transition in which Parisians reaped some benefits of industrialization and 
capitalism that are democratizing—mass production makes lots of things available for a lot 
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of people— and before the advent of capitalism on steroids, a global free market in which 
price rather than design or craftsmanship serves as the primary differentiator of fashion. 
Stein’s fashion designers are a constellation of local milliners, not an international oligarchy 
of designers directing assembly lines. 
 Stein links France’s focus on civilization in and of itself to a refusal to change.  But 
since Stein also valorizes French fashion, which in her view depends on change, I read 
“change” here as “perceptible change.” Change in France happens gradually, over time, 
imperceptibly, and therefore peacefully. And, Stein suggests, peaceful change—good or bad-
- enters through fashion. Stein offers a very clear example contrasting (native French) 
civilization and (foreign-sourced) fashion: 
 And so France cannot change it can always have its fashions but it cannot 
change. And this brings me to dogs. 
 The french dogs which are native are useful dogs beautiful dogs but dogs that 
work. They are shepherd dogs and hunting dogs. 
 […] 
 The french have to have as pet dogs foreign ones which they change and 
fashion in their own way, and the mode in these dogs changes, they mostly always 
come back again, as long as I have known / France first it was poodles then it was 
Belgian griffons, … […] Now all these dogs being of no use can be made 
fashionable, because fashion must never be useful, must very often be exotic, and 
must always be made to be french. That is what fashion is and it must change. (33-35) 
 
In using the particular example of dogs to contrast that which is useful and native to 
something frivolous and foreign in origin, Stein positively construes possibilities of 
contamination and hybridization. The foreign dogs are out of context but may be brought into 
relation with the rest of French civilization.  Fashion constitutes a border area between useful 
and frivolous, individual and collective, artisan and machine—it is an area where the new 
intrudes and gets worked out in various ways, or doesn’t get worked out and dominates as 
one, mass-produced, context-less thing for everyone. Fashion mediates between old and new, 
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organic and inorganic, managed in a special temporality that is discontinuous and repetitive, 
as something remains fashionable only for a short time (guaranteeing change) even as the 
repeated establishment of fashions maintains a civilizing stability. 
 
Fashion as Habit 
Stein’s project of retemporalization opts for a logic of recontextualization, not shock. 
In an article that uses Benjamin’s reading of Baudelaire to distinguish Gertrude Stein’s work 
from that of the avant-garde manifesto mongers, Lisi Schoenbach writes of Benjamin: 
“Through his reading of Baudelaire, he imagines an aesthetic that remains equally attuned to 
the power of habit and to modernity’s endless jolts to habit, an aesthetic that, like 
pragmatism, sets these two states in a necessary and ongoing relation to one another.”151 Just 
as Baudelaire, in Benjamin’s reading, parries shock on behalf of readers, Stein, Schoenbach 
argues, employs a strategy of recontextualization to grapple with “modernity’s endless jolts 
to habit.” Schoenbach contrasts this focus on recontextualization to avant-garde manifestos’ 
tendency to use strategies of opposition, citing Stein’s disdain for “an attention-grabbing 
performance or outrageous manifesto.” Stein foregoes spectacle for “civilization, in the form 
of daily behaviors accumulated over time” (Schoenbach 245), shock for recontextualization. 
I think the major difficulties of Stein’s writing stem in large part from her attention to 
fine-grained recontextualization, from her attention to capturing the instability of ongoing 
processes precisely and from areaders’ habits of approaching texts teleologically, to enjoy a 
narrative or learn content, for example. As David Jarraway notes of Stein, linking her, as 
does Schoenbach, to pragmatism, Stein’s writing focuses on process, on capturing the 
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mutable nature of experience, or as Randa Dubnick explains, “the process of experiencing 
each moment in the present tense as it intersects with consciousness” (29). One of the 
difficulties readers encounter in Tender Buttons and other writings by Stein stems from a 
disjuncture between a reader’s expectations of referentiality and Stein’s interest in processes 
of perception. As Ulla Dydo observes of Stein’s writing, 
Her stripped words cannot be joined by unthinking habit. Their exploration 
requires thought. Out of the physical properties uncovered by the process of 
reduction, she builds new, unstable and ambiguous forms and meanings. They sound 
strange precisely because they are new and unfamiliar. They are indeed anarchistic. 
(17) 
 
Stein’s anarchism results from a refusal to accept norms of referentiality—this is the woman 
who upon penning “Rose is a rose is a rose” claimed that roses were red for the first time in 
the English language in many years-- and an interest in using language to engage in practices 
of recontextualization, reorganizing and reconstituting reality at a given moment. 
 The possibilities Stein envisions for fashion emerge in her writing’s displacement of 
form in favor of process and playfulness with genre. Stein experimented with multiple 
genres, mixed genres, and intergeneric work throughout her career, and the formal and 
generic variety of Stein’s œuvre embodies a consistent resistance, if not outright opposition, 
to form as domination, the imposition of unity and stasis on an everchanging field of 
difference. Stein’s attention to process is innately hostile to form but her emphasis on 
community yields an attitude toward genre that is less hostile than (to use exactly the wrong 
word) ‘reformist.’ Stein’s anarchist poetics works against form but for a democratization of 
genre. Only once the strictures of form have been sufficiently loosened and genre made a 
changing repository of inclusive preferences can fashion perform truly useful work.   
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 James’s thinking on habit in Principles of Psychology produces at least two differing 
conceptualizations of habit, and I argue that one of these is particularly amenable to 
anarchism and to Stein’s aspirations for securing self-determination relationally, dialogically, 
and without any restrictions on the character a polis, society or nation will possess. James 
offers four maxims, the first two from Alexander Bain’s chapter “The Moral Habits,” the 
latter two of his own devising. The first two maxims emphasize absolute rupture in changing 
from one habit to another. James asserts, “…in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving 
off of an old one, we must take care to launch ourselves with as strong and decided an 
initiative as possible”; and “The second maxim is: Never suffer an exception to occur till the 
new habit is securely rooted in your life.”152 These two maxims describe habit in terms 
antithetical to Stein’s “peaceful and exciting” and open anarchist poetics, unlike the maxims 
James derives, “Seize the very first possible opportunity to act on every resolution you make, 
and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of habits you aspire 
to gain” (124) and “Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every 
day” (126). The first two maxims are dictatorial, fashion as propaganda. James refers to the 
last statement as “a final, practical maxim.”  
 I see two important shifts in the conception of habit between the first two and second 
two maxims. The first two maxims demand absolute change and a change in content, or 
program, from practicing one specific habit to replacing it with another. James’s own 
maxims, however, focus on the practice of change and the ability to change, not on adopting 
one program of action, one habit, in place of another. As James makes clear in the chapter, 
his interest in habit stems not from the question of how to replace one program with another 
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but from the concern of how to make ongoing change possible and probable, how a concept 
of habit might contribute to individuals’ character development. James writes: “No matter 
how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one’s sentiments 
may be, if one have not [sic] taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act, one’s 
character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions, hell is 
proverbially paved” (125).  Action itself, not intention, not action to advance a particular 
program or ends, is what matters, and habit helps encourage this action on the part of 
individuals. 
 This conception of habit—as the ongoing, continuous realization of individual 
agency—comprises the logic of Stein’s anarchist poetics. We can see Stein’s texts as 
constantly trying to work out an anarchist conception of habit, and she makes revealing 
comments on this project in her discussions of both habit and anarchism. For example, Stein 
thinks through the problem and possibilities posed by James’s paradoxical pragmatist notion 
of habit not just in early texts such as Tender Buttons but over the course of her career. In 
Wars I Have Seen Stein muses: 
And then also and this is strange if you like but I was then already skeptical about 
Utopias, naturally so, I liked habits but I did not like that habits should be known as 
mine. Habits like dogs dogs have habits but they do not like to be told about their 
habits, and the only way to have a Utopia is not only to have habits but to like to be 
told about these habits, and this I did not like. I can remember very well not liking to 
be told that I had habits.153 
 
The crux of the issue is utopias’ apparent requirement that people not only practice habits but 
be told about them, and in the telling lies the problem. Stein writes that she likes habits, 
valorizing their practice. But once habits become the subject of telling, are characterized and 
codified into norms and even laws, they become a problem, a limiting rather than enabling 
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institution. In practice, habit provides the means through which individuals enact freedom 
dialogically. Frozen into prescriptive form, most notably as laws, habits govern, limiting 
individual action and therefore collective change. 
 An often occluded linchpin of Stein’s poetics, habit functions as a mechanism of 
peaceful change; a means of registering time (taking into account tradition); as a  mediation 
between individuals and collectives that promotes positive freedom; and as a way of staving 
off centralization, boundaries, and the limitations of fixed forms while avoiding anarchy. An 
anarchist conception of habit does not entail chaos. In fact, Stein intimates that habit 
organizes nations. Anarchist habit is not about absolute change, rupture or revolution, not 
about stasis, and not about sameness. It serves as a means to facilitate peaceful, ongoing 
change and in so doing to preserve the capacity for effecting change (positive freedom), not 
to replace one program of domination with another, however well-intentioned.  
On a spectrum between ethical anarchism, with its orientation towards a concept of 
freedom that links individual autonomy to collective self-determination, and individualist 
anarchism, with its solipsistic focus on specific individuals, Stein’s writings seem much 
closer to the left in their focus on individuals living in community, peoples, and nations, 
unfettered by a strong state’s imposition of restraints. Stein claims freedoms for individuals 
and collectives simultaneously, calling to mind both Castoriadis’s symbiotic relation of 
individual self-institution to that of the polis and Jefferson’s equivalence of personal ethics 
with those of nations. Jefferson’s valorization of an agrarian nation, insistence on a non-
energetic federal government, and equanimity towards rebellion re-emerge in Stein’s notion 
of governance without government, facilitated by space and an ethics of democracy. This 
ethics relies largely on an anarchist conception of habit as a mechanism of peaceful change. 
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Ideally, habit functions beyond the perceived boundaries of the aesthetic realm as a means to 
hold off form analogously to the ways in which Stein’s writings stave off form through 
unending process. 
 
 IV. The Difference of Democratic Time 
 In the final section of this chapter, I revisit the chapter’s major themes and offer a 
close reading of a small series of prose poems to argue that we should revise portraits of 
Stein as yet another unreasonably difficult modernist poet/writer. Instead, we should take 
stock of her contribution in terms of anarchist modernism’s project of retemporalization, an 
aesthetic endeavor grounded in augmenting individuals’ political agency. Stein’s texts work 
towards a democratization of time. Her language generally and the language of Tender 
Buttons specifically is not easily consumed, but it be may consumed by just about everyone.  
Others have defended Stein from charges of nonsense by locating various values in her work, 
including cubist, Gnostic, feminist, lesbian, and pragmatic strains.154 My interest lies less in 
reprising these various readings than in showing that Stein’s work actually matters outside 
the purview of art. 
 Positive freedom, in the sense of individual agency, is a consistent concern for Stein, 
who battled her older brother Leo (at the time of the composition of Tender Buttons) and the 
domination of rigid cultural norms and pressures of conformity to think, express, and act out 
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singularly. The liberties Stein sought to secure include the freedom not to maintain a 
particular individual identity, to take on multiple identities (even to write as someone else) or 
to momentarily shirk identity altogether to create.155 Stein broaches this problem by 
scrupulously attending to relationality, to the character and kind of relations that obtain and 
may yet obtain across time. A key anxiety for Stein, “the tyranny of the organized,” in 
Catharine Stimpson’s apt phrase, is held at bay by focusing on process in terms of relations 
in time. Process places less emphasis on the discrete entity than on the character of 
experience constituted relationally, such that the household objects in Stein’s prose poems 
frequently do not appear (in the semantic web of the prose poems) to be the objects their 
names evoke: they step away from being locked into signifying identities as Stein loosens 
words’ referential function. Yet this step away from signification does not deprive words of 
autonomy. Stein insists on a kind of grammatical equity among all the parts of speech, 
imbuing the relation among words with the power usually ascribed, for example, to nouns as 
actors. Stein’s sentences reach for a politics (inclusive democracy) and an economic 
equivalent.  
 Tender Buttons offers a model of production (of language art and of sense) that 
actually adheres to “free and fair” trade, bringing Stein’s domestic economy to households 
everywhere. Her prose poems are both radically singular and impersonal. One can see Stein’s 
notion of radically individual linguistic production in the way she tends to strip words at least 
partially of referential value to call attention to the work words perform in a given context, 
their relationality.  For example, in the first two of four prose poems entitled “Chicken” in 
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the “Food” section of Tender Buttons, Stein seems to have much more to say about the way 
the word “chicken” is perceived in relation to other words in specific contexts than she does 
about poultry.  The first poem in its entirety reads: “Pheasant and chicken, chicken is a 
peculiar third.”156  Stein does not describe a difference between the birds that makes chicken 
comparatively “peculiar” but rather a peculiar position for the word “chicken”: to begin a 
sentence “Pheasant and chicken” and then return to chicken as the third noun in the sentence 
is indeed peculiar, as one would expect either a predicate to follow or, if pheasant and 
chicken are to be part of a series, that the third noun in the series not repeat the second. Stein 
continues in this vein in the second poem “Chicken,” which reads: “Alas a dirty word, alas a 
dirty third alas a dirty third, alas a dirty bird.”157  Is “chicken” a “dirty word” because it is 
wrong for its position in the sentence, wrong for sense, or because chickens are in fact dirty 
birds, or both? Is chicken a dirty word because it is a wrong as a third noun, as the second 
clause suggests, and repeated as the third clause so that “chicken” will in fact re-occupy its 
position as third noun? Stein’s conclusion to the poem, “alas a dirty bird” brings a sense of 
unity through sound, rhyming with “word” and “third,” and sense, as many readers likely 
know that fowl is foul, that chickens are not the cleanest members of a farm community. 
As the “Chicken” poems illustrate, Stein produces in Tender Buttons a language of 
moments of radically singular perception, capturing “the process of experiencing each 
moment in the present tense as it intersects with consciousness.”158 The impersonality of this 
singularity is its guarantee.  What seems to go unnoticed all too often in Stein’s writing is 
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that its mode of apprehending experience in language (art) is intelligible to readers: my 
reading of the chicken poems depends on rules of grammar, habitual language use, and a 
little knowledge about chickens. Stein’s language production is not elitist: the knowledge one 
needs to read Tender Buttons is much more widely held than the knowledge required to 
imbibe high Modernist texts such as Eliot’s “The Waste Land” or Joyce’s Ulysses or to 
understand the mythological allusions in H.D.’s poetry. Stein challenges readers in a 
different vein from that of her difficult Modernist contemporaries. Robert Chodat recognizes 
this difference when he claims that Stein’s writing “loses sense within descriptions,” while 
the writing of High Modernists such as Eliot and Pound “loses sense between 
descriptions.”159 The problem with this distinction is that it substitutes level or locus of 
difficulty for kind.  Stein does not use fragments or esoteric allusions “within” descriptions; 
in fact, she tends toward lengthy elocutions and a small, common vocabulary. Stein’s 
language generally and the language of Tender Buttons specifically is not easily consumed, 
but it may be consumed by just about everyone; it is largely democratic in its difficulty.  
  Intelligibility and agency come together through an anarchist notion of habit 
generally identifiable in James and compatible with a “grammar of democracy” (to borrow 
Ulla Dydo’s term) wary of form. Interesting work on Stein has highlighted her attention to 
habit, focusing on pragmatist conceptualizations.160 Yet Stein’s avoidance of all things 
teleological makes James’s anarchist bent much more amenable to Stein than that of a more 
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faithful pragmatist, such as Dewey.161 As  Dydo observes, Stein “builds new, unstable and 
ambiguous forms and meaning” that “sound strange precisely because they are new and 
unfamiliar. They are indeed anarchistic.”162  Dydo characterizes Stein’s writing in terms of a 
battle against a long list of ills anarchism seeks to remedy and summarizes Stein’s œuvre as 
grappling with democratic prospects: 
Her rejection of the rigid conventions of language led her gradually to dissociate 
herself from all inflexible forms, including hierarchical thinking, authoritarian 
organization, prescriptive grammar, and chronological narrative-- aspects of the 
patriarchy. In a sense, all her work is a demonstration of possibilities of grammar for 
democracy. She was interested in spacious, living sentences.163 
 
The intelligibility of Stein’s language resides in its grounding within a community or 
overlapping communities of users. For singular language use to possess any social resonance, 
for it to escape exile in an aestheticist realm, Stein suggests, requires a governing logic of 
free and unfettered interaction, a logic never submitted to any one’s governance. Radical 
language use, defined as multiple instances of singularity, ultimately depends on a 
commensurately radical, open-ended organization of society, one which disdains the 
teleology of revolution. This freedom can neither exist apart from norms nor endure within 
inalterable ones: fashions and fashioning take place in the context of logic and civilization. 
The basis for Stein’s aesthetics is identical to that of a republic or self-determining polis: 
both rely on a logic of ongoing interaction as the underpinning for an inclusive democracy. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Keeping Time in Play: Tristan Tzara Spreads the Word (Dada) 
 
DADA is not a doctrine to be put into practice: Dada—if it’s a lie you want—is a prosperous business venture. –Dada runs up debts and 
will not stick to its mattress. God has created a universal language, that is why no one takes him seriously. A language is a utopia. God can 
afford to be unsuccessful: so can Dada. That is why the critics say: Dada is a luxury article or Dada is in heat. God is a luxury article or God 
is in heat. Who is right: God, Dada or the critic?  
“You digress,” says a charming reader. 
“No, not at all! I simply wanted to arrive at this conclusion: subscribe to Dada, the only loan that brings in 
nothing.164 
  --Tristan Tzara, “Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love” 165 
 
He [Tzara] was awaited like a sort of Anti-Messiah whose anti-gospel would mobilize minds and anti-minds 
that the war had left prepared to accept anything. 
  --Hans Richter on the anticipation of Tzara’s move to Paris in 1919.166 
 
 This chapter interprets the question Tzara poses somewhat facetiously—“Who is 
right: God, Dada, or the critic?”-- as a bad-faith riddle whose answer is “language.” And 
language’s “rightness” depends more on its spreading than on words, like Gertrude Stein’s 
difference (“The difference is spreading”).167 Language keeps time, which in a secular 
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universe makes it sovereign. Literary Dada worshipped and exploited language for the cause 
of good governance. 
 Under Tzara’s leadership, Dada attempted to change the character of the polity by 
reconfiguring relations within language and altering people’s relationship to language. Dada 
performances, beginning at the Cabaret Voltaire at the Meirei bar in Zurich and extending to 
soirées across Paris, reintroduced people to language as the bearer of multiple times. Poèmes 
simultanés, abstract poems, bruitist and static poems, and many other experimental genres 
put verbal virtuosity on display. These performances exposed audiences to non-rational, 
unfamiliar creation in language, literally setting the stage for audience members to confront 
language in new ways. But it was the manifestos that actualized Dada’s project by bringing 
language and time together for the audience in the context of enacting change. 
 Tristan Tzara’s Seven Dada Manifestos undertake a project of repopulating time and 
re-infusing temporality with the movement and activity of human thought, debate and 
creative activity. By simultaneously performing and overturning the generic conventions of 
the manifesto, Tzara transmutes its desired future moment of revolutionary action into a 
present intensity of unknown duration. This intensity functions as a force field in which 
preconceived barriers among art, life and anti-art; intelligence, intuition and automatism; and 
between subject and world, collapse, opening language to different concepts and altering 
people’s experience within it. In articulating the call for a new world these Dada manifestos 
enact the ground conditions for its creation. 
In what follows I explore Tzara’s Dada manifestos as the centerpiece of a religio-
political project devoid of religious or political content. My aim is threefold: to distinguish 
Tzara’s use of the manifesto as a literary genre from that of other modernist and avant-garde 
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groups; to bring to light some of the affinities between Dada and anarchism, which have 
often been obscured by associations of Dada with anarchy; and to show how Dada’s 
retemporalization of language recodes the surface as the site of meaning, temporally 
evacuating the trajectory from aestheticism to asceticism and mysticism.  
 
I. The Avant-Garde Manifesto as Liturgy 
Seven Dada Manifestos borrow from the conventions of other modernist and avant-
garde manifestos, particularly those of the futurists, to flout the programmatic aims of their 
discourses and further refashion the manifesto as a genre proper to aesthetic endeavors or 
poeisis. Like the futurists, Tzara incorporated visual art, such as drawings by Francis Picabia, 
and typographical and collage techniques into his manifestos; he also read his manifestos as 
part of mixed media and multi-generic public performances. Unlike the futurists (and even 
more unlike the patricidal Surrealists Dada would birth) Tzara deploys the manifesto as a 
means to instantiate open-ended collective creation, not for the establishment or governance 
of a particular aesthetic or political program.  
Dada’s, and particularly Tzara’s, use of the manifesto has been obscured due to 
Dada’s eclipse by Surrealism and to a tendency in scholarship to see Dada and Surrealism as 
part of a continuum. The extent to which Seven Dada Manifestos differ radically from 
Breton’s surrealist manifestos and the futurist manifestos becomes clear in considering the 
general context of avant-garde manifestos. It is worthwhile to consider briefly the questions: 
What did modernist movements accomplish, aesthetically or politically, by producing 
manifestos?  Why write them? Why did so many avant-garde groups, with very different 
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artistic and social goals, feature the manifesto as a significant, and in the case of futurism, as 
Marjorie Perloff has argued, even the preeminent, genre?168  
In the introduction to her collection of modernist and avant-garde manifestos, Mary 
Ann Caws remarks “The manifesto, at its height, is a poem in heightened prose.”169 In 
likening the manifestos to prose poems, Caws recognizes their aesthetic value, their status as 
literary works of art in and of themselves. In the context of the prose poem’s engagement 
with issues of time, this resemblance raises the question of whether the modernist manifesto 
also possesses a temporalizing dimension. Yet generically manifestos focus on political, not 
aesthetic, aims and on the enactment of a particular program posthaste, not through some 
belabored process of temporal unfolding. The paradox this resemblance poses points to a 
question at the heart of the genre as it is practiced by various modernist movements: does the 
avant-garde manifesto re-form a political genre to articulate a message about aesthetics, or 
does it represent a new literary, sometimes visual, genre that uses the rhetorical conventions 
of the political manifesto for its own ends?  
If the case is the former, if the avant-garde manifesto signals a political power play by 
art, then the development of the manifesto in conjunction with avant-garde art movements 
can be read as a sign of anxiety about the perceived marginalization of art, or (frequently 
“and”) conversely, as dissatisfaction with the character of modern life and a need for art to 
assert dominance over it. Luca Somigli proffers the first interpretation in his study of 
futurism and imagism, declaring “[I]t is precisely through manifestoes that avant-garde artists 
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and writers confront their audiences with the problem of the loss of the halo [alluding to 
Baudelaire’s prose poem] and attempt to articulate new strategies of legitimation of their 
activity.”170  Peter Bürger famously argues for the second interpretation, conceiving of 
futurist, Dadaist, and surrealist manifestos as part of a struggle to undo art’s autonomy status 
and locate in art the basis for a new praxis of life.171  In both instances, the avant-garde 
manifesto retains the traditional political function of the genre, articulating a grievance—the 
mistreatment of art, the awfulness of the character of contemporary life—and a solution in 
the form of a program to be enacted. In this conception the manifesto orients itself spatially 
to the domain over which it plans to extend its program. Time is contracted to the moment of 
revolution when, in the best-case scenario, the manifesto’s demands will be implemented. 
If, on the contrary, the manifesto incorporates the conventions of a political 
genre into a new aesthetic expression, then the question shifts to what role the 
political articulation plays within the artwork. Martin Puchner identifies this 
role as theatricality. Puchner characterizes Marinetti’s transformation of the 
political manifesto into an avant-garde aesthetic manifesto in terms of 
performativity (or instrumentality) giving way to theatricality, explaining: 
“The distinction between performativity and theatricality can be phrased in 
terms of means and end: the socialist manifesto has tended toward seeing 
itself as an instrument, as a means to an end, whereas the avant-garde 
manifesto has tended toward seeing the manifesto as an end in itself.”172 
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Puchner reads the development of Dada manifestos in terms of an additional 
displacement of content by form, asserting “While in futurism the form of the 
manifesto informs the content—the obsession with progress and its 
machinery, the exclusive invocation of the future—Dadaism discards any such 
modernizing content and instead practices the form of the theatrical 
metamanifesto, the act of founding a movement, of creating a label, of 
forming a collective as an end all in itself” (153). This analysis captures 
Dada’s lack of program, yet Puchner’s focus on form obscures the temporal 
character of Dada manifestos, the ways in which they arrest, repeat, and draw 
out time.173 Dada’s refusal of a program, or content, in Puchner’s terms, leads 
to a preoccupation with the practice of the manifesto, not its form. Viewed 
through the lens of repetition and reiteration that lead nowhere, Tzara’s 
manifestos manifest time.  
Time is not a distinctly aesthetic or political category, so it’s difficult, if not 
impossible, to classify Tzara’s manifestos in terms of a specific reconfiguration of the 
relations between aesthetic and political spheres. At the same time, Seven Dada Manifestos 
engage the commonplaces of modernist and avant-garde critique such as pressures of 
conformity, mass culture, commodification, alienation, and nationalism, and they often voice 
identical complaints. Perhaps the clearest way to situate Dada among the manifesto 
movements is through a categorization based on each movement’s approach to the problems 
they all confront. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
173
 Puchner also vacillates between thinking of the space of Dada manifestos as discontinuous and 
transnational or as contiguous and international. Puchner recognizes Dada as a network that  ‘criscrosses’ nation 
states but more often analyzes Dada as cohesively international because of his—and many Dadaists—Marxist 
framework. See Puchner, Poetry of the Revolution, 136-146, especially 136-36. 
  
119 
The path each movement envisions as leading to a solution constitutes the field of 
action for its manifestos, determining audience, aspects of engagement (which problems 
matter most), and character (pessimistic or optimistic, strident or cynical or enthusiastic, 
etc.).  Modernist manifesto movements suggest at least four paths: withdrawal, colonization, 
participation, and reconstitution. Aestheticism provides the classic example of withdrawal, of 
art’s rupture with the social and political realms. This withdrawal promotes distance so that 
art may demand almost holy veneration from a mass public who cannot be expected to 
understand or appreciate it. The path of colonization replaces rupture with suture, conceiving 
art not as different from life but as of a piece with it (or what it could be) and superior to its 
dominant character. Surrealism, under Breton, provides a model of this artistic vanguard 
approach. In contrast, the participatory approach pragmatically and agnostically seeks a way 
for art to survive and flourish under the conditions of industrial capitalism and mass 
production, thus Pound’s exhortation to “Make it New!” and instances of shameless self-
promotion. Finally, the path of reconstitution, rather than seeking a niche for art within 
society, aspires to a kind of social art, a collective poiesis that will reconstitute society by 
enacting it. Dada follows this approach. 
Somigli shows how the manifesto functioned as a way for modern artists to re-
connect with bourgeois audiences and simultaneously articulate their difference from such 
audiences, linking the modernist adoption of the manifesto to fin-de-siècle artists’ publication 
in newspapers in order to “appeal to… [their] bourgeois audience through the media that are 
proper to it.”174  To a large extent, Dada used the manifestos to opposite effect. Manifestos 
are hardly the “proper” genre for either like-minded artists and peaceniks (in Zurich) or 
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complacent bourgeois Parisians seeking to familiarize themselves with the latest trend. They 
are redundant for the first group, self-defeating for the second (who have already absorbed 
any shock from the futurists’ manifestos.)   Seven Dada Manifestos do not re-position art vis-
à-vis bourgeois consumers; they use the manifesto, noticeably devoid of any instrumentality, 
to bring artist and audience together to jointly confront their alienation from time after its 
attenuation and re-apportioning by industrial capitalism and nation states.  
Tzara places the manifesto’s inability to effect actual change center stage, next to 
other veneers, like fellow Rumanian Marco Janco’s masks. He declaimed his seven 
manifestos (as well as other short declaratory texts, like the colonial syllogism) to live 
audiences in Zurich and Paris between 1916 and 1921.175 These texts and performances 
relied on the conventions of political manifestos to undermine the genre and, more 
importantly, the historical claims of radical politics underlying it. Janet Lyon attributes three 
generic conventions or "argumentative gestures" to the manifesto: (1) a concise, teleological 
encapsulation of history leading up to the current state in which the manifesto attempts to 
intervene; (2) a litany of complaints or stipulations that characterize a fight between 
oppressed and oppressive (the status quo the manifesto challenges) agents; and (3) rhetoric 
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that calls out, directly challenges an oppressor, and impels the audience to action.176  Tzara 
takes as his history that of the manifesto, as his litany of complaints its pretensions to 
significantly alter the balance of power relations and their character; and as his call to action 
the insistence on the creation of a new mode for change, one that trades illusions of 
instantaneous revolution for a more pluralist conception of time. 
Tzara thus denigrates the genre of the manifesto even as he writes within it.   His and 
Dada’s most famous manifesto, “Dada Manifesto 1918,” begins by launching a self-critique: 
To put out a manifesto you must want: ABC 
to fulminate against 1, 2, 3, 
to fly into a rage and sharpen your wings to conquer and disseminate 
little abcs and big abcs, to sign, shout, swear, to organize prose into a form of 
absolute and irrefutable evidence, to prove your non plus ultra and maintain 
that novelty resembles life just as the latest appearance of some whore proves 
the existence of God. His existence was previously proved by the accordion, 
the landscape, the wheedling word. To impose your ABC is a natural thing—
hence deplorable.177 
 
This description of the manifesto links it to the worst tendencies human behavior exhibits: 
domination, exclusion, sophistry, illogic and self-serving irrationality in the guise of reason, 
etc. Tzara offers a similarly negative, tongue-in-cheek appraisal of the genre in  “Manifesto 
on Feeble Love and Bitter Love,” explaining “A manifesto is a communication addressed to 
the whole world, in which there is no other pretension than the discovery of a means of 
curing instantly political, astronomical, artistic, parliamentary agronomic and literary 
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syphilis” (86). 178 Manifestos threaten peace and stability with their imperial aims, claims to 
knowledge, and, perhaps worst of all, insistence on instantaneous cure-alls. Tzara concludes 
this passage of his manifesto by reminding audiences that manifestos are in vogue at the 
moment, and since he is delivering one at that very moment, then they must actually (though 
now counterfactually) be “gentle, good-natured, … always right, …strong, vigorous and 
logical.”  
 In critiquing the motives intrinsic to the genre he is performing, Tzara warns listeners 
and readers not to trust him (he is one of those manifesto mongers) and to trust him (he is 
proclaiming a manifesto, which is “always right”). As a genre, the manifesto creates a subject 
position from which to speak and calls into being an “us” to which it then appeals to take 
some action against a “them”(the purveyors of some intolerable status quo). Manifestos thus 
imagine a particular future and attempt to offer a means to achieve it.  Tzara dismantles the 
subject position of his manifestos even as he inhabits it in order to speak in the first place. As 
a political subject, the “I” Tzara speaks does not cohere: it rejects what it claims to want and 
contradicts and disavows its own desires and attributes, leaving listeners and readers only 
with its speech and un-anxiously repeated assertions that it is “charming.” Tzara unsettles the 
us/them binary opposition manifestos characteristically posit. His amicable first-person voice 
engages an audience poised in uncertain relation to three other terms: the speaking subject, a 
nebulous we (which at times seems to be, but can’t be, Dada, because Tzara proclaims Dada 
a sign signifying nothing) and multiple unsavory “thems.” This four-term model perfectly 
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suits the call to action the Dada manifestos articulate, a call to devise another way of 
attempting to bring about change.  
Tzara’s dismantling of the conventional manifesto’s clear us/them dialectic would 
seem to leave him in the lurch, unable to clarify the single serious difference between two 
groups necessary for advancing a program of action and motivating partisans to enact it. But 
Dada depends on holding opposing tendencies in tension; it revolts not against a group but 
against a binary oppositional scheme. This revolt makes the manifesto central to Dada, 
because it allows the movement to take up the site where binary oppositions are clearly 
articulated in the service of revolutionary action, undo those binaries, and thus prevent a 
revolution. Tzara insists: 
I write a manifesto and I want nothing, yet I say certain things, and in 
principle I am against manifestos, as I am also against principles… I write this 
manifesto to show that people can perform contrary actions together while 
taking one fresh gulp of air; I am against action; for continuous contradiction, 
for affirmation too, I am neither for nor against and I do not explain because I 
hate common sense. (“Dada Manifesto 1918,” 76)179 
 
This refusal to do anything a manifesto requires indicates an attempt to undo the framework 
of the manifesto to replace it with an inclusive (non-oppositional) alternative that can 
accommodate difference. A footnote in “Manifesto of Mr. Aa the anti-philosopher” reads 
“No more manifestos” (84).  
Readings of Tzara’s manifestos and Dada generally as pure revolt or nihilism confuse 
content with character, teleology with aspirations, critique with creation. The discontent 
Dada articulates aims not to scold but to move beyond, to create more tolerable conditions. It 
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is how Dada goes about creating these conditions that distinguish its use of the manifesto 
from that of other avant-garde groups: its manifestos focus on enacting collective change, not 
on authoring the visions to which change should adhere. This change depends on 
retemporalization, on a process, not moment, of enactment. Dada challenges the time-sense, 
the idea of revolution set forth in that foundational modernist manifesto, the Communist 
Manifesto. Puchner, after Blanchot, argues that manifestos after Marx and Engels are 
characterized by “impatience,” by dissatisfaction that “the manifesto will always remain a 
split second removed from the actual revolution itself.”180 Tzara’s manifestos, in contrast, are 
not impatient; they are sometimes momentary, sometimes meandering and drawn out, and 
always repetitive: they organize a changeable liturgy, a ritual of collectively reconfronting 
the problem of change and enacting a process of salvation. 
 
II. Bergson’s Gospel of Temporalization and Creation 
The alternative approach Dada sought for change required a repopulation of time, a 
way to bring others into a realm not of fixed structures, set hierarchies, and already delimited 
paths but of openness and possibility. Dada demolished barriers between art and anti-art and 
art and life so that each person might emerge as an artist, as co-creator of this alternative. 
Tzara called for a collective that was non-coercive and which ignored nationality, class, 
talent, and erudition. The manifestos articulate this call and seek simultaneously to establish 
the conditions for enacting such a collective by opening up a collective time. 
Dada organized a collective for no purpose other than to create something other than 
the conditions giving rise to World War I.  In this way it gathered a multitude of 
dissatisfactions together provisionally in the service of engendering an alternative whose 
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character was unknown but which would result from voluntary collaboration. Hugo Ball 
claims to have organized the Cabaret Voltaire in order to show the public that different 
modes of living, outside nationalism and war, did in fact exist. Ball wrote in the first 
pamphlet Dada issued:  
When I founded the Cabaret Voltaire, I was sure that there must be a few 
young people in Switzerland who like me were interested not only in enjoying 
their independence but also in giving proof of it. […] The present booklet… is 
intended to present to the Public the activities and interests of the Cabaret 
Voltaire, which has as its sole purpose to draw attention, across the barriers of 
war and nationalism, to the few independent spirits who live for other 
ideals.181 
 
Dada emerged in Zurich not only to introduce to the public people who did not support war 
and nationalist programs but to show these people’s independence. Showing independence 
consisted in critiquing nationalism and the war and, more importantly, in demonstrating the 
positive character of independence. Critique took the form not of opposition or revolution but 
of a loosening and dismantling, identifying logical inconsistencies, a-logical constructions, 
and unhappy consequences of the status quo in order to make room for alternatives.   
Dada engaged a double object of critique, specific ideals and their consequences, the 
ways of living they allowed and encouraged. This critique resulted in a general wariness 
towards ideals such that the response to critiques of nationalism was not to erect other ideals 
in its place but to undertake a different project: to experiment with other ways of living, to 
create the alternative whose need the critique signals. Considered collectively, this project 
aimed to replace ideals with a Bergsonian élan appropriate to an open society. Ball’s 
collective of independent souls undertook “successive efforts” to yield an élan rather than 
“the progressive realization of an ideal,” as no preconceived ideal could “represent an 
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ensemble of acquisitions of which each one, in creating itself, would also create its own idea 
of itself; and yet the diversity of efforts would concentrate themselves in something unique: 
an impulse.”182  The focus here is modal: not to execute a particular (substantive) project but 
to enact it in a certain way, intensely, through creative concentration. 
Henri Bergson’s notions of dynamism and creation provide a framework for 
understanding Tzara’s manifestos in relation to a Dadaist ethos of action independent from 
general conventions and particular programs. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
(1932), Bergson presents dynamic religion as the expression of open morality. Religion in 
this usage concerns a mode of existence rather than a specific doctrine. The author asks 
“When one makes a critique or apology for religion, does one always realize what it is 
religion possesses that is specifically religious?” and displaces dogma with a state of being in 
his response: “One attaches oneself to it [religion] or attacks it in terms of the accounts it 
perhaps needs to obtain a state of the soul that will propagate itself; but the religion is 
essentially that state itself.”183 For our purposes this state has the advantage of not existing 
for any particular end.  
Bergson then posits two kinds of society, closed and open, which differ in “essence.”   
The closed society values social cohesion, relies on the exclusion of others to maintain its 
identity, tends to get involved in wars, and practices static religion.  The open society values 
all humanity and aspires to universality and peace through dynamic religion. Obviously, an 
open society is preferable to a closed one; what makes the distinction interesting is the role 
Bergson attributes to creation in the open society and the way in which he envisions such 
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creation coming about. While creation in a closed society is reactive, a response to a 
representation, creation in an open society proceeds from emotion and from or through 
creation to representation. Expressing dynamic religion, this society “realizes each time 
something of itself in the creations of which each one, through a more or less profound 
transformation of the man, permits surmounting difficulties until then insurmountable.”184  
Individual aspirations and social obligations align, becoming indistinguishable in practice, 
but an open society borrows its form--obligation-- from the closed society, just as “dynamic 
religion can propagate itself only through the images and symbols” of the same organizing 
trope, “la fonction fabulatrice.”185  The fabulative or mythmaking function acquires an 
“exceptional force” when exercised in the religious domain, insinuating a tyrannical 
character in the closed society and a facilitating character in the open society. We may 
understand the religious character of Dada’s project as an aspiration to a society whose 
principal mode is creative and whose end is a state of being conducive to free creation. 
The political character of this project follows from its secular, temporal element: the 
problem of prolongation. Bergson notes that the maintenance of an open society requires 
people to triumph over an instinct that believes persons in superior positions to be superior.186 
Bergson offers examples of the nobles in 1789 and the bourgeoisie in 1830 and 1848 to argue 
for their importance, over and above the action of the peasants or proletariat, in bringing 
about revolution:  “The truth is that if an aristocracy believes naturally, religiously, in its 
innate superiority, the respect it inspires is not less religious, not less natural.”  Only when 
                                                 
184
 Ibid, 285. [my translation] 
 
185
 Ibid. 
 
186
 Ibid, 299 [my translation] 
 
  
128 
enough “superior” figures are won over to the cause of revolution does it acquire the critical 
mass to take off. Declaring democracy the political conception most distant from nature, 
Bergson asserts that it is also the only political conception “that transcends, in intention at 
least, the condition of the ‘closed society.’”187 But democracy requires creative instantiation.  
Referring to the cases of France and the U.S., Bergson notes that historically democracy has 
come about largely as protest, and that “democratic formulas” lend themselves to facile 
rejection, reversal and interdiction. He emphasizes, “Especially, they [democratic formulas] 
are only applicable if they are transposed, absolute and almost evangelical, in terms of purely 
relative morality, or rather the general interest” and that this “transposition always risks 
leading to an “incurvation” in the sense of particular interests.”188 The political actualization 
necessary for the creative open society requires this society as a precondition. Thus we arrive 
at Tzara’s and Dada’s conundrum, the problem of how to enact both simultaneously.  
Bergson again seems to offer a view towards a solution: replacing a mechanistic outlook 
with a dynamic one, shifting from the rule of law and abstraction to an emphasis on 
multiple unfolding in time. Bergson contrasts mechanism with dynamism by depicting 
their different conceptions of simplicity. Mechanism regards what is most simple as that 
which has effects one can predict, perhaps even calculate, at the outset, such that “the 
notion of inertia is then by definition, simpler than that of liberty, the homogeneous 
simpler than the heterogeneous, the abstract simpler than the concrete.”189  Dynamism 
seeks the real relation, something the mechanist regards as “primitive” but which is 
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arrived at through a fusion of several “rich” notions, a transformation without remainder 
or trace, like the darkness that results from interference of two lights.190  Mechanism 
starts with the abstract law, dynamism with the specific circumstances surrounding our 
encounter of something. While mechanism relies on static conceptions and assumptions 
of uniform processes, dynamism always starts again, re-confronts the present each time, 
in each situation. Mechanism uses law to take time into account primarily as it is 
mediated by procedure. Dynamism unfolds in time multiply (in each specific encounter), 
rendering law a “more or less symbolic” expression of reality.191  As Bergson notes, 
mechanism and dynamism represent two very different views of human activity. 
Dada adopts dynamism to bring specific, different, real individuals and concepts into 
an unfolding project of creation. Tzara opens the first of his Seven Dada Manifestos with the 
declaration, “Dada is our intensity.”192  This intensity constitutes open, creative time. Novelty 
is valued only insofar as it registers a desire for change that has been short-circuited and 
compressed to an impossible moment.  Tzara writes of the modern fetish for the new: “The 
love of novelty is the cross of sympathy, demonstrates a naïve je m’enfoutisme 
[Idon’tgiveadamnism], it is a transitory, positive sign without a cause” (76).193 A desire for 
novelty signifies a need to replenish time, to shift collectively towards a more dynamic and 
less mechanist mode. This mode requires a creation that is at once inextricably aesthetic and 
political, incorporating art and anti-art to fashion an open society.   
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Dada calls for the transformation of protest into creation in “Dada Manifesto 1918”: 
“The new artist protests: he no longer paints (symbolic and illusionist reproduction) but 
creates… locomotive organisms capable of being turned in all directions by the limpid wind 
of momentary sensation” (78).194 In a society of artists, these dynamic, responsive organisms 
could be the desired results of self and communal creation.  
 
III. Thou shall not do x and thou must do x: Anarchist attitudes as values  
Creation demands a restoration of time in which to enact salvation or freedom. Re-
infusing time with difference and possibility makes everything subject to creation and 
recreation and requires a demolishing or at least loosening of current categories of perception 
and classificatory schemes. Tzara portrays himself as a madman, hoping for the best as he 
unleashes chaos: “I destroy the drawers of the brain and of social organization: spread 
demoralization wherever I go and cast my hand from heaven to hell, my eyes from hell to 
heaven, restore the fecund wheel of a universal circus to objective forces and the imagination 
of every individual” (Dada Manifesto 1918, 79)195  Even as the speaker looks to 
improvement, his eyes moving from hell to heaven, his hands have already begun altering 
heaven and re-making the universe.  
The project of retemporalization and re-creation extends and repeats time to generate 
the conditions necessary for enacting a new collective.  There is no formal contraction of 
time into a foundational act. As Dada participant and historian George Ribemont-Dessaignes 
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observed, Dada’s character depended on a tension between forces of dissolution and “other 
forces seeking form and substance.”196 Tzara’s manifestos operate within this Dada force 
field, reconceptualizing form and content as intensity. Tzara divests the manifesto of both 
form and content, preserving only its rhetorical context, the articulation of a call for change. 
But this change requires a process, if not a teleology, and Tzara’s manifestos do articulate a 
set of values or conditions for producing this process. 
In place of commandments or laws, Tzara articulates a set of anarchist attitudes. 
Seven Dada Manifestos call for poiesis by maintaining a carefully provocative tone and 
establishing a set of values to promote collective creation. The tone of the manifestos 
oscillates between two sets of antipodes, one set an attitude towards the world, the other the 
speaker’s attitude toward his audience. The portrait the manifesto offers of the world 
alternates between despair and serious dissatisfaction, on the one hand, and amusement and 
joy at the richness and possibilities the universe presents for experience, experimentation, 
and creation, on the other. Regarding readers (literally, during performances), Tzara 
alternately lavishes them with praise and affection and mocks them, occasionally even 
adopting a hostile register. The manifestos intertwine hyperbolic claims of revolt and 
regeneration with claims to love and adore listeners and readers, all in a context of sweeping 
statements about the awful state of humanity and the force Dada will bring to bear on it. 
These enormous shifts in tone and attitude accomplish three very specific tasks (at the 
moment of their performance and over the course of four years of Dada): they make the case 
for change, portraying the status quo as unpleasant, untenable, wrong-headed, and quite open 
to creation and correction; they bring audiences into the Dada collective; and they use 
sympathy and revulsion to establish a dialectic that subsequently alienates the audience from 
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Dada (and then perhaps re-integrates it) in order to maintain the independence of each 
audience member. After all, Dada’s collective poeisis is grounded in difference, not unity; 
the dissolution of audience members into some Dada essence would be antithetical to Dada’s 
project. 
 The first Dada manifestation in Zurich on July 14, 1916 leveled established value 
systems to clear the ground for Dada in the first reading of a movement manifesto, Tzara’s 
“Manifesto of mr. Antipyrine.” The manifesto introduces Dada in four ways, three defining it 
by what it refuses, the fourth in terms of its aims. The manifesto proclaims refusals to 
advocate a particular program, to exist for anyone, and to inhabit a position of judgment vis-
à-vis norms (“Dada is not madness—or wisdom—or irony”).197 In terms of aspirations, it 
promises to recognize art as “not serious” and give its audience pleasure. Performed on 
Bastille Day, the manifesto ventriloquizes “vive la France” through an absurd “Ambassador 
of sentiment,” whose speech serves to undercut nationalism, psychology, science, and their 
pretences of seriousness and intelligence. In their stead Dada promises a non-serious art for 
their audience’s pleasure.  
Yet the continuous creation of art (and anti-art) entails its own values, and the Seven 
Dada Manifestos consistently impart five values in the guise of attitudes and modes of 
action. These values focus on generating the ground conditions for Dadaist practice. 
1. Sufficient and sufficiently tenuous faith. Tzara begs readers to indulge Dada with a 
sort of limited faith, a belief in the need for change and in the multitude of possibilities to 
create change through art accompanied by a suspicion of Tzara’s –and, perhaps, by 
extension, Dada’s—own sincerity, rightness, and authority. The “Manifeste de monsieur 
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Antipyrine” ends “But we DADA are not of their [the Ambassadors of sentiment] opinion for 
art is not serious I assure you and if in exhibiting crime we learnedly say ventilator, it is to 
give you pleasure kind reader I love you so I swear I do adore you” (76).198  Read as sincere, 
this assertion assures readers that Tzara and Dada do not wage high stakes in their rebellion 
and wish their audience well. Read more skeptically, Tzara seems to mock the intellectual 
grounds of those who would lay claim to readers’ loyalties with pretensions of good will that 
perhaps involve higher stakes (like those entailed by nations whose asserted good will 
towards their citizens may occasion serious sacrifice).  
Rather than elicit audience members’ faith, Tzara’s declarations produce two useful 
doubts: in the sincerity and rightness of those who speak with the authority of nations or 
science, and in the sincerity of Tzara or of anyone in a position of authority who claims 
affection as the justification for wielding power over others. As Tzara warns in the 
“Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter Love”: “A priori, that is with eyes closed, Dada places 
before action and above all: Doubt. Dada doubts all. Dada’s an awl. All is Dada. Watch out 
for Dada” (92).199 The manifestos ask listeners and reader to take Dada the phenomenon 
seriously enough to engage it, but not to actually take Dada seriously. Tzara almost 
resembles a liberal Anglican minister reassuring his flock that religious zeal is unseemly, that 
the important thing is to come to church, enact the rituals, and share fellowship. 
2. Uncertainty. The manifestos cultivate uncertainty to position Dada against the 
future and replenish the present with its full experiential value. In dismantling all universal 
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laws and permanent, foundational claims, the manifestos deprive their audience of any 
certainties beyond the status quo (which they deplore) and the creation that might unfold 
presently. Dada’s intensity is discomfiting and vertiginous, “life without carpet-slippers or 
parallels.” Tzara addresses the future negatively and obliquely, imbuing it with an awareness 
of imminent degeneration (“our brains will become downy pillows”) and task yet to be 
accomplished, notably attaining liberty (“we are not free yet shout freedom” [75]).  A 
presentist orientation advocates both Carpe diem, as a letting go of futurity, and ascetic 
efforts to on behalf on creation. As a value, uncertainty functions to negate actions based on 
certainty, reducing deferred action to deferral, expectation to self-abnegation, and force 
action grounded in present circumstance. 
3. Multiplicity. Negotiating uncertainty happily leads to an embrace of multiplicity. 
Variety in the here and now, the plenitude of the present, fulfills the vacancy of a projected 
future. Flexibility emerges as the best strategy for preparing for an unknown future, enacting 
difference the best guarantee for preventing a coalescence of power that will foreclose future 
options. The manifestos offer a choice between uncertain creation and submissive 
automatism. Dada remains alone among modernist movements in thinking multiplicity. On 
the one hand, as a collective Dada’s thinking and creating together respects and enacts 
difference harmoniously and simultaneously, as shared but individuated time. On the other 
hand, this collective that gathers together and empowers specific individuals to create makes 
the individual less salient as the quantitative unit, opening up possibilities for ontological 
mobility. The enactment of creation and ongoing process of experience—inseparable in 
Dada’s refusal to distinguish between art and life—allow for new connections and the 
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potential for a multiplicity of machines, in Deleuze’s terms, to replace the individual as the 
focal point of epistemological and political concerns.  
4. Enactment, discovery through doing. While artists such as Duchamp also worked 
to restore temporality through art, moving from Cubist painting of successive motions to 
three-dimensional works like The Large Glass, which requires observers to circulate around 
the piece, literary Dada was better positioned to make audience members confront the 
movement of thought. Indeed, even Duchamp frequently resorted to the strategy of writing to 
infuse his visual art with a sense of time, not only through perplexing titles to prolong 
viewers’ encounters with a visual artwork (“The Bride Striped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even” 
comes to mind), but by making his years of notes for a work-- The Large Glass-- into an 
artwork itself, The Green Box.200 Duchamp also wrote “Kind of Sub-Title” (1934) in which 
he exhorts readers to substitute a temporal vocabulary for a visual/spatial one: “Use ‘delay’ 
instead of ‘picture’ or ‘painting’” in order to succeed “in no longer thinking that the thing in 
question is a picture.”201 Duchamp claimed that he wished to reconceive of painting in purely 
intellectual, not visual-sensual, terms. 
Without endorsing Lessing’s and similar arguments from aesthetic theory on the 
spatial quality of painting and temporal purview of literary arts, it’s important to note that 
“Paris Dada, unlike the Zurich, New York, Berlin, Hanover and Cologne movements, 
belonged almost exclusively to writers, not to visual artists.”202 In the preface to his 
anthology, (painter) Robert Motherwell cautions readers with the even broader claim: “Dada, 
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like surrealism, was probably more the work of poets than painters, however inspiring the 
cubist revolution in painting may have been to both, and … Dada’s permanent effects have 
been on contemporary French literature, not on modern painting.”203 
 The manifestos make listeners and readers aware of the transition from one thought 
to another by employing strategies of contradiction, disavowal, disjunction, and false 
conclusions, and through frequent recourse to non sequiturs. Tzara undermines relations of 
cause and effect and rejects set methods and predetermined means for arriving at an end to a 
thought process. And he vilifies nothing as much as systematic thinking, mocking: “The 
system of quickly looking at the other side of a thing in order to impose your opinion 
indirectly is called dialectics, in other words, haggling over the spirit of fried potatoes while 
dancing method around it” (79).204 Tzara valorizes poiesis as unplanned and unregulated 
unfolding of creation in time, arguing that we create, discover, and actualize possibilities in 
the making.  
5. Repetition and Re-iteration. Martin Puchner points out that “unlike futurism, 
vorticism, and surrealism, Dada never expressed any reverence for its own foundational 
manifesto; in fact there is no First Dadaist Manifesto the way there is a Foundation and 
Manifesto of Futurism or a First Manifesto of Surrealism.”205 Dada celebrated “the endless 
repetition and iteration of consecutive foundational acts. What Dada thus highlighted was 
that the foundational force of the manifesto is a performative effect that can and must be 
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repeated: Dadaism is being founded and manifested over and over again.”206   As such 
Tzara’s manifestos call into question not just political programs but the procedural 
constitution of the polity. Procedures determine what can be done and are neither neutral nor 
universal. It’s not just that they evoke certain values—rationality, mechanism, hygiene—but 
that they depend on a false distinction between means and content, between how something 
is done and what is decided, what is possible. Foucault’s assertion “Liberty is a practice” gets 
at Dada’s anxiety over procedure and insistence on temporal difference: freedom must be 
constantly reasserted or it doesn’t really exist; it requires exercise. Freedom is not out there: 
it is a project to be continually realized and re-realized in time, the collective time of 
intersecting durées.  
Dada’s anarchistic values leave it vulnerable to the same critiques anarchism 
confronts routinely, particularly the charge of what Murray Bookchin termed “lifestyle 
anarchism.” Dada was critiqued on grounds that its theoretical evacuation, on the one hand, 
and apoliticism, on the other, allowed its practice to be absorbed as consonant with the 
functioning of the very society it wished to change. In a tough critical assessment of Dada in 
1920, Albert Gleizes inveighed against the movement’s showy and superficial character. As 
he observed Dada’s very lack of substance or doctrine, Gleizes asserted ironically “Of all 
human beings it is the Dadaists who have the greatest appreciation for the discovery of 
printing.”207 Gleizes noted the Dadaists’ habit of giving their books and pamphlets away to as 
many people as possible as quickly as they can. And yet, Gleizes claims, the Dadaists have 
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nothing to say—they are simply “mortally afraid of silence” and “cannot live alone.” Gleizes 
sees Dada as prostrate before the crowd, hardly a force for changing its character:  
They [Dada] seek the crowd, in which they believe. They are flat on 
their bellies before it, or else they engage in all sorts of clownery in order to 
coax catcalls or invective from it. They invite it to their demonstrations and 
stranger still, the crowd comes and does their bidding. As they disperse after 
their meeting, the Dadaists rub their hands and say, “Big success!” This crowd 
is composed of curiosity seekers and of highly Parisian boulevardiers, the 
arbiters of artistic fashion for snobbish circles. These elements are in quest of 
the ‘modern direction.’ The fear of no longer being modern holds them in its 
grip, and they keep asking each other what to do. Let them be of good cheer 
and take up Dada without further hesitation, for Dada is modern if by this we 
mean that it is the great attraction of the day, the ‘great event of the season.’208
  
Gleizes’ critique turns on the power relations between Dada and its audience, Dada’s lack of 
program, and the temporal element—the fashionable momentariness—of Dada. Gleizes sees 
Dada in a servile role, needful of the audience’s attention, and unable or unwilling to impel 
the audience to real change, for which it lacks a program in any case.  
 Gleizes overlooks the flip side of this power dynamic and of Dada’s lack of program. 
If, as Bergson and others have noted, social change still depends largely on the endorsement 
and participation of at least some members of a society’s “upper crust,” then it would seem to 
make sense both for Dada to cater to trendsetters and followers and to do so in a manner that 
will allow them a decisive role in enacting change. The positive case for Dada is that by not 
dictating a program and instead gathering together the “major players” in a way that will 
provoke them to ponder change, Dada augments the chances that change will take place. And 
Gleizes’ vision of Dada as the “great event of the season” alludes to it as a happening rather 
than a simple regime change, calling attention to its potential for a non-directed or multi-
directed character. 
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While they despised nationalist and fascist rhetoric as well as most conservative 
literary and (visual) artistic aesthetics, Paris Dada lacked clearly defined positions in relation 
to the political and cultural left. Unlike Berlin Dada, Paris Dada veered away from 
ideological positions and political activism. Richard Huelsenbeck and Raoul Hausmann 
contrast the self-consciously socialist character of Berlin Dada with the apolitical character of 
Zurich and Paris Dada. Huelsenbeck writes: “Here the difference between our conception 
and that of Tzara is clear. While Tzara was still writing: “Dada ne signifie rien”—in 
Germany Dada lost its art-for-art’s-sake character with its very first move. Instead of 
continuing to produce art, Dada… went out and found an adversary. Emphasis was laid on 
the movement, on struggle. But we still needed a program of action, we had to say exactly 
what our Dadaism was after. This program was drawn up by Raoul Hausmann and myself. In 
it we consciously adopted a political position.” The program, entitled “What is Dadaism and 
what does it want in Germany?” lists as Dada’s first demand: “The international 
revolutionary union of all creative and intellectual men and women on the basis of radical 
Communism.” 209 In contrast, most participants and audience members of Paris Dada were 
bourgeois or haute bourgeois, or even minor members of the aristocracy (like Picabia on his 
mother’s side). The few direct encounters between Paris Dada and the working class political 
left made clear a structural and procedural disjuncture: Dada’s antics and the form of fora for 
explicitly engaging the French political (socialist) left were not a good fit. Dada performed 
irreverence, undermining ideologies and entrenched identities through creative critique that 
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worked best with audience participation (if only through heckling, protests, and projectiles 
launched at the stage). The French left relied on specific forms of communication (lectures, 
polemical tracts and pamphlets, reasoned debates) of a set of themes and entrenched 
(national, class and regional—at least Paris vs. the rest) identities. Without formal innovation 
or compromise on one or both sides, Dada and the main leftwing elements were in no 
position to converse: they could speak at, but not to, one another. 
 Two trainwrecks of encounters illustrate the failed communication between Dada and 
the constituents of France’s political left. Both occurred in February 1920, just after Tzara’s 
arrival and the launching of Paris Dada ‘proper.’ On the seventh Dada accepted an invitation 
by Léo Poldès to speak at his debate club, the Club du Fauborg, “before an audience of [over 
a thousand] workers, labor leaders, leftist intellectuals, and minor politicians” (128). Breton, 
Tzara, Aragon and Ribemont-Dessaignes represented Dada mostly by declaiming manifestos 
to the group. Breton biographer Mark Polizzotti reports that Aragon accomplished a brief 
rapprochement with the anarchists in attendance through an impromptu “eloquent harangue 
against the audience’s armchair socialism… until Breton’s recital of Tzara’s nonsensical 
‘Dada Manifesto 1918’ (‘Ideal, ideal, ideal. Knowledge, knowledge, knowledge. Boomboom, 
boomboom, boomboom’) alienated all factions equally” (128). Polizzotti’s account of the 
event seems to take a perspective similar to Breton’s, viewing Dada’s lack of articulation of 
clear, positive political content as a failure; Tzara, however, might have considered such an 
end result—audience members’ equal alienation— a resounding success, though Dada’s 
subsequent visit to a leftist forum that month suggests that he also had yet to address the 
obstacles to communication confronting such encounters. 
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Hans Richter provides an account of Dada trying to reach the working class after 
accepting an invitation to the Université Populaire “a center for adult education,” “an old 
liberal institution” whose students were “mostly workers.” Richter registers the 
uncharacteristic “markedly civilized atmosphere” of the encounter, speculating that “Tzara’s 
style may have been a little cramped by his respect for the working class.”210  This astute 
observation gets at the heart of the problem, one of style, not political ideology (or the failure 
to advocate one): what alterations to style did such an audience require? Ribemont-
Dessaignes asserts, “It was necessary to make them [the workers] understand that we were 
against Culture, and that we were rebelling not only against the bourgeois order but against 
all order, all hierarchy, all sacralization, all idolatry, whatever might be the idol” (176). Yet 
Dada seems to have lacked the means to do this. Richter sums up the result: 
Claims of this sort became progressively more ‘theoretical’ as the evening went on. 
The audience clearly found difficulty in swallowing ideas that consigned Napoleon, 
Kant, Cézanne, Marx and Lenin to the same scrap-heap. Ribemont-Dessaignes is 
forced to admit that the Dadaists failed to convince the workers. And this is not to be 
wondered at, since the movement as a whole tended towards the anarchism of 
Picabia. It was not until the advent of surrealism that a socio-political program, 
opposed to anarchism, was to reappear and be followed up systematically.211  
 
Richter’s conclusion sounds a very un-Dada-like note: since when did Dada aim to convince? 
As Hugo Ball explained Dada in its infancy in Zurich, it aspired to show, to “give proof” that 
non-nationalist individuals of independent spirit existed. Convincing someone, especially in 
relation to a proper perspective on culture or politics, sounds a Bretonian note, and Richter’s 
last sentence reminds us that he writes retrospectively, after surrealism. As I argue in the 
previous chapter, Dada’s refusal to advocate a specific “socio-political program” lies at the 
heart of its political and cultural import. Dada’s problem here seems to be one of 
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communication, perhaps mostly of style, perhaps also of content (Napoleon, Kant, Cézanne, 
Marx and Lenin), tone, or approach, but not of “essence,” ideology, or lack thereof. 
A Dada-esque response to this disjuncture between Dada’s and French socialist foras’ 
modus operandi would have been for Dada to refashion its critique to target this particular 
audience more viscerally, for Dada to enter into better proximity with “the workers” so as to 
be able to perform its dialectic of incorporation and alienation. Breton’s response was to 
abandon Dada for a movement that would articulate positive political content: still preferring 
the label thief to poet, he trades the poiesis at Dada’s heart, the experimenting with producing 
different social relations, for programmatic clarity, cashing in an aesthetic (but not 
aestheticized!) take on politics for a politicized aesthetic. 
In the final section of this chapter I bring together Proudhon’s and Deleuze’s ideas of 
the event to argue for a conception of Tzara’s manifestos as an opportunity for historical 
intervention, for a transformation of historical narrative into lived multiplicity. 
The temporal character of the event instills a way to envision change in terms of a fairly 
open-ended present, as either ongoing and open to popular participation through that 
extension in time or repeatedly asserted and thus open to mass participation through distinct, 
multiple opportunities for involvement.  Dada works toward collective, non-revolutionary 
change in contrast to the programmatic shifts much of the avant-garde solicits, changes 
occasioned by absolute rupture and imposed on a collective by circumstances or a tiny 
minority.  Moreover, Tzara’s manifestos envision a status quo where peaceful instability is 
the norm. If change is continuous rather than sporadic, the character of any single change 
matters far less than maintaining a process of ongoing change open to multiple actors. Dada 
replaces stable substance (values and ideals) and structure with style and a habit of change.  
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 That said, it is not my intention in this retrospectively proleptic reading of Tzara’s 
manifestos to discount the serious obstacle Gleizes emphasizes, the question of how to 
convert “charming” manifestos and fashionable soirées into real social transformation on a 
broad scale. Rather, I wish to establish what Dada might have done to explore a road mapped 
but ultimately not traveled outside literary modernism. I try to offer a plausible account of the 
failure to enact widespread social transformation in the next chapter, casting André Breton in 
the role of chief villain. 
 
IV. Dada as Event: Against Ætiology 
 
Here again are some other variants on the same event: 
It’s the Left who assured the success of the coup d’État, in voting, on the 17th of November, against the 
proposition of the quaestors.212  
It’s the press of the Elysée who frightened the bourgeois with their stories and retained their indignation. 
 It’s the army, ferocious and venal, whose character caused the citizens to lose their patriotism. 
 It’s this, it’s that! 
 Always such large events explained by little causes! 
 Oh! If I had only to reply to those ignorant pedants! If it were but a matter of me flagellating one more 
time those mystifiers, lackeys of revolutions they didn’t foresee and which have surpassed them! 
 --P. J. Proudhon, La Révolution sociale démontree par le coup d’état du 2 décembre, 1852213  
 
In all historical phenomena like the Revolution of 1789, the Commune, the Revolution of 1917, there 
is always one part of the event, irreducible to social determinisms, to causal series. The historians don’t like this 
aspect very much: they restore causalities afterwards. 
--Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “May ’68 Did Not Take Place”214  
  
In Proudhon and Deleuze anarchism and poststructuralism meet in a historically-
inflected philosophy of the event that refuses to confine events to temporal or formal bounds. 
This philosophy emphasizes experience and experimentation, notably the irreducible 
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particularities and complexities that make up a mass event in Proudhon’s thinking and the 
temporal continuity of an event-- its lived afterlife-- in Deleuze’s conception. In combination, 
Proudhon’s and Deleuze’s reflections allow us to read Tzara’s manifestos as the aesthetic and 
linguistic enactment of such an event. 
As collective, ongoing phenomena that register and enact change, events occupy a 
tendentious position in relation to historical narrative. Proudhon and Deleuze share a 
conviction that the character of certain historical events exceeds and differs from the causal 
explanations history attributes to them retrospectively and the motivated interpretations 
stakeholders promulgate in their aftermaths. Proudhon critiques the way in which the 
uprising and subsequent political consequences of 1848 were reduced to one logic or another; 
Deleuze critiques the dead character attributed to such events, the location of their 
importance in the past. Both thinkers argue for a concept of a mass event that defies a 
specific temporal perspective—relegating what matters about an event to a precursor, usually 
to some cause—and a tendency to efface the variable instantiation of the event with a unified 
view.  Events both generate and thwart history, leading Deleuze to claim “History is made 
only by those who oppose history.”215 Proudhon and Deleuze suggest that we should reckon 
with events in their immediate irreducibility as relevant to the present moment and to the 
shaping of the future.  
Events offer opportunities to challenge historical narratives and change course. 
Borrowing from Nietzsche, Deleuze defines the time of the event as untimely, as 
subhistorical or superhistorical. The problem turns on how to recuperate or continue the 
event, to inhabit it rather than deform it to conform with a historical narrative. Deleuze 
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argues for a collective taking up and inhabiting of the event over and above historical 
analysis, echoing Bergson’s argument for a turn above interested analysis towards 
experiential knowledge, a leaping inside that allows one to go within and experience durée. 
In what follows I argue that Tzara’s Dada attempts to bring about such an event. I use 
Deleuze’s idea of reconversion as a framework for assessing the interrelations among 
language, time, form and audience in Tzara’s manifestos. Reading Seven Dada Manifestos as 
an attempt to generate a mass, variable event to shape the present and future argues for a 
practical dimension at the heart of Dada. 
A full event—one not immediately wrested from happening and relegated to history -
- acquires a mass character by virtue of bringing together as many different elements (people, 
ideas, perspectives) as possible into a locus of interaction. This event depends on what 
Deleuze calls “reconversion” for actualization, a collective response that takes the character 
of a social change or transformation. Deleuze and Guattari explain, “When a social mutation 
appears, it does not suffice to draw out its consequences or effects, following lines of 
economic or political causality. The society must be able to form new collective dispositions 
corresponding to the new subjectivity, in such way as it wishes the mutation. That is a real 
‘reconversion.’”216 By making transition and futurity the proper temporal nature of events, 
Deleuze empowers them to happen. For the events to really occur, and for us to react to them 
ethically, we must grapple with them, let them work on us, and actively respond. This 
response is not to the event itself; it is the product of our engagement with the event, like the 
parrying of shock Benjamin sees in the confrontation with the forces of the modern European 
city that resulted in Baudelaire’s poetry.  
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 Put simply, Deleuze’s conception of reconversion permits a democratic engagement 
with events. Tzara’s manifestos broach this kind of engagement by opening up form to 
creative enactment of diverse, changeable perspectives. The tripartite form of the manifesto 
follows a procedural logic, stating a problem with the status quo, offering up a solution, and 
concluding with a call for its enactment. Seven Dada Manifestos disorders the manifesto’s 
procedural form through repetition and change within each movement of a manifesto, 
positing and re-positing the same and different problems, echoing and varying solutions. 
Repetition and variation replace macro-level structure and furnish multiple opportunities for 
new audience members to “catch up” and enter into the discussion at hand: the manifestos 
repeat and offer anew starting points as they unfold. Even as the sole speaker, Tzara presents 
his manifestos as dialogues or conversations among himself, Dada, and the audience. The 
identities of the participants in the conversation are uncertain, at times overlapping or 
changing. The imperiled line between author and audience falls away in the manifesto’s 
confused intermingling of Tzara, Dada, audience, revolutionaries, and keepers of the status 
quo. Tzara does not make clear who is to author the new world the manifestos seek to create: 
Tzara? Dada? The people?  Which is which and who is who? Uncertainty precludes 
knowledge of to which group one belongs and the boundaries and character of that group. 
Such uncertainty calls one to act as if she possesses membership in multiple groups.  Stakes 
in the outcome of revolution and creation for multiple groups involved make change more 
thoughtful (thought from more vantage points) and more likely peaceful.  
Tzara’s manifestos mix not only group membership but time, commingling the pregnant 
now of a manifesto—a moment—with an ongoing past penetrating the now and the 
future unfolding right now and for the longer term. On the one hand, as with multiple and 
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uncertain group membership, residency in multiple or unclearly differentiated 
temporalities confers responsibility for more times, for the realization of the past and 
future on whose continuity of existence the present moment depends. On the other hand, 
the confusion of identity and temporality engenders a kind of nonsense that makes the 
task at hand uncertain. The audience for Tzara’s manifestos find themselves in a universe 
and rhetorical situation that more closely resembles the nebulous alterity of the prose 
poem than the definite contours of the manifesto. 
 Tzara shows how language, in relation to time, reveals the falsity of many distinctions 
between surface and depth, undoing critiques of language as social veneer, as hiding some 
private experiential, visceral depth beneath it. Language functions as becoming, intersecting 
sedimented pasts and moments, as a force working to efface and replace borders between 
individuals and groups: “it is the task of language both to establish limits and to go beyond 
them.”217 The most social medium of the surface (for humans) is language, so an event that 
infuses or infects language on a mass scale has a shot of going somewhere. Bergson 
emphasizes language’s inability to capture the depth of individual experience, contrasting the 
presentation of love in a novel, which offers only the “objective and impersonal aspect” of a 
person’s experience of emotion, to a more substantial character of individual experience. 
While the novel, Bergson states, tries to capture love by juxtaposing “a multiplicity of 
details” in “their primitive and living individuality,” in individual experience “states of 
consciousness cease juxtaposing themselves to interpenetrate, melt together, and each one 
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become tinted with the coloration of all the other.”218   Because juxtaposition is not 
interpenetration, Bergson faults language for failing “to translate entirely what our soul 
senses,” for an incommensurability with thought.219  Yet the failure Bergson attributes to 
language more accurately belongs to narrative, to its sequential ordering. Tzara’s use of 
language challenges borders of form, genre and identity, re-making language as 
interpenetration.  
Tzara’s manifestos charge the atmosphere with linguistic richness, saturating the air 
so that those present must wade through a language (much of) whose diversity has been 
actualized. Tzara releases hyperbole, contradiction, excess, lies, obfuscations, unsupportable 
claims, ridiculous repetitions, commonplaces and banalities, making them present for 
incorporation, alteration, transformation and generation. Moreover, he opens language to 
experimentation by imbuing it with a different temporality, a presentness open to creation 
and subject to continual change. As he announces in “Manifesto on Feeble Love and Bitter 
Love”: “Here is the great secret: The thought is made in the mouth” (87).220 
 Tzara’s assertion echoes the same spatialization of time as surface that Deleuze finds 
in his reading of the Stoics: “The event is coextensive with becoming, and becoming is itself 
coextensive with language… Everything happens at the boundary between things and 
propositions. Chrysippus taught: ‘If you say something, it passes through your lips; so, if you 
say ‘chariot,’ a chariot passes through your lips.’” Deleuze finds ‘the only equivalents’ of 
such paradox in Zen Buddhism and English or American nonsense, in their “dismissal of 
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depth,  …display of events at the surface, and…  deployment of language along this limit.”221  
What matters about real events, then, is breadth, not depth, the ways in which they bring so 
many different elements into a force field of multiplicity, not the way in which they cultivate 
a linear, teleological depth. Reconversion happens on the surface, sometimes on a surface not 
fully accessible hitherto (think of what has been buried, kept under wraps, occluded), and 
charges this surface with a particular kind of energy, an intensity that changes its 
generational possibilities, what it can grow, produce, and what can live on it. 
 In the context of the Bergsonian conception of dynamic religion discussed above, we 
might conceive of the (language) event as the practice of this religion, the means to create an 
open society. The transformative creation enacted and encouraged in Tzara’s manifestos 
revolts against the “practices of critique and contestation” of the manifesto genre. Tzara is 
able to “transform critique into a ‘re-volt,’ …a turn within power, beyond forms of power.” 
In Ziarek’s reading, “Dadaism was never simply a revolt against bourgeois culture and 
morality but rather a turn within the logic of Enlightenment rationality—which Tzara 
identified as the organic disease of modern life—and toward an eventlike rupture of 
experience free from investments of power.”222 Dada suggests that by extending creation to 
everyone, not just artists, Ziarek’s redisposition of forces and its reception as such, as work, 
might occur simultaneously and unreflectively, as a plural norm of experience.  Thus the “re-
volt” within power, a “critical inflection in the tonality of power, a change of momentum 
whereby forces become released from the circuit of power and are given a free space of 
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occurrence,” becomes the norm, not the exception.223 Power does not coalesce; it exists 
provisionally and in becoming. 
 Ziarek’s definition of force as “the very temporality of happening, in which 
occurrence has the structure of an event extended into the coming future and therefore 
irreducible to any particular instant of the now”224 returns us to Proudhon and Dada. 
Proudhon’s insistence on the irreducibility of the revolutions of 1848 (and their failure) to 
any single interpretation resonates with Dada’s avoidance of unified content or program as a 
means of protecting the multiplicity it actively solicits from selective simplification.  
Tzara’s manifestos refuse causality without refusing antecedents: they evoke traditions, 
norms, and contemporaneous contexts of experimentation (cubism and futurism) to gather 
multiplicity together so that all its different components might interact. Dada divests itself of 
revolution so that it may enter and endure in perception as a full event, not merely a 
consequence, and endure as becoming rather than coalesce into form or a static identity. This 
conception of Dada as concerned with “the specifically poietic momentum of force relations 
opened up by the artwork” makes much of its nonsense lisible, as its refusal of a unifying 
logic is central to pre-empting a reading of it that relegates it to the past, to some causal 
principle.225 
Proudon and Deleuze both advocate a perspective on events that prioritizes their 
prolongation through future action over debates about interpretation. This perspective reflects 
an anarchist preoccupation with open-ended, participatory action over top-down dictated 
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ends. Assigning events causality and specific interpretations consigns them too quickly to a 
particular historical narrative, effectively ending their availability as means for self-
determination. Keeping events in play, in contrast, provides an opportunity for more people 
to participate in them and makes them means and ends for exercising collective agency. 
Released of the dominance of causality, events can make proper use of the past, connecting 
with its richness rather than coalescing it into a single point of grievance.226 The past 
functions as body and substrate, both locus and object of transformation. The orientation of 
events towards reconversion makes the past accessible outside the confines of historical 
narrative as context and raw material for creation. Deleuze’s constant attention to releasing 
events and creation from history— “There is no act of creation that is not transhistorical”—
re-imbues the past with virtual presence, permitting not just aporias but an escape from 
narrative (returning us to the manifesto as prose poem).227 As aesthetic creation aiming to 
generate an event, Tzara’s manifestos reactivate the past to escape the teleology of history. 
Literary creation thwarts the temporal character history has produced for language, the times 
of the assembly line, the train schedule, the nation.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Redisciplining the Manifesto: Breton’s Surrealist Vanguard 
 
 My approach to anarchist modernism in the preceding chapters argues for a textual 
politics of time as a signal contribution of modernist and avant-garde art.  In this chapter I 
approach Surrealism as a movement on the cusp of anarchist modernism, torn between a 
politics of time and politics proper, the actual political domain. The circumstances of 
Surrealism’s formation, Breton’s personality and leadership style, and most significantly, 
surrealists’ oft-voiced anxieties of being perceived as ‘merely’ aesthetic, ultimately 
prevented Surrealism from sustaining the conventionally apolitical ethos that seems a 
necessary precursor to the development of a politics of time within a framework of aesthetic 
production.228  
 I propose to read the following quandaries as false choices emblematic of 
Surrealism’s anxieties about its relation to aesthetic and political production: (1) making art 
and participating in political activism vs. making political art; (2) organizing social 
revolution vs. encouraging individual revolt; and (3) producing new art (forms) vs. breaking 
with art altogether.229 The surrealists confronted each of these choices over and over again as 
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they configured and re-configured the relations between aesthetic undertakings and socio-
political programs within the Surrealist movement. 
 I read these sets as positing false choices because they force unnecessary and, I argue, 
even undesirable distinctions: between aesthetic and political endeavors, between collective 
and individual change, and between forms and practices. The dangers of conflating 
phenomena represented by one term with those represented by its mate are well-documented 
by a huge body of critical work, particularly in regards to fascism.230 And yet insisting, 
reifying and policing the borders within each set induces comparably dangerous 
blindnesses.231 It is not a matter of forcing a distinction or insisting on a lack thereof: rather, 
as the anarchist avant-garde’s politics of time allows, one might simultaneously think and 
practice a sort of flexible and plural semi-autonomy. Categorization and identity should not 
limit invention but serve as changing-sames that facilitate it. 
 As I show in my analyses of Gertrude Stein and Dada, this flexible and plural semi-
autonomy requires a theoretical suppleness (a willingness not to lock in definitions) and, 
especially, a specifically multi- or intra-temporal orientation. While Breton refused on 
Surrealism’s behalf the disparaging dichotomy of socio-political inefficacy or aesthetic 
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compromise, his movement never acquired the time-sense that would allow it to throw off 
the yoke of these false choices. In this chapter I offer a reading of Breton and Surrealism in 
terms of an oscillation between creating and advocating a politics of time, on the one hand, 
and putting this aesthetic practice of temporality aside in favor of more explicit political 
interventions, on the other.  
Surrealism wavered discomfitingly among conceptions of art as the practice of 
ultimate living, art as mysticism, and art as politics by other means. The “sinuous evolution” 
of Surrealism’s positions might cause whiplash in an overly attentive observer; Breton 
himself readily admits in the Second Manifesto of Surrealism that in less than six years 
political ideology had displaced automatism as the movement’s center of gravity. Partly due 
to the very unambiguous effects of Breton’s doctrine du jour on his fellow surrealists, I offer 
a less sympathetic and less dialectical or evolutionary reading of Surrealism’s sequence of 
positions. 232 Despite Breton’s concerns about contradiction, which I discuss later, the 
frequent shifts in surrealist positions are not so surprising in the context of the movement’s 
almost myopic focus on the future. Surrealism is “rooted” in a future time and “in the space 
which imagination creates beyond the borders of everyday life.”233 Numerous studies have 
argued that Surrealism’s reckoning with temporality demands a corresponding re-evaluation 
of our own time-sense in analyzing the movement, and Mary Ann Caws has claimed that this 
emphasis on what is beyond present quotidian life exempts Surrealism from the restrictions 
of time and locale placed on other literary movements. Following Blanchot, David 
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Cunningham asserts that “a genuine account of Surrealism should take into account the 
challenge that it produces to the temporal modalities and categories of historicism itself.” 234 
While Surrealism, like its modernist and avant-guard confreres, does call for a re-thinking of 
our temporal categories, I argue that this emphasis on a future accessible only by breaking 
with contemporaneous everyday life comes at the cost of socio-political efficacy and a 
coherent politics of time; most notably, this emphasis points to an aporia between current and 
desired experiences and practices without offering a means to bridge it or close the gap. 
Preococcupied with a radically different future detached from the present, in its socio-
political dimension Surrealism undermined the potential of its (extra)aesthetic innovations, 
short-circuiting possibilities for actually enacting change through the tools it developed with 
an unwavering emphasis on that which is beyond. For all its innovations, Surrealism proved 
too often unable (or unwilling in its impatience for change) to think processually or to grasp 
the character of time as difference in kind, as a multiplicity of heterogeneous and virtual 
qualitative difference that any socio-political program seeking to break with western 
Europe’s status-quo -isms (nationalism, industrial capitalism, imperialism, etc.) should take 
into account. 
 This chapter approaches Surrealism from two vantage points:  its political 
commitments and practices, and its time-sense, its theorization of temporality. In the 
previous chapters I have argued that conceptualizing an anarchist avant-garde provides us a 
way to understand time as a mediating category between literary experimentation and 
aspirations for significant social change. In this chapter I explore Surrealism largely as a 
counter-example to the anarchist avant-garde for two purposes: first, to clarify the usefulness 
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of temporality as a category for understanding the linkage of formal innovation to 
sociopolitical concerns in modernism and the avant-garde; and second, to identify what in 
Surrealism is dead (surrealist revolution) and what remains vibrant (specific aesthetic 
strategies and material practices) and potentially of use to us today.  
 Apart from its material legacy, specific works of art and the infamous surrealist 
objects, Surrealism spawned important experiential concepts at the interstices of form and 
practice such as automatic writing, objective chance, and Dali’s paranoia-critical method. 
These concepts offer tools that may yet yield social change, provided a specific experiential 
context in which to work and open-ended space for action, a concrete time in which their 
effects might unfold apart from predetermined ends. Surrealism neglected to furnish its tools 
a present existence: its times are those of the future revolutionary moment, the past, or the 
non-time of the state between waking or sleeping. Time is either completely abstracted (a 
category not tied to anything, metaphysical) or spatialized, harnessed to a person or a 
collective or object, here or there (Europe vs. its colonies, elsewhere). 
 In short, I argue that Surrealism’s theoretical attenuation and outright devaluation of 
present existence cuts the legs out from under its socio-political aspirations. Surrealism’s 
embrace of a political program, though not without alterations and inconsistencies, is 
characteristic of its avoidance of temporal multiplicity, with its inherent dynamism and social 
complexity. Through their attempts to make qualitative duration available—literally 
present—for aesthetic and political undertakings, Baudelaire, Stein, and Zurich and Paris 
Dada exemplify an anarchist modernism that intertwines aesthetic and political undertakings 
under the sign of avant-garde poetics. Surrealism, in contrast, favors a much more common s 
‘modernist’ project of revolution, one ultimately far less radical in terms of social and 
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political experimentation. The distinction I make here relies largely on a diverging time-
sense.  My linking of generically modernist undertakings to revolution and anarchist 
modernist ones to radical change corresponds to a view of a different central preoccupation 
for each. Following Perry Anderson, the “horizon of revolution”—whether welcomed, 
feared, or abhorred—forms the backdrop for modernist movements.235  In contrast to faith in 
or fear of drastic, temporally contracted change, anarchist modernist  movements, following 
Peter Bürger’s description of the avant-garde, orient around projects of radical change to 
collective life, often through re-imagining and seeking to reconfigure the relations between 
aesthetic practices and ‘the praxis of (everyday) life.’ The time-sense of anarchist 
modernism, like that attributed by Bürger to the avant-garde, is not inherently infused by a 
(forthcoming) contraction of the present; in fact, as I argue for the project of 
retemporalization, it should generally oppose such contraction. 
The first part of this chapter offers a literary historical account of the death of Dada 
and development of Surrealism that emphasizes how the movements’ theoretical disparities, 
especially those related to time-sense, translate into important concrete differences in 
practice. Breton’s execution (in both senses of the word) of Dada reveals a break between 
Dada and Surrealism of a character rarely recognized: the abandonment of a transnational 
project of retemporalization for a national and international project of attempted revolution. 
The shift in power relations between Tzara and Breton represents not just a move from 
political noncommitment to “revolutionary discipline,” but also a change in orientation from 
transnational and potentially democratic to national and international and resolutely 
vanguardist. Tristan Tzara’s self-proclaimed sadness in the country (his pseudonym’s 
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approximative meaning in his native Rumanian) gives way to Parisian urbanity; Dada’s 
decentralized transnationalism (its varying movements in Zurich, Cologne, New York, 
Berlin, Hanover and Paris) is overtaken by a Surrealism governed from Paris.236  After 
characterizing the schism between Dada and Surrealism, I focus on the political character 
Breton inculcates in Surrealism, particularly its focus on governance, and the consequences 
of Surrealism’s uneasy allegiance to the French Communist Party (PCF).  I explore 
Surrealism’s intrusions into the political realm, in terms of both its own politics and the 
political ideologies it advocated, to clarify the conventional nature of Surrealism’s political 
thought. 
 
I. Political Praxis I: Executing Dada in Paris 
Though hardly a feminist avant la lettre, Breton might well have said about his roles 
in Dada and Surrealism, “The personal is political.” The slogan and its inverse describe 
Breton’s management style more aptly than Surrealism’s philosophies, which lend 
themselves at least as much to political action through “bodily collective innervation,” as 
Benjamin hoped, as through individual agency.237 Yet because Surrealism existed as means 
to an as yet unattained end, in the meantime Breton’s management style mattered more than 
Surrealism’s potential meanings. Breton was indisputably the chief theoretician and 
dominant force of Surrealism until the Second World War, and the movement bore a very 
deep imprint of his character. His amalgamation of personal and political realms somewhat 
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paradoxically paired the “sinuous evolution” of surrealist theory and practice with 
expectations of absolute adherence to its positions at every moment.   
The conjoining of personal and political realms of feeling and action subtends 
Breton’s embrace and eventual disavowal of Dada. Intensely felt affiliations and friendships 
with other (male) intellectuals provided much of the energy and content that infuse Breton’s 
intellectual production at any given time. Breton first fell under the spell of men of letters, 
Mallarmé, then Rimbaud, and perhaps most notably, Isadore Ducasse, the Count of 
Lautréamont, whose Les Chants de Maldoror and Poésies he discovered as a young man. As 
a budding poet himself, Breton chose mentors in Valéry, Apollinaire, and Reverdy, each of 
whom encouraged and eventually disappointed him.  Breton was involved in serial 
passionate friendships, with Théodore Fraenkel from childhood, Jacques Vaché as a young 
man (and forever after as a ghost), then Soupault, Aragon, Picabia, Tzara, Eluard, and Péret. 
Of all these relationships, only the one with Péret would endure until (Péret’s) death.  
Breton’s relationships rarely allowed a distinction between friend and collaborator, which 
sometimes required a balancing act or even dissimulation, for example in maintaining good 
relations simultaneously with powerful figures in the Parisian literary world—such as 
Jacques Rivière and Jean Paulhan-- and his immediate cohort, the Littérature group or Dada. 
The overlap of friend and collaborator also meant that an emotional hurt could translate into 
a professional break and vice versa.  Breton’s relationships constituted acts of faith and 
demanded extraordinary commitment on both sides, including, on Breton’s part, at least, the 
belief that personal loyalty and esteem were inseparable from professional and ideological 
accord.  
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Of these soul mates, Jacques Vaché, the first to die, had the most significant influence 
on Breton personally and professionally. Breton chose to interpret Vaché’s 1919 death by 
opium overdose as suicide, linking it to his long-affected nihilism, and made Vaché into a 
sort of high prophet of Surrealism, an originator of black humor and the most important 
proto-surrealist. At the same time, Breton fortified himself against falling prey to the 
intensity of his sequential passions with Vaché’s notion of ‘desertion within oneself,’ a 
protective mechanism of interior nihilism based on a grasp of ‘the utter pointlessness of 
everything’ that provided Breton a veneer of indifference in the midst of emotional tumult. 
Breton came to Dada (just before Dada came to Paris with the arrival of Tristan Tzara 
in 1920) with a history of intense but time-delimited relationships, a sort of Platonic serial 
monogamy with men and their writings. The tendency for Breton’s object of adoration and 
philosophical position to go hand-in-hand would present a specific problem vis-à-vis Tzara 
and Dada, given both’s refusal to avow any particular philosophy or even to seriously 
entertain the prospect of doing so. If Dada could stand no doctrine in place of heterogeneous 
possibilities, Breton could brook no ideological uncertainty over the long haul of a friendship 
or professional collaboration. Breton’s conflation of the personal with the professional and 
political left very little room for tolerance and virtually none for significant difference.238 
Breton’s attraction to Tzara owes much to chance circumstances and timing. While 
Breton admired “Dada Manifesto 1918,” which he read in Dada 3 (published in December 
1918, encountered by Breton in January 1919) and found resonances in it with Vaché’s 
‘umor,’ he had dismissed the two earlier issues of the journal, which he had perused at 
Apollinaire’s, as “largely derivative of prewar experiments” (90).  Breton re-encountered 
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Dada at a moment when he was foundering personally and philosophically: Vaché had just 
died, Apollinaire had died a few months before, and Breton was at loose ends artistically, 
producing nothing. It certainly mattered that Dada went beyond conventional aesthetic 
boundaries and that it was resolutely nonconformist and international; it may have mattered 
most that Tzara’s first letter to Breton, requesting a poem for the journal (Dada), was penned 
the day Vaché died, January 6, 1919. In Breton’s January 22 reply to Tzara, he writes: 
What I loved most in the world has just disappeared: my friend Jacques Vaché is dead. 
Lately it had been my joy to think how well you would have liked each other; he would 
have recognized your mind as akin to his own, and by common consent we would have 
been able to do great things… I am really enthusiastic about your manifesto. I no longer 
knew where to turn to find the courage you have shown. Today all my attention is turned 
toward you. (Breton qtd in Polizzotti 91) 
 
The relationship between Tzara and Breton began with an intensity on Breton’s part that in 
fact antedated the actual relationship. Indeed, Breton’s expectations of greatness—as well as 
the anticipation generated by numerous false announcements of Tzara’s arrival in Paris 
before he finally showed up on Picabia’s doorstep on January 17, 1920—led to momentary 
disappointment on the part of Breton upon discovering in person that Tzara was dark and 
diminutive, with very odd-sounding French, and not at all imposing or serious. In a way the 
Dadaist, the promoter of absurdity and decomposition, was too moderate for Breton’s 
inclinations, physically and philosophically. 
 As a participant in Paris Dada, Breton found himself in a position of personal and 
political discomfort. Personally, he became frustrated by Tzara’s and Picabia’s lack of 
seriousness, their refusal to commit to a program beyond nonconformism and general 
irreverence for established norms. And he came to find Dada’s posture of noncommitment on 
the political (ideological) front comparably discomfiting. To be fair, no one else in the Paris 
Dada group seems to have had a strong sense of where Dada stood politically, with the 
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possible exception of Tzara, who insisted on a politics for Dada (nondirection, spontaneity, 
and performance) and on an apolitical stand towards politics itself, at least until he joined the 
PCF several years later. Initially, Dada’s non-endorsment of a political ideology may have 
mattered less to Breton than its lack of identifiable substance and nomenclature: Breton 
sought some kind of definite, positive content. He had asserted that he would rather be a thief 
than a poet; what he needed was a name and a program to articulate what it was he was doing 
that was not poetry or ‘merely’ art.239 
 Tzara and the other participants in Paris Dada were either unable or unwilling to 
describe what Dada was if not art: they either dodged the question, referred to Dada by way 
of negative reference to art as anti-art or non-art, or defined Dada in purely negative ways, 
for example Tzara’s famous declaration that Dada was the greatest swindle of all time. Had 
Breton possessed a looser educational formation and tolerance for open-endedness, he might 
have arrived at a description of Dada based on its methodologies and practices, but for all his 
protestations to the contrary, Breton’s intellectual formation was primarily literary, 
secondarily psychological and medical, and his interests tended more to personal 
introspection, on the one hand, and grand ideas and mystical musings, on the other, not to the 
specifically social.240 After all, Breton’s idea of revolution involved language because he was 
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interested in a revolution of the mind, not primarily in the way language functions exterior to 
any one mind—socially-- and explicitly interpersonally.  
Breton’s usurpation of Dada unfolded as an exercise of top-down judgment over 
flexible pluralism.  Breton asserts, “For my part, I shall try, once again, to join the fight, as 
far forward as possible, although I do not, like Francis Picabia: [sic] ‘One must be a nomad, 
pass through ideas as one passes through countries and cities,’ make a rule of hygiene or a 
duty out of it. Even should all ideas be of a nature to disappoint us, I propose none the less to 
devote my life to them.”241  Breton hated both travel and theoretical uncertainty, while 
multiple geographical and theoretical wanderings define Dada: “passing through becomes the 
condition of Dadaism par excellence.”242 Breton’s adherence to ideas, regardless of the 
“disappointing” consequences, came to characterize the rigid governance of Surrealism, 
beginning with an imposition of morality on aesthetics, a move traceable in part to the 
dualism that consistently haunted Breton’s thought.243 
 
II. Political Praxis II: Breton Lays Down the Law 
 If experimentation characterized whatever political character can be ascribed to 
Dada’s aesthetically-generated pluralism and flexibility, Surrealism’s intrapolitical 
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organization and style mark a return to established norms, just as Breton’s use of the 
manifesto constitutes a return to the traditional political genre.  Breton imbued Surrealism 
with a clear sense of order, a de facto if not de jure hierarchy, and thoroughly regulated 
message. This revolutionary discipline emerged first in his use of the manifesto form, which 
was retrograde politically, aiming for the authority to govern by establishing a speaking 
position and platform/program as well as constructing a foundational literary historical 
narrative of surrealists, and avant-garde aesthetically, in its typography and prose poem 
features, though not stylistically avant-garde in any noticeably new ways.  
The surrealist Manifestos neatly encapsulate the movement’s overall lack of innovations in 
political form and thus its failure, arguably, to attain an actual avant-gardist extraesthetic 
existence. 
 Given the immediate context of Surrealism’s origins, its lack of innovation in 
political form should not be shocking.  Surrealism emerged through dissatisfaction with 
Dada’s lack of socio-political content, not disagreement primarily predicated on its aesthetic 
practices.  Breton broke with Dada over its incommensurability with any ideology, 
acceptance of peaceful instability as a virtue, and increasing public acceptance. And he made 
clear the political nature of the break through his means of effecting it (a power grab and 
coup d’état) and call for explicitly political action (a revolution and style of governance 
resonant with the Terror).  
  The power grab that preceded Breton’s rupture with Dada aimed to re-make Paris 
Dada into an animal of governance or else consign it to the dustbin of modernist movements. 
In early 1921 Breton persuaded the Dadaists to undertake a project of collective cultural 
assessment in the form of a conventional educational task: grading. Dada members graded 
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men respected as writers, thinkers, or geniuses in other fields—almost two hundred of 
them—on the scale French schools use, assigning each a score from an abysmal -25 to a 
nearly unheard of 20.244  The top averaged score, 16.85, went to Breton, with Rimbaud, 
Ducasse (Lautréamont), Vaché and Charlie Chaplin also earning high marks; poet Henri de 
Régnier and Anatole France received the lowest scores. The results were published under the 
heading “Liquidation” in the March 1921 issue of Littérature. Breton thus began his shift 
towards a movement that dictated proper standards of judgment. 
 The push toward governance that effectively killed Paris Dada began with overt 
attempts to take on juridical and legislative functions, with Breton playing judge, convener of 
the legislature, and ghost executive. Most notably, Breton pushed Dada into a mock trial of 
literary lion Maurice Barrès in 1921 and tried to organize an international congress of artists 
in Paris at the beginning of 1922. The founding manifesto of Surrealism did not appear until 
1924, by which time Breton had declared Dada a corpse, severed ties to Tzara (until the end 
of the decade), and made clear that he would occupy the highest leadership role in any future 
movement he would promote. 
The role Breton’s personal insecurities played in his political decisions quickly 
became apparent in his call for the mock trial. As a youth Breton (and Aragon) had deeply 
admired both Barrès’s anarchist views in works such as Un Homme libre (1889) in the Culte 
du moi trilogy and L’Ennemi des lois (1892), and the exoticism of Du sang, de la volupté, de 
la mort (1893). But after Barrès became a Boulangist, anti-Dreyfusard, and politician (he 
served as a deputy from 1889-1893), his works began reflecting an ardent nationalism, 
especially the trilogy Les Bastions de l'Est (comprised of Au service de l'Allemagne, 1905; 
Colette Baudoche, 1909 and Le Génie du Rhin, 1921), disappointing Breton and other 
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admirers among the Dada/Littérature group. Moreover, Barrès’s apparent transformation and 
betrayal of his earlier platform of individualism called to mind Breton’s own worries about 
the limits of acceptable self-contradiction. Aware of his personal history of shifting alliances, 
philosophical, ideological and interpersonal, Breton’s shifting charges against Barrès in fact 
revealed his own Janus character: Breton originally charged Barrès with “conspiracy against 
the security of the Mind”245 but later amended the accusation to efface any contradiction on 
Barrès’s part, claiming that “upon closer examination of that in his [Barrès’s] first books 
which inspired praise, one finds nothing that one cannot perfectly reconcile with his current 
stance.” 246 The metamorphosis of the chief charge intimates Breton’s need for control to 
determine truth and pass moral judgment for popular consumption. 
The trial contained only a few recognizably Dada elements: effective advance 
publicity through widely disseminated flyers proclaiming the “Trial and Sentencing of M. 
Maurice Barrès, by DADA”;247  Tzara’s testimony, which concluded with a “Dada song”; 
and a ruckus among the crowd (at the appearance of Péret as the “Unknown [German] 
Soldier).248 Ribemont-Dessaignes describes an unusual development in the history of Dada 
performances, the spectacle of established literati supporting Dada’s undertaking: “Serious 
and benevolent citizens defended ‘these young people’ who were offering an inimitable 
spectacle of intellectual justice. Mme Rachilde, who for a long time had boasted of her 
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weakness for the Dadaists, spoke in their favor and also in favor of Maurice Barrès.”249 Yet 
the upheaval among the crowd included their collective singing of “La Marseillaise” in 
reaction to the figure of Péret’s German soldier, a nationalist response hardly characteristic of 
the reactions Dada wished to elicit. And despite the ballyhoo, Breton managed to convict the 
defendant of “offense against the security of the spirit,”250 though the sentence, twenty years 
of hard labor, fell “short of the death penalty Judge Breton had wished.”251 
The mock trial violated Dada’s nongovernmental and nondiscrimatory ethos. Breton 
coaxed, cajoled and bullied the Paris Dadaists into the trial. Some participants, notably Tzara, 
treated the entire undertaking as a Dadaist performance, another occasion to embody the 
nonsensical nature of conventional reality rather than a weighty, reasoned juridical 
proceeding. A plurality of the Dadaists thought the trial un-Dada-like. Picabia disowned the 
trial from the beginning, commenting: “Having been ill for the last six weeks, I had nothing 
to do with arranging this activity. All that I hope is that it will not become political, clerical 
or anticlerical, because I will never take part in an activity of that kind, since I regard Dada as 
a personage having nothing to do with beliefs, whatever they may be. ”252 Georges 
Ribemont-Dessaignes, who reluctantly played the role of prosecutor in the trial, announced 
after the fact, “Dada could be a criminal, a coward, a destroyer or a thief, but not a judge.”253 
                                                 
249
 Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, History of Dada, trans. Ralph Manheim. Originally published in La 
Nouvelle Revue Française, Paris, no. 37 (July 1931). In The Dada Painters and Poets, ed. Robert Motherwell 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), 116. 
 
250
 Ribemont-Dessaignes, 116. 
 
 
251
 Polizzotti  Revolution of the Mind, 158. 
 
252
 Francis Picabia qtd in Georges Hugnet, The Dada Spirit in Painting, trans. Ralph Manheim. First 
published in Paris in Cahiers d’Art, 7:1-2, 6-7, and 8-10 (1932) and 9:1-4 (1934). In The Dada Painters and 
Poets, Motherwell, 184. 
 
253
 Ribemont-Dessaignes qtd in Richter, Dada, 186.  
 
  
168 
Hans Richter and Georges Hugnet echoed this sentiment, with Richter coming to view 
Breton as almost inhumanly judgmental254 and Hugnet noting that “the role of judge did not 
suit it [Dada] at all. 255 Breton’s mock trial staged nothing less than Dada’s demise. 
Appropriately self type-cast as judge, Breton attempted in his verdict to convert Dada into a 
force for law and order: “Dada, judging that the time has come to endow its negative spirit 
with executive powers, and determined above all to exercise these powers against those who 
threaten its dictatorship, is beginning, as of this date, to take appropriate measures.”256 The 
statement rings far truer if one substitutes “Breton” for “Dada.” 
Breton’s trial produced a negative of Dada: instead of manifesting and promoting free 
collective creation to replace social and governmental norms, Dada now functioned as an 
extension of government into the realm of aesthetic endeavor, valorizing stability over 
creation. Dada historian Hugnet also reads the trial as the beginning of the end of Dada: 
The “Barrès trial,” though disapproved of by Picabia and Tzara, surpassed any 
preceding demonstrations by Dada in Paris, and foreshadowed future activities 
induced by the threat of an unsolved problem. The tone of the verdict is somewhat 
different from that of the usual Dada writing. Only certain parts of the testimony gave 
to the trial a Dadaist, anarchist, contradictory and humorous tinge. […] Practically 
speaking, the result of the new extravaganza was general dismay, expressed, as far as 
the critics were concerned, in a threat never again to mention Dada in their 
columns.257 
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Both fascist nationalism (represented by Barrès) and Communism (nascently and 
problematically incarnated here by Breton) posed deadly threats to Dada’s anarchism.258 In 
this case, as almost two decades later in Spain, the actual death blow to the anarchists came 
from the left, not the right, in this instance through Breton’s intrusion of conventional 
political governance into the aesthetic and extra-aesthetic sphere of Dada.  
 This emerging predilection for status quo governmental projections onto aesthetic 
production foreshadowed the Congress of Paris Breton undertook to convene in the aftermath 
of the trial, a parliament of artists with proportional representation of the futurists, cubists, 
Dadaists, emerging surrealists, and various other “isms.” On January 3rd, 1922, Breton 
announced in the journal Comoedia an upcoming “International Congress for the 
Determination and Defense of the Modern Spirit,” soon abbreviated to “Congress of Paris.” 
Though the announcement was signed by a seven-person organizing committee (all French), 
the conference was Breton’s brainchild. It was to be a sort of League of Nations to negotiate 
among all the modernist and avant-garde movements to determine the appropriate “modern 
spirit” and, presumably, means of safeguarding it. Tzara already found the idea of such a 
congress dubious, noting that its purpose was to solve such burning dilemmas as “whether a 
railway-engine was more modern than a top-hat.”259 Breton soon authored a statement that he 
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finagled everyone on the organizing committee into signing (except Jean Paulhan, who was 
conveniently absent) and which denigrated Tzara as  “a publicity-mongering imposter… 
known as the promoter of a ‘movement’ that comes from Zurich, whom it is pointless to 
name more specifically, and who no longer corresponds to any current reality.”260  Breton’s 
slur against Tzara ultimately incurred such disapproval among the congress invitees that the 
gathering did not take place. However, the damage was done. As Tzara pointed out in his 
reply to Breton (published in the next day’s Comoedia), “an ‘international’ Congress that 
reprimands someone for being a foreigner has no right to exist.”261  The rift between Breton 
and Tzara made the collapse of Paris Dada indisputable, and Breton’s implicit critique of 
Tzara’s foreignness revealed the insular outlook he and much of the Parisian avant-garde 
shared despite their opposition to nationalism. 262 
As the attempted Congress suggested, Breton would make Paris the center for 
Surrealism.  As Breton’s surrealist sun was rising from Paris, its rays emanating on other 
parts of the globe, Dada’s multiple stars fizzled out. Dada’s funeral “officially” occurred in 
May of 1922, multiple times in different locales as befitted Dada’s decentralized 
transnationalism. Tzara gave graveside homilies in Weimar, Jena and Hanover, which Kurt 
Schwitters printed in Merz as “Conférence sur la fin de Dada.” Breton was conspicuously 
absent, “marshal[ing] his forces” and preparing “a policy speech on the character (and the 
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characters) of the evolution of modern art,” which he delivered in Barcelona in 1923 at the 
premiere of a Picabia exhibition.263 
 Breton spent the next two years assimilating and reflecting on his experiences of the 
last few years to distill Surrealism. He was assured a splashy official beginning for the 
movement simply by choosing a term that originated with Apollinaire (and carried 
resonances of Gérard de Nerval’s surnaturalisme), and arguments over the nature of 
“Surrealism” and ownership disputes played out in the pages of literary journals. Breton’s 
main competition was bilingual poet and Apollinaire confidant Yvan Goll, but Breton easily 
triumphed over him, largely through the well-crafted power play of the 1924 foundational 
Manifesto of Surrealism.  
 The genre of the manifesto itself, of course, was an apt choice for a foundational act, 
especially given its recent history as the establishing, governing and, often, most important 
aesthetic form for Modernist and avant-garde movements. Breton deployed both the 
traditional polemical and avant-garde stylistic elements of the genre masterfully. Equally 
important, he used the manifesto to codify key components of his Surrealism as digestible 
bits, offering readers important specifics, such as dictionary- and encyclopedia-style 
definitions of Surrealism and a membership roster. Breton also used geographic imagery to 
make Surrealism concrete and, simultaneously, present a sort of hierarchy of surrealists in 
terms of proximity to the new movement. Breton discusses Surrealism in terms of a chateau 
“not far from Paris” inhabited by himself, Aragon, Soupault, and Eluard (the four 
musketeers). Just outside the edifice, Robert Desnos and Roger Vitrac duel in the park; 
hovering nearby, Théodore Fraenkel waves from his hot-air balloon. Picabia comes to visit, 
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Duchamp just visited for the first time, and “Picasso hunts thereabouts.”264 Such place-based 
imagery translates easily into Surrealism’s continued development, with Breton’s apartment 
on Rue Fontaine and the Certa (the first café to host daily meetings of the surrealists) vying 
for the role of the chateau and the Bureau of surrealist Research as the site for visitors, 
would-be surrealists, and curiosity seekers. One also imagines a hinterland where the 
ignorant and, increasingly, the purged and excommunicated reside. Breton’s imagery both 
concretizes the movement’s existence and reflects his (and therefore its) penchant for 
hierarchy and centralized governance.   
 The actual governance of Surrealism makes apparent its “old-school” adherence to 
political imperatives of control, order, and stability, on the one side, and compromise, 
contradiction and shifting coalitions on the other, especially upon its embarkment on a 
decade-long alliance with Communist organs and factions, most tendentiously with the 
French Communist Party (PCF). In 1925 Breton and the surrealists entered into a union with 
the staff of the Marxist periodical Clarté.265 The immediate cause of the surrealists’ explicit 
engagement of the political realm was their unpopular support for Abd-el-Krim, who was 
leading the Rif opposition to French colonial rule in Morocco. Under Jean Bernier Clarté had 
recently shifted “from pedagogy to undermining the dominant bourgeois culture” (248), an 
undertaking that allied it with Surrealism’s goals, and the Clarté group was also one of the 
few to show sympathy for the surrealists’ vicious attack against Anatole France upon his 
                                                 
 
264
 Manifeste du surréalisme, OC, 321-22. 
 
265
 Clarté emerged in 1919 as an anti-war periodical begun by Raymond Lefebvre, Henri Barbusse, 
and Paul Vaillant-Couturie. Its board initially included notables such as Anatole France and many non-French 
intellectuals, such as Upton Sinclair, Stefan Zweig, Thomas Hardy, and H.G. Wells. As its tone became 
increasingly inflexible and its mission moved towards indoctrination, Clarté’s leadership changed, with 
Barbusse leaving in 1923, and by 1924 it even attacked Anatole France, who the PCF organ, L’Humanité (and 
the far right) lauded. See Polizzotti, Revolution of the Mind, 247-49. 
  
173 
death in the pamphlet A Corpse. On October 5th, Clarté, the magazine Philosophies, and the 
surrealists officially joined forces. The large group agreed that the revolution consisted of the 
totality of occurrences bringing about a shift in power from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat 
and pledged fidelity to the Communist International and to the PCF (249). 266 Most 
significantly for Surrealism’s internal politics, the group declared that anyone who 
challenged this definition of revolution should automatically be branded a 
counterrevolutionary, setting the stage for the numerous purges from the surrealist ranks that 
were to follow. 
 While the group declaration did not equate to absolute commitment to the PCF, it was 
put to immediate use as grounds for exile from Surrealism.267 The purges that became a 
regular occurrence within Surrealism reflect a rigorous emphasis on ideological adherence in 
which Breton’s need to maintain discipline conveniently aligned with the practices of the 
Communist International, the PCF, and, of course, Stalin (though Breton came to strongly 
oppose Stalin, especially after the Moscow Trials). Roger Vitrac was the first casualty of 
Surrealism’s newly declared ideological purity; he was drummed out of the group that same 
month. The movement’s recentering in political ideology instead of psychic automatism did 
spark an increased intolerance of departures from Surrealism’s (shifting) norms on Breton’s 
part.  Discipline extended beyond an ideological litmus test to minor infractions such as 
behavior perceived as damaging to Surrealism’s public perception. For example, in 1926 
Breton and Aragon, who was to become his bitterest enemy a few years hence in 1932, wrote 
a pamphlet to protest Ernst’s and Miró’s work as set designers for a Diaghilev-directed ballet 
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of Romeo and Juliet. Breton and Aragon had originally approved of the project and then 
apparently changed their minds after Picasso denigrated Ernst and Miró for collaborating 
with a White Russian. The pamphlet accused the artists of selling out Surrealism, 
contributing to the “downgrading [déclassement] of the surrealist idea” in putting their 
individual talents to work for money. From the opening sentence, “It is not acceptable for 
thought to be at the command of money,”268 the attack highlighted a willingness of the 
surrealist leadership to militate for an utterly impractical ideal at the expense of their 
comrades’ basic need for employment. On May 18, 1926 the surrealists dropped the 
pamphlet over the heads of audience members at the ballet and proceeded to run about the 
auditorium yelling “Long live the Soviets!” and “Long live the Russian Revolution!” The 
audience retaliated, and the police arrived in time for the “wives and girlfriends in the café 
next door” to see the men escorted out.269 Ernst, likely assuming that a large part of what 
irked Breton and Aragon had more to do with pride than ideological disputes, critiqued 
Breton’s “pretty revolutionary stances, carefully studied in front of a mirror.”270  
Perhaps most damningly, Breton’s authoritarian-style politics took advantage more 
than once of supposedly pluralist occasions and opportunities for joint action to express 
themselves most vituperatively. For example, in February of 1929 Breton ostensibly 
undertook a project of collective action, sending a letter to 76 artists and intellectuals (many 
of them current or past collaborators of Surrealism) to ask respondents’ thoughts about 
individual versus joint action. In addition to conveying willingness or refusal to partake of 
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joint action, each respondent was asked to tell with whom he would and would not be willing 
to collaborate.  Upon reading the responses, Breton chose to disinvite some of the addresees 
and invite the others (57) to a group meeting on March 11th at the Bar du Château. Thirty-
two of the invitees attended the meeting, which Breton began by asking Raymond Queneau, 
the secretary, to read each person’s response aloud to the full group. Breton commented on 
each response, announcing that before getting down to the business of any collective action, 
such as support for Trotsky, it was necessary to ascertain “the qualifications, moral or 
otherwise—but moral without a doubt—of each man present” (Polizzotti 316). Breton then 
set to ripping apart Surrealism’s intellectual competition, a young group of intellectuals and 
artists in their twenties who had formed a group called Le Grand jeu [The Great Game]. 
Breton had judged only three of the six core members-- poets Roger Gilbert-Lecomte and 
René Daumal and then-critic Rolland de Renéville—worthy of inviting, but they all came. 
Breton first attacked Gilbert-Lecomte and then, most devastatingly, Roger Vailland, a 
novelist and—to Breton’s disapproval—journalist, for a feature article he had written for 
(conservative) Paris-Midi that praised the police commissioner. Character assassination took 
over the meeting; Gilbert Lecomte never got to the notes he had brought with him on ideas 
for future projects of collective action.271  
Breton didn’t leave it at that: he and Aragon wrote up the event, including the 
invitees’ responses and the surrealists’ judgment of them, in À Suivre: Petite Contribution au 
dossier de certains intellectuals à tendances révolutionnaires, published in the Belgian revue 
Variétés in a June issue dedicated to Surrealism. In contrast to the white paper of the rest of 
that issue, À Suivre was printed on pink stock with roman numeral pagination, making it 
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difficult for a reader to overlook. In response to the tenor of the meeting, Vailland had 
written a letter to Breton explaining that while he understood concern over his collaboration 
with a bourgeois newspaper and could imagine others’ worry over whether such 
collaboration might impact his participation in a group advocating revolutionary action, 
Breton’s conduct was unacceptable. Vailland protested, 
 But to take the context of collaboration [towards joint action] as an occasion to 
pronounce a moral judgment on me, or, more generally, that one would take as 
pretext an act whose motives one doesn’t know, to judge someone, that I cannot 
accept. You yourself will recognize that that is the normal procedure of bourgeois 
tribunals.272 
 
That Breton and Aragon included excerpts from Vailland’s letter in À Suivre testifies to a 
conviction in the moral correctness of their behavior and a security in their own power within 
Surrealism and the literary world. That the surrealists would publish À Suivre makes clear 
their preoccupation with moral and ideological accord over collective action, a stance that 
characterized Surrealism throughout its official existence. 
Polizzotti characterizes the Second Manifesto of Surrealism, published that same year 
(1929), as “the culmination of a grand sweep that had begun with the exclusions of 1926…; a 
purge of every discordant element in Surrealism; of every figure, idea, or inspiration that had 
not managed to follow the sinuous developments of Breton’s own evolution” (323).273 Like 
the first Manifesto, the Second Manifesto provides a “Who’s Who” of the surrealist 
movement and notes the dismissals of Artaud, Limbour, Masson, Soupault and Vitrac, etc., 
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engaging their opposition at length to dismantle it and charting the changes to Surrealism’s 
roster during the intervening years. In the Second Manifesto Breton announces the conclusion 
of the first period of Surrealism, which was marked in part by a change in the movement’s 
journal from La Révolution surréaliste to the subdued, ‘serious’ Le Surréalisme au service de 
la Révolution. At the same time as this shift shows Surrealism’s adoption of Communism, the 
title belies Breton’s constant quest to maintain autonomy for his movement rather than 
submit it wholeheartedly to Communist dictates, particularly the dictates of the PCF, with 
whom Breton had a fractious relationship. As Polizzotti alludes here and others have 
recognized, Breton and Surrealism evolved “sinuously,” not linearly. The movement’s 
intolerance for ideological divergence was not matched by a consistent ideological purity. 
 Surrealism’s defections to Communism and Breton’s own rejection of Stalin and, 
eventually, Communism itself, resulted from an unraveling of an alliance that was never 
absolute and always characterized by problems of trust and respect on both sides. Breton lost 
his two closest confidants, Aragon and then Eluard, to Stalin, and the leader always desired a 
freedom of expression that thwarted Stalinist attempts to harness art for the purposes of 
propaganda. At the same time, Breton’s primary focus on a sort of aesthetic autonomy 
frustrated many of his colleagues concerned with practical action to confront the immediate 
threat of fascism. Tzara, who had renewed relations with Breton at the beginning of the 
decade, and René Crevel both broke with Surrealism in 1935, arguing that Breton critiqued 
the Soviets while offering nothing in their stead. They found the aestheticist leanings of 
recent texts such as La Grande Actualité poétique particularly frustrating. Breton had little 
tolerance for Communist critiques of surrealist revolution, and during a chance encounter of 
Ilya Ehrenburg in the street responded to the latter’s accusations against Surrealism with 
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multiple slaps.274 Breton’s violence led the organizing committee of the upcoming Paris 
Congress of Writers to bar Breton from the program. Even in the face of passionate pleas 
from Crevel, who despite his recent defection from Surrealism was doing his utmost to 
secure Breton a speech slot at the upcoming Congress, Breton refused to apologize to 
Ehrenburg. After Crevel’s suicide (accompanied by the note “Disgust, Please cremate me”), 
the commission agreed to grant Breton a slot at the last minute, ‘out of respect for Crevel,’ 
but prohibited Breton himself from delivering his speech.  Breton chose Eluard to read the 
speech, which he presented to a largely empty hall upon being disfavored with a midnight 
time slot. 
 Breton’s differences from Communism were also apparent in the resemblance of his 
purges to excommunications. As “the pope of Surrealism,” Breton believed that a spiritual 
revolution must precede the material one, and he insisted that Surrealism merited an 
autonomous space within Communism as its moral arbiter. Breton’s preference for the 
spiritual over material issues was reflected in his view of purges as excommunications: he 
saw the men he threw out of Surrealism has having failed Communism politically, perhaps, 
but more significantly as having failed him personally, and themselves and the universe 
spiritually and morally. 
  As the Manifestos announce, Surrealism itself—in terms of essence—may have 
changed center of gravity from psychic automatism to political ideology, but its structure and 
character of governance did not change.  One could draw an analogy between Surrealism’s 
political aspect and the merely literary realm or novelistic genre Breton loathed: Surrealism’s 
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politics simply presented differing content (literature) in traditional (political) form, 
operating through conventional political structures and procedures. Breton’s failed desire for 
Surrealism to escape the formal bounds of aesthetics emerges most often and tellingly in his 
explicit, repeated reliance on literary references and means in an attempt to forge an “extra-
aesthetic” movement. Surrealism, most vociferously through Breton, disavows the “merely” 
literary even as it relies on it.  
In the second part of this chapter I explore Surrealism’s temporal dimension in two 
senses of the word: Surrealism’s conceptualization of the secular realm (its shifting 
aesthetico-political configurations) and Surrealism’s time-sense. In the latter half of the 
chapter I focus on the movement’s political manifestations, arguing that they emerge in lieu 
of a politics of time 
 
III. The Problem of Conjoining Art and Revolution: From Surrealist Revolution 
to Surrealism in the Service of the Revolution to an Independent Revolutionary Art: 
Surrealism’s Temporal Configurations 
 
Just as Surrealism’s claims to an extra-aesthetic existence were destabilized by its 
reliance on literary history and means and its claims to revolution undercut by its own 
conventional intrapolitics, the movement’s theoretical self-conception vacillated in its 
conceptualization of the relation of aesthetic pursuits to political aims. As the shifting titles 
of the movement’s primary journal and a late manifesto intimate, Surrealism’s configuration 
of aesthetic and political aspects passed through at least three stages from the 1920s to the 
Second World War:275 a conjoining of art and politics in an aestheticized ideal of revolution; 
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an equally problematic conscription of art to purportedly advance political aims; and a 
peaceful, glasnost-like co-existence of art and politics within a particular political model. I 
interpret each stage with respect to Surrealism’s difficulty in conceiving of a political 
function for art without subordinating it to politics or the political realm. 
Stage 1: The 1924 Manifesto of Surrealism presents an ideal of revolution that enlists 
art to dismantle social norms and forms and then retreat from constructing alternatives into a 
spiritual and psychological interiority cut off from social time. Surrealism intervened into 
social norms in part by opening art to non-artists through exploratory techniques such as 
automatic writing and drawing. At the same time as Surrealism empowered non-artists to 
participate in aesthetic creation, it removed the processes, subjects and interpretations of such 
creation from the social realm. Surrealism focused on psychological methods with mystical 
overtones, substituting non-rational, individual exploration over social engagement. “Poetic 
Surrealism” often argued on the basis of foundational assertions about aesthetic and spiritual 
norms that it claimed antedated current social behaviors. Early Surrealism thus presented a 
newly aestheticized and tentatively formless unity as a return to origins and essence. The 
extra-aesthetic character of poetic Surrealism re-coups social dimensions of human existence 
for an aesthetic and spiritual cultivation au-delà, beyond reach. It is tempting to read early 
Surrealism in terms of an aestheticization of politics, or at least of social behavior intrinsic to 
political life, because its pairing of interiority and that beyond reach, a mysticism culled from 
a partial rejection of religion and infusion of psychology, encroach on social and political 
terrain. 
 Surrealism’s claims about the proper originary character of dialogue provide a good 
example of its recuperation of a politically-relevant social norm for interior individual 
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aesthetic exploration. In the First Manifesto, Breton states as a key goal of poetic Surrealism 
to alter the ways in which people converse. He posits a foundational view of dialogue that 
evokes ideas of the primitive that reduce civilization to mere veneer. Stylistically, Breton’s 
conception of dialogue imagines a primitive existence unmarked by formal conventions of 
etiquette and social niceties. Substantively, Breton’s retrospective definition of dialogue 
relies on a belief in some ideal of a pure, primitive existence beyond sociability, a 
paradoxical freedom that rescues the participants in a dialogue from any implied obligations 
and outcomes of social interchange even as it limits their agency. Surrealism’s dialogue 
transforms interlocutors into soliliquizers. Breton explains:  
 Poetic Surrealism, to which I devote this study, has to this point applied itself 
to reestablishing dialogue in its absolute truth, in freeing the two interlocutors from 
obligations of politeness. Each of them simply pursues his soliloquy, without seeking 
to extract from it a particular dialectical pleasure and impose it on everyone and his 
neighbor. The intentions in mind are not, as is ordinary, for the goal of developing an 
argument, no matter how negligible; they are as withdrawn as possible. As for the 
response they call for, it is, in principle, totally indifferent to the amour-propre of the 
one who has spoken. The words, the images offer themselves only as springboards to 
the spirit of he who listens.276 
 
The practice of dialogue the Manifesto calls for opposes “absolute truth” to the articulation of 
arguments, needs, and desires. This truth has nothing to do with the specific complexities and 
practicalities people negotiate in social interactions; it is beyond the social sphere. 
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 The 1924 Manifesto characterizes social interaction negatively throughout the text by 
linking it to imposition, curtailed freedom, and petty class-climbing. The surrealists root all 
cultural accomplishments of note, in aesthetic or extra-aesthetic fields, in a disdain for 
specific social goals. For example, the Manifesto insists on a frenzied distraction from 
specific social realities, not an interest in altering them, as the motive for invention, asserting 
that the inventor leaves the ‘futile’ task of curing the sick to others and has no plan, only a 
“sacred fever.” Just as the absolute truth of dialogue replaces specific goals of social 
interaction with a nonteleological withdrawal from social concerns, the genius of invention 
emerges as a divinely-inspired drive leading to discoveries whose social utility is only 
incidental.277 From this surrealist perspective the key to creation lies in a withdrawal from 
social considerations; only absent-mindedness and distraction permit the nonconformism 
Surrealism prizes for its creative potential. Yet claims to value nonconformism contrast with 
Surrealism’s tendency toward fusion, particularly its avowal of a oneness that undoes 
contradiction. A surrealist glimmer, a fusion of human individual and universal force, 
produces divine moments where there is no longer any point of contradiction.278 Coupled 
with its flight from concrete social interactions, Surrealism’s evocations of “absolute truth,” a 
rayon invisible, and moments where contradiction is momentarily effaced bring it perilously 
near to supplanting social norms and forms with a tyrannical formless unity. 
 Surrealism’s flirtation with aestheticism emerges most clearly in its simultaneous 
refusal of form and evocation of an indefinable, atemporal formless unity in form’s stead. In 
an early interview with Roger Vitrac (April 7, 1923), Breton clarifies the desire that 
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underwrites surrealist texts such as his and Soupault’s The Magnetic Fields as a project of 
breaking with forms of expression altogether, not simply another venture into formal literary 
experimentation: Breton announced to Vitrac his intention to give up writing because 
“Literature gives one license never to change anything… [Poetry] is not where one thinks it 
is. It exists outside of words, style, etc… Only the entire system of emotions is inalienable. 
Therefore I cannot recognize any value in any means of expression.”279 Without form, 
without means, only Surrealism’s “glimmers” of “absolute truth” remain. Divested of any 
worldly social context and thus cut off from social time, this formless unity comes to be 
represented most frequently through images. Despite early Surrealism’s almost complete 
negligence of visual art, even the 1924 Manifesto notes the importance of the image to the 
movement, noting “the atmosphere created by mechanical writing… lends itself particularly 
to the production of beautiful images.”280 The temporality of the image fits that of automatic 
writing: it is both spontaneous and atemporal, disconnected from worldly temporal flow in its 
production and value. The Manifesto highlights the static dimension of the image through 
paradox and imbues it with a hidden depth of power, characterizing Surrealism itself as the 
“’invisible ray’ that will permit us one day to triumph over our adversaries.”281 What 
constitutes triumph, if not some measurable alteration of the social world? The Manifesto 
suggests an ambitious and aestheticist answer: not change but a transformation of perception, 
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an ability to observe “This summer the roses are blue; the wood is made of glass.”282 Once 
freed from the fetters of form, surrealist revolution culminates in a mental image, safely 
walled off from the world Surrealism revolted against. 
Stage 2: Surrealism would re-confront the world of surrealist revolution and 
reconsider the question of political engagement by the end of the decade, choosing to affiliate 
the movement more directly with Communist aims. Yet even in the service of political 
revolution, the movement retained its aestheticist disdain for engaging specific social and 
political realities in practice. Without questioning their sincerity, I argue that surrealists’ 
professions of ideological faith had little effect on the substance of the movement, its works 
of art/non-art and techniques. Rather, the explicit (and explicitly troubled) alliance of 
Surrealism with the PCF merely provided another lens through which observers might regard 
its practice and a more concrete baton with which Breton could lash out against disobedient 
group members    
Though the Second Manifesto of Surrealism appeared in the December 15, 1929 
edition of La Révolution surréaliste, its appearance marked the end of an era that took that 
periodical with it. The Second Manifesto declares a shift in the movement’s core emphasis 
from psychic automatism to political ideology. The title of the new surrealist periodical, Le 
Surréalisme au service de la Révolution , which appeared from 1930 to  1933, announces this 
change up front, masking the fact that the shift from a set of techniques (psychic automatism) 
to beliefs did not imply any particular change in aesthetic practice, and indeed, Surrealism 
continued to make use of automatic writing and other techniques of psychic automatism.  On 
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the one hand, the Second Manifesto boldly calls for a renewal of surrealist revolution around 
this new orientation; on the other hand, the Second Manifesto evidences the movement’s 
continued reluctance to address social and political worlds. The 1929 Manifesto opens in 
grand style: “Despite the specific moves of each of those who have called on or [now] call on 
it, in the end one grants that Surrealism aims at nothing so much as to provoke, from an 
intellectual and moral point of view, an attack of conscience of the most general and serious 
kind and that the achievement or inachievement of this result alone decides its success or 
failure historically.”283 But this attack of conscience can occur only in the most nebulous and 
vaguely general way, as “Surrealism is not interested in taking great notice of that which 
produces itself alongside it under the pretense of art, that’s to say of anti-art, of philosophy or 
of anti-philosophy”; Surrealism is not interested “in… all that does not conclude in the 
annihilation of the soul of ice as well as that of fire. What really could those people expect of 
Surrealism who maintain concerns about the place they will occupy in the world?” 284 
Surrealism may now claim a political ideology for this world, but in practice it has no 
interests in social or political engagement, in people’s “concerns about the place they… 
occupy.” 
As before, in the aestheticized ideal of revolution that revolted against social and 
political forms to take refuge in stillborn images of formless unity, Surrealism’s primary 
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focus is to marshal the forces of the aesthetic realm for annihilation. This intent is most 
famously conveyed in the Second Manifesto in the description of ‘the simplest surrealist act,’ 
firing randomly into a crowd. The Manifesto endorses the act in terms that make clear its 
fidelity to the movement’s overarching goal of lashing out against contemporary social forms 
and norms (like the crowd) to attain that mystical surrealist glimmer: “The simplest surrealist 
act consists, pistol in hand, of descending into the street and shooting randomly, as much as 
one can, into the crowd. Who has not had, at least once, the desire to have done with this 
little system of degradation and idiocy in force has his place marked out in this crowd, 
stomach at canon level. The legitimacy of such an act is not, in my understanding, at all 
incompatible with the belief in this glimmer that Surrealism seeks to discover in our 
depths.”285 As with the notion of dialogue in the 1924 Manifesto, the surrealist conception of 
“absolute truth” depends on a breakdown of social forms to release some previously 
subjugated formless freedom. Interestingly for a man who took on the role of judge, Breton 
advocates a kind of rebellion here foreign to juridical notions of justice, restitution, 
rehabilitation and alteration. The concept of “legitimacy” Breton finds in accord with this act 
bears no relation to legal or political definitions of legitimacy:  it locates value in forms (or 
formlessness), not individuals, and its sources are mystical and irrational, not socially 
generated and reasoned. It is difficult not to see nihilism-- Vaché’s desertion within 
oneself—at the heart of the simplest surrealist act, and indeed, Vaché’s biography may be 
even more closely linked to Breton’s conceptualization of this simplest act, as Vaché 
                                                 
285
 “L’acte surréaliste le plus simple consiste, revolvers aux poings, à descendre dans la rue et à tirer 
au hazard, tant qu’on peut, dans la foule. Qui n’a pas eu, au moins une fois, envie d’en finir de la sorte avec le 
petit système d’avilissement et de crétinisation en vigeuer a sa place toute marquee dans cette foule, ventre à 
hauteur de canon. La légitimation d’un tel acte n’est, à mon sense, nullement incompatible avec la croyance en 
cette lueur que le surréalisme cherche à déceler au fond de nous.” Second Manifeste du surréalisme, OC, 782-
83. 
 
  
187 
reportedly did threaten once to shoot randomly into a crowd, the crowd being his fellow 
spectators at the opening of Apollinaire’s Les Mamelles de Tiresias. Apparently Vaché 
approved of neither the play nor the self-congratulatory avant-garde taste of the audience. 
 Given Surrealism’s fallback tendency to revolt against established social forms and 
norms and its continued disinterest in specific, concrete social realities, it is not surprising 
that the movement relied on its normal modus operandum—a mobilization of aesthetics to 
annihilate the social status quo conceived as a more or less unified form—even upon its 
embrace of a practical program in Communist political ideology. The unwieldy excess of 
annihilation emerged as Surrealism’s response to any and all actual political failings, such 
that no matter how incisive a critique any one surrealist might offer of a particular political 
dispute, the movement lacked a comparatively nuanced plan of redress. This inflexibility ill-
equipped Surrealism to deal with the major political issues of its time. Take, for example, the 
movement’s first major political involvement, its opposition to the Rif War. Surrealism’s 
critique of colonialism, bent on annihilation, not just correction of the immediate problem 
(France’s support to quell Abd-el-Krim), developed into an indictment of humanism and a 
desire to destroy Western Civilization wholecloth. In July 1925’s "Open Letter" to Paul 
Claudel, fellow man of letters and Ambassador to Japan, the surrealists declared "Creation 
matters little to us. We profoundly hope that revolutions, wars, and colonial insurrections will 
annihilate this Western civilization whose vermin you defend even in the Orient. We take 
this opportunity to dissociate ourselves publicly from all that is French, in words and 
actions.”286 The surrealists were responding to an interview with Claudel that ran in the June 
24 issue of Comoedia in which Claudel had mocked the capabilities of any artistic movement 
then extant in France and asserted that Surrealism meant nothing but pederasty. However 
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offended Breton and Co. were at Claudel’s remarks, their shrill condemnation of Western 
Civilization did little to undermine Claudel’s assertion of contemporary artists’ irrelevancy, 
and it hardly garnered them effective like-minded political cohorts. 
 The surrealists accompanied their wholesale condemnation of Western Civilization 
with a comparably unreflective endorsement of Middle Eastern cultures as a desirable other 
and appropriate antidote to European and American shortcomings. In a response to a question 
in the journal Cahiers du mois about the likelihood, desirability and character of influence of 
the Orient on the Occident, Breton heaped adulation on his idealized construct of the Orient. 
His response, which appeared in the February-March 1925 issue, enthusiastically anticipated 
the Orient’s curative powers to combat the moral failures of the West, proclaiming “The 
Orient of dreams… will dissipate this somber politics of this last period of our decadence. It 
will leave us indifferent to all that… is not our proper dictatorship.”287 Characteristically, the 
excess of judgment here (of the Orient’s future worth) was not accompanied by thoughtful 
political consideration which might have revised the affirmation of a “proper dictatorship” 
[dictature]. 
 The tenor of Surrealism’s political judgments remained similarly offensive and 
practically sterile throughout the ‘20s and ‘30s. The 1932 “Murderous Humanitarianism” 
essay lumps together humanitarian undertakings with humanism, imperialism, colonization 
and capitalism, to declare “Our gallant sailors, policemen and agents of imperialist thought, 
in league with opium and literature, have swamped us with their irretentions of nostalgia; the 
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function of all these idyllic alarms among the dead and gone being to distract our thoughts 
from the present, the abominations of the present.”288  
Drafted mainly by René Crevel, the essay furnishes yet another example of the utter 
lack of nuance and pragmatism in Surrealism’s political thinking. In zealously tarring 
everyone with any political power with the same brush of “Murderous Humanitarianism,” it 
empowers no one to take any steps to remedy specific situations. Crevel quit Surrealism two 
years after writing the essay, in part due to what he perceived as Surrealism’s political 
inefficacity, its unwillingness to marshal sufficient forces or to consider more practical 
means of combating fascism. Even as critique, as opposed to prescription, the surrealists’ 
capability was limited by generality, And, as surrealist sympathizer Aimé Césaire noted, no 
one in Europe—including the surrealists—seems to have cared much about imperialism until 
it threatened them in the form of fascism. Without a talent for political analysis or problem 
solving, and without the ability to muster sustained interest in a particular, concrete situation, 
the surrealists’ commentaries on politics had little practical impact. To be of service to the 
Revolution, Surrealism needed to do more than espouse loyalty to a political ideology; it 
needed to innovate in its own area of expertise and expand the possibilities of aesthetic and 
extra-aesthetic creation to address social and political grievances. 
Stage 3: After a decade-long, problem-fraught alliance of Surrealism to Communism, 
Surrealism became preoccupied with carving out an autonomous space for itself, particularly 
after its disastrous and marginalizing experience at the Paris Writers’ Congress. Breton’s 
1938 stay in Mexico and his collaboration with Trotsky there helped determine a new 
outlook for Surrealism’s relation to political ideology, one that reinscribed some boundaries 
                                                 
288
 This declaration, written in 1932, first appeared in Nancy Cunard's Negro Anthology (1934), 
translated by Samuel Beckett. 
  
190 
between the aesthetic and political domains. Breton and Surrealism returned to imagining a 
broader role for art beyond the confines of a particular political ideology, through with the 
risk of cutting art off from the political imagination.  
Interestingly, Trotsky seems to have been much more reliable than Breton in desiring 
to protect art from ideological conscription as propaganda and, particularly, to protect artists 
from pressures to declare political allegiances. As Trotsky observed to his secretary, Breton 
seemed to persist in believing that artists had something to do with advancing specific 
political ideologies. The challenge for Trotsky was to marshal artists as a force against 
political dictates, as a means of resisting Stalinist or fascist attempts to put a lockdown on 
creative freedom and harness art to particular political exigencies. Art’s relevance resided in 
its refusal of totalitarian conditions. The challenge for Breton was to provide Surrealism a 
comfortable distance from the French Communist Party and recast its political revolutionary 
role as necessary. Trotsky was more successful, at least on the theoretical front; while Breton 
did manage to move Surrealism further away from the PCF, he largely failed at his second 
task, reconceiving art’s possible political import. By the outbreak of World War II, Breton 
had oriented Surrealism toward subscription to a politics from which it would claim a large 
degree of exemption on separate but not equal grounds between artists and citizens. Rather 
than find a way to link aesthetic practices to political innovation, Breton aimed to grant art at 
a kind of political exceptionalism.  
 “Manifesto for an Independent Revolutionary Art” (1938) provides in Breton’s own 
words my argument for Surrealism’s stance with respect to anarchism and art’s work of 
revolution. Signed by Breton and Rivera but actually authored by Breton and Trotsky, the 
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manifesto (inadvertently) makes a mockery of art’s possible revolutionary character.289 
Breton and Trotsky initially seem to adopt the reverse of the position of the 1925 manifesto, 
in which Breton makes art handmaiden to revolution, proclaiming:  “One must not prescribe 
the themes of art in accordance with alleged reasons of state”(475). But the word that matters 
here is “themes”: art may choose its content, but not its scope for action. In this context art 
has no role to play in imagining a collective or work to perform in discovering alternative 
ways of living together, because it is already a foregone conclusion that socialism offers the 
right kind of government. Breton and Trotsky enforce a strict boundary between art and state, 
asserting: 
 Granted that, in order to develop the material forces of 
production, the revolution has no other choice but to build a 
socialist regime with centralized control; however, it must 
from the very beginning, when it comes to intellectual 
creativity, establish an anarchist system based on individual 
freedom. No authority, no constraint, not the slightest trace of 
orders from above! 
“Individual freedom” apparently only matters for artists and action in a clearly delimited 
aesthetic realm. No one may tell art what to do, so long as art has nothing to do with politics. 
The manifesto ends: “Our goals: the independence of art—for the revolution; the 
revolution—for the liberation of art once and for all (477). Yet the ‘independence’ and 
‘liberation’ of art and the very idea of revolution ring hollow, since neither will be allowed to 
perform transformative work.  
                                                 
289
 Caws, Manifestos, 472-77. 
  
192 
Breton’s and Trotsky’s immediate practical goals were to establish “local and 
national” congresses that would then unite in “a world congress that… [would]l officially 
consecrate the foundation of the International Federation.”290 This task echoes the failed 
Congress of Paris Breton attempted in the 1920s, although in much more serious and 
grimmer circumstances. After a brief period of limited success, this project also failed. The 
problem of organizing a union to protect art’s freedom around a pre-ordained ideology again 
proved unresolvable. 
As we see in Breton’s rule over Surrealism as a movement in the development of his 
philosophy of Surrealism, only (bourgeois) artists, not the public at large, were to be granted 
full access to a poetic form of existence. At its worst, Surrealism loathed and man-handled 
the masses it portended to love. In fact, it strove to destroy all the institutions near and dear to 
their hearts. As the Second Manifesto of Surrealism asserted, “all the means are fair game for 
shattering the ideas of family, of fatherland, of religion.”291 Surrealism’s preoccupations with 
aesthetic autonomy and political revolution culminate in a perilous asociality and a false 
substitution of a needless and problematic asocial concept of individuality for singularity. 
  
IV. ‘Existence is Elsewhere’: Surrealism’s Flight from Social Time 
 The anarchist modernist engagement with formal-constitutive, historical and 
experiential time occurs in a social dimension and demands a reckoning with qualitative 
difference. Whether one imagines this difference in terms of distinct individuals, as did 
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Proudhon, or as the subjectless multiplicity of poststructuralism matters less than keeping its 
existence at the forefront of temporal exploration. Many surrealist texts, however, evince a 
double social disconnect: insufficient recognition of a heterogeneous multiplicity and a 
concomitant disregard for the connections among individuals or interpenetration of 
temporalities. In short, Surrealism lacks social time. To make this case I offer a strong 
argument—a characterization of social time that makes clear its difference from the 
temporality of Surrealism—and a weak one, evidence of Surrealism’s social temporal 
“disconnects.” 
The political-philosophically-oriented approaches to time I have distilled primarily 
from Proudhon, Bergson, Benjamin, and Deleuze and attributed to an anarchist avant-garde 
project of retemporalization have a tenuous foothold in the domain of physics. In a paper 
entitled “Time and Classical and Quantum Mechanics: Indeterminacy vs. Discontinuity,” 
Peter Lynds revives and advances the Bergson-Einstein debate over the character of time, 
updating Bergson to show how a qualitative, intensive account of time in which it is not 
equated to the space on which it unfolds is compatible with Einstein’s physics.292  I will 
briefly summarize Lynd’s argument here in order to then affirm Sebastian Olma’s reading of 
it in terms of social time, which clarifies its relevance for any modernist and avant-garde 
politics of time.293 
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Lynds asserts that time cannot be a chain of static instants because that would render 
motion impossible: there can be “no precise instant in time underlying a dynamical physical 
process,” for if that were the case, “the relative portion of a body in relative motion or a 
specific physical magnitude, although precisely determined at such a precise static instant, 
would also by way of logical necessity be frozen static at that precise instant.” 294 Lynds thus 
escapes Zeno of Elea’s paradoxes of Achilles and the Tortoise, the Dichotomy, and the 
Arrow, as they depend on time’s division into units affixed spatially. The tortoise who 
challenges Achilles to a race affirms that Achilles will never catch up to him because, once 
motion is correlated to space, Achilles will always have a further fraction to move; he can 
never attain the end point of the race to best the tortoise, however slowly the animal moves, 
provided that the tortoise has a head-start.  Lynds concludes, “if a physical value were 
precisely determined, it could never change.” As in Bergson, time subsists apart from simple 
quantity. But unlike Bergson, Lynds offers an explanation for his proposition’s compatibility 
with Einstein’s theories from within physics, explaining “It is relative interval as measured 
by all clocks (whether digital, atomic, light, biological or other) that is warped and mutable at 
relativistic velocities and in the spatial vicinity of gravity, not any physical progression of 
time.” 
Lynds’ physics rescues Bergsonian durée from speculations that it is ‘merely’ a 
philosophical or psychological notion and re-poses the question “What makes time?” 
Sebastian Olma convincingly speculates “If time is not a succession of instants, no more is 
the time of physics determined by a succession of masterminds. It would be a more sensible 
hypothesize that a particular society’s historical conception of time emerges out of that 
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society’s material practices.”295 This description of time as contingent on social practice 
alludes to a field of action for a literary (or broadly aesthetic) politics of time, and it makes 
conceptions of time dependent on collective material practices and, presumably, a 
collectively-generated—or at collectively accepted—reflection on the signification of such 
practices. In other words, any specific historical conception of time emerges in relation to the 
public sphere, to habits of action and social interpretations of such action. 
 Yet Surrealism generally seems more interested in isolating both the individual from 
social ties of any duration (as in its enthusiasm for spontaneous erotic encounters) and the 
moment (also from duration). As in its conception of an originary ideal of ‘dialogue’ (as 
solipsistic public monologue permitting sparks of reaction), Surrealism preoccupies itself 
with the mind outside temporal consideration: there is the time of the individual mind, with 
has no connection with anything, and historical time, which isn’t really historical because it 
is fixed.  Surrealism’s “latent revolution” is focused inward, as Breton had thought originally 
of Tzara: “At the end of 1919, Tzara arrived in Paris a little like the Messiah. After two or 
three words I attributed a very rich interior life to him.”296 Breton only deems Dada a failure 
because, he claims, it focused on the external social world and failed to alter it: “As far as I 
was concerned, it was impossible for me to remain any longer with Dada, which, as a force 
turned entirely against the exterior, was losing all reason to exist the moment it showed itself 
powerless to change the proportions of the conflict.”297 Presumably, had Dada focused 
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inward, a lack of success in remaking the exterior social world would not have been a 
problem. 
The first Manifesto does recognize historical specificity-- “Le merveilleux n’est pas le 
même à toutes les époques”--, noting that the place of ruins in Romanticism is accorded to 
the mannequin today.298 But it then seeks to arrest time with definition and retroactively read 
Surrealism through literary history, from Dante and Shakespeare “on his best days” to 
Reverdy, Saint-John Perse and Roussel.299  As Mary Ann Caws has also noted, Surrealism 
aspires to transcend history, a movement “that, as the concretization of certain eternal 
phenomena, would never age.”300 Breton in particular favors revolution to escape time, to get 
out of his time rather than work within it, assailing both his present moment and a 
precoccupation with time generally in a near hysterical tone:  
if we do not find enough words to condemn the servility of Western thought, if we do 
not fear to enter into insurrection against logic, if we would not swear that an act one 
accomplishes in a dream has less sense than an act one accomplished awake, if we are 
not even certain that one will never have done with time, old sinister farce, 
perpetually derailing train, crazy pulsation, inextricable heap of grueling and worn 
out beasts, how is it that you can expect for us to show some tenderness, for us even 
to exercise tolerance towards an apparatus of social conservation, whatever it may 
be? That would be the only really unacceptable vain delirium on our part.301 
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In light of such sentiment it is difficult to take Breton’s claim that he writes to lengthen time 
seriously (116).  
Breton’s description of Dada echoes Deleuze’s description of the multiplicity of 
temporality in his book on Bergson. In a long text (pp. 7-44) that appeared in a special 
surrealist issue of Edward Titus’s British revue This Quarter in September, 1932,  
“Surrealism: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” Breton asserts his own theory of Dada’s 
downfall and the need for Surrealism as its replacement: 
There is no doubt that before the surrealist movement proper, there existed among the 
promoters of the movement, and others who later rallied around it, various, very 
active but unfortunately very antagonistic nonconformist desires that, from 1915 to 
1920, tended to align themselves quite superficially in Switzerland, in Germany and 
in France under the sign of Dada. Post-war disorder, the essentially anarchic state of 
mind that guided that cycle’s diverse manifestations, the deliberate refusal to judge—
for lack, it was said, of criteria—the actual qualifications of each individual, and 
perhaps, in the last analysis, a certain spirit of negation which was making itself 
apparent, brought about too quickly the dissolution of a group almost imagined, by 
reason of its dispersed and heterogeneous character…302  
 
Breton’s critique of Dada extends beyond its ‘anarchic,’ ‘inchoate,’ ‘dispersed,’ and 
‘heterogeneous’ composition to its character as a movement, its “deliberate refusal to judge” 
individuals’ qualifications on grounds Breton finds dubious (“for lack, it was said, of 
criteria”). The desire for individuals to possess “actual qualifications” to participate runs 
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counter to Dada’s nature and ignores the specific historical context of its emergence in 
Zurich.303  
Ball’s assertion that the “sole purpose” of the Cabaret Voltaire is to “give proof” of 
the existence of at least a “few independent spirits who live for… ideals” other than “war and 
nationalism” makes clear the absurdity of Breton’s suggested “qualifications.” In Ball’s 
account Dada emerged to focus the public’s attention on independent spirits and not to 
accomplish any other aims for which specific qualifications might matter. Breton’s ultimate 
disregard for Dada stems from its refusal to coalesce generally, to cohere into a group that 
emanates from a central point, and to coalesce around a specific program for whose 
advancement one could devise certain qualifications.  
Walter Benjamin’s Surrealism essay (“Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the 
European Intelligentsia”) provides a useful vantage point from which to compare Dada and 
Surrealism as avant-garde movements, and, especially, to distinguish the political function of 
each movement’s manifestos. Benjamin proposes the spatial position of the German “in the 
valley” rather than that of the Frenchman “at the head of the stream” as a place from which to 
evaluate Surrealism. As one “long acquainted with the crisis of the intelligentsia” and “its 
highly exposed position between an anarchistic fronde and a revolutionary discipline” (177), 
Benjamin’s German gazes through a critical lens calibrated to catch political, organizational 
variation among aesthetic philosophies of the European intelligentsia. 
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 While “anarchistic fronde” and “revolutionary discipline” serve to some extent as 
useful shorthands to differentiate Dada and Surrealism, attention to each movement’s spatial 
and temporal orientation permits a more precise reading of the causes and consequences of 
each one’s organizational impulse.304 While Dada dodges spatial and temporal boundaries, 
calling into question the constitution of any here and now, it yet engages that here and now, 
whatever it may be. Surrealism, in contrast, is escapist: rather than open up the here and now 
for remaking, it flees place and time. Contrary to a common sensical reading, Dada’s 
anarchism mines political potential while Surrealism harnesses revolutionary discipline 
against political action. While Benjamin’s valorization of Surrealism over the more 
anarchistic Dada movement seems to stem from a fear of frivolity and disorder taking the 
place of discipline and organization, I argue that the different temporalities of the two 
movements ultimately render Surrealism politically inconsequential and Dada politically 
useful.305 Breton’s precoccupation with an originary myth as a sort of static touchstone for 
Surrealism after the break with communism hardly seems compatible with Benjamin’s 
Jetztzeit that interrupts continuous time to break free of the given continuum or perceived 
character of a particular historical moment.306 
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 In a recent essay on the relationship between Breton and Trotsky, Pierre Taminiaux 
clarifies Surrealism’s ultimate political ambivalence by thinking through the implications of 
its ties to utopia.307 Taminiaux notes “surrealist politics had much more to do with the 
collective attempt to create an ideal world in which art and poetry would define the human 
condition as a whole than with the material and historical production of a state” (59). One 
might well offer the same assessment of Dada.  Yet Taminiaux’s explanation of the effects of 
Surrealism’s utopian thinking shows how it cleaves itself from the political realm in a way 
that Dada’s own revolt does not. Surrealism’s preoccupation with utopia entails a refusal to 
commit to a place—utopia is no place—as well as an abandonment of the present. Enamored 
of both utopia and revolution, Surrealism pursues a temporally paradoxical project in seeking 
to retrieve a lost paradise and to bring about a new world. While Surrealism’s emphasis on 
memory distinguishes it from Marxism, the two hold in common a high estime for the 
theoretical and the possible over the actual. As Taminiaux explains,“For Breton, the 
fascination for communism and the Marxist view of the world largely stemmed from the 
profound love of elsewhere (ailleurs), an essentially poetic notion that implied the sense of 
the unknown and of what could only be imagined because of its utmost remoteness” (66).308 
But even given this shared abhorrence of the merely here and now, Breton’s sympathy for 
Trotsky, and the commitment of many surrealists to the French Communist Party (PCF), 
Breton asserts Surrealism as an aesthetic undertaking independent of political commitment. 
The great escape artist, Breton guides Surrealism into the human interior of the psyche, to 
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dreams and hallucinations, and to collective phantasmagoria, to relations with the 
nonrational, but only rarely to dynamic relations within collectives. Surrealism’s flight from 
time and place lend it a peculiarly static, mystical quality very different from the dynamic, 
political or “practical religious” character of Dada. 
 To return to Benjamin’s essay for a moment, it is interesting to note the disparate 
spatial and temporal positioning he takes vis-à-vis Surrealism. While the perspective of the 
German “in he valley” provides a fuller, more specific context from which to perceive 
(largely French) Surrealism, Benjamin’s own temporal positioning, in contrast, seems 
affected by the temporal collapse of his object of study. Benjamin’s German considers 
Surrealism from the vantage point of a still moment removed from temporal flow, in terms of 
that last snapshot, the European intelligentsia on its deathbed, and the sphere of images and 
bodies left after “dialectical annihilation.” Benjamin concludes with a stillborn 
transcendence, the replacement of “the play of human features” by “the face of an alarm 
clock that in each minute rings for sixty seconds” (192). It is as though Benjamin has 
translated the stasis of Breton’s mysticism into political dead-time, a nihilistic void peculiarly 
bereft of action. Individual man gives way to what Benjamin calls an interpenetration of 
body and image in technology that looks a lot like the enslavement and devolution of the 
human by industrial time. So while Benjamin writes in a position of belatedness and 
extemporality, I take his endpoint—“the sphere, in a word, in which political materialism and 
physical nature share the inner man… with dialectical justice, so that no limb remains 
unrent” (192)—as temporally contiguous, inseparable from, not outside, historical and actual 
(experienced) time.  This difference matters because it accounts to a large degree for my 
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argument that Benjamin’s pessimism overestimates Breton’s Surrealism (and stasis) at the 
expense of a more optimistic (Dada-esque) understanding of dynamism. 
 
V.  Coda: Surrealism and the Terror 
There is only one thing that can allow us to go out, at least temporarily, from this awful cage in which 
we struggle, and this thing is revolution, any revolution, as bloody as one wants, which I call for today 
with all my strength. Too bad if Dada was not that… If Dada enlisted men who were not ready for 
everything, men who were not of explosive material, I repeat, too bad for it. And one should not expect 
me to be more gentle than necessary towards those among us who have worn, for such a small glory, 
the uniform of volunteers. It would not be bad to re-establish for the mind the laws of the Terror.309 
--André Breton, The Characteristics of Modern Evolution, 1922 
 
 The link this passage establishes between the idea of revolution Breton held at 
Surrealism’s genesis and the historical phenomenon of the Terror crystallizes my argument 
that Surrealism’s impatience for socio-political action precluded it from espousing a coherent 
politics of time. Breton’s untroubled invocation of the law of the Terror expresses a desire for 
fixed randomness universally applied, the antithesis of anarchist retemporalization’s 
imaginary of an open-ended multiplicity.310 
Breton prepared the ground for Surrealism by looking back to the Terror and ahead to 
a revolution yet to come. In this talk on the evolution of modern art at the opening of a 
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 “Il n’y a qu’une chose qui puisse nous permettre de sortir, momentanément au moins, de cette 
affreuse cage dans laquelle nous nous débattons et ce quelque chose c’est la revolution, une revolution 
quelconque, aussi sanglante qu’on voudra , que j’appelle encore aujourd’hui de toutes mes forces. Tant pis si 
Dada n’a pas été cela… Si Dada a enrôlé des homes qui… n’étaient pas prêts à tout, des homes qui n’étaient pas 
de la matière explosive, je le répète, tant pis pour lui. Et qu’on ne s’attende pas à me trouver plus tendre qu’il ne 
faut pour ceux qui ont porté parmi nous, pour une si petite gloire, l’uniforme des volontaires. Il ne serait pas 
mauvais qu’on rétablît pour l’esprit les lois de la Terreur.” Caractères de l’évolution moderne, OC I, 305. My 
translation. All subsequent translations are my own unless otherwise attributed. 
310
 I am not endorsing broader critiques of Surrealism in terms of a notion of terror, such as the absurd 
claim that Surrealism ‘prepared the mind’ for terror, advanced by Jean Clair, or even views of Surrealism as on 
the side of terror rather than rhetoric in French letters (Jean Paulhan and Michel Beaujour). Clair suggests that 
just as Marinetti and the futurists helped pave the way for fascism by enabling people, in Benjamin’s words, to 
experience joy at the contemplation of their own destruction, so Surrealism helped “prepare the mind” for 
September 11th and a collapse of the West and rise of the Orient. See Jean Clair, Du surréalisme dans ses 
rapports au totalitariansime et aux tables tournantes [On Surrealism, In Its Relations with Totalitarianism and 
the Occult] (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2003). 
  
203 
Picabia exhibition in Barcelona, he effected a coup d’état of sorts, declaring Dada dead, 
much to the surprise of the self-declared Dadaists in the audience, who had come to see a 
leading figure of Dada’s Parisian manifestation. These Dadaists encountered instead a 
rallying cry for the movement that would develop into Surrealism. Breton’s case for 
revolution articulates a vision of absolute tyranny: the content of the revolution does not 
matter, so long as it overturns the status quo completely and establishes total dominance. The 
coup d’état character of Breton’s declaration is analogous to the oppositionality of the 
nascent surrealist movement to Dada. Visions of Surrealism as a more evolved Dada obscure 
the radically different political natures of the movements. While Dada’s project of revolt and 
re-creation embraced contradiction, pluralism and inclusion, Surrealism’s insistence on 
revolution valorized unity at the price of the automatic exclusion of many ideas, genres, 
individuals, and whole classes of people. 
 What would it mean to apply, as Breton considered, the laws of the Terror to the 
mind? Historian Carla Hesse distills the character of legislation during the Terror to three 
attributes: (1) total disavowal of the past, of the monarchy and its symbols; (2) “abstraction: 
the defense of abstract… values, rather than the institutional forms, of the emergent 
sovereign”; and (3) a “proliferation of specificity,” the seemingly endless production of laws 
based on individual acts perceived to violate the core abstract values.311  The laws of the 
Terror detemporalize, since changes in abstract values over time are conceptual and hidden 
from view, unlike the more readily visible, concretely embodied changes of monarchs and 
institutions, and easily acquire a timeless character. Perhaps most frighteningly, the laws 
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result not from a process of deduction but from unexplained interpretations of specific acts 
converted into universal proscriptions: “Every individual act of resistance was thus 
generalized into a law.”312  Despotism no longer resides in a monarch or institution; it 
inhabits the law itself. Neither properly deductive or inductive, law formation during the 
Terror obscured processes of exegesis and reasoning, which occurred out of view and 
without justification, allowing a particular act (mysteriously judged a transgression), stripped 
of its context, to be made into an (attenuated) universal proscription imposed on the public. 
Like the call for “revolution, any revolution,” the laws of the Terror provide a vehicle for 
absolutism, however unreasoned. 
 Breton’s well-known loathing of “Latin logic” aside, the most important aspect of the 
project he advocates is not its disdain for rationality but its insulation from critical 
engagement and revision. Just as the Terror legislation’s basis in abstract values protected it 
from having to confront shifting interpretations over time, Breton’s location of Surrealism’s 
meaning in future revolution forestalled critique. The most significant distinction between 
Dada’s theoretical inclusivity and Surrealism’s practices of exclusivity stems from their 
temporal, not specifically aesthetic or political philosophical, differences. As I discussed in 
chapter three, Dada’s temporality favors an extended duration of the present in which to 
engage artists and audiences together in reconsidering the boundaries between art and non-art 
and venturing alternatives to such dichotomies. Surrealism, in contrast, sacrifices the present 
on the altar of future revolution. While Dada’s meaning and action unfold simultaneously as 
ongoing poiesis, Surrealism divides ends from means. Its deferral of meaning postpones 
collective creation until a future moment, after the revolution. Until then, two exclusions 
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predominate: that of artists who fail to adhere aesthetically and ideologically to a surrealist 
vision of revolution, and that of a creative pluralism, since the surrealist version of art and 
politics intertwined favors only those (aesthetic and political) undertakings it perceives at a 
given moment as generating the conditions that will bring about revolution
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